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Abstract: In a simple model of regulation, three different types of 
actor, “ the regulator” , “ the regulated” and “ the protected” are 
positioned in relationship to each other by a legal framework. 
Academic scholarship has mainly focused on the first two types of 
actor, with little  attention paid to “ the protected” . Yet “ the 
protected” are the raison d'etre  of nursing home regulation and “ the 
resident”  is at the centre of many key rules. Without an image of 
“ the resident” , such rules are without meaning. The central question 
for this thesis, then, is how are nursing home residents represented in 
the regulatory system which aims to protect them?
Within this regulatory regime a number of social networks in which 
the category of “ the resident”  has meaning were identified. These 
included elements of the system that are key to the interpretation of 
regulatory rules -  specifically, the practices of nursing home 
inspectors and the appeal system for nursing home owners -  as well 
as the discourses of nursing and health policy. The practices of 
nursing home inspectors were observed, the decisions of the 
Registered Homes Tribunal analysed, and the construction of “ the 
resident” in the discourses of nursing and health policy was 
explored. Taken together, these methods provided a broad 
multiperspectival understanding of influences and constraints on the 
construction of the term “ resident” .
As a group, the residents of nursing homes are elderly people in poor 
health and at the end of their lives. This thesis concludes that there 
are great difficulties in understanding extreme old age either as a 
lived experience or a sociological construct. In nursing home 
regulation, these difficulties are compounded by a framework of 
normative and fiscal policies where the state ensures that the term 
“ resident” remains unstable or ill-defined. Against this background, 
the articulation of any clear moral purpose for nursing home 
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Chapter 1
IMAGES OF "THE PROTECTED” 
IN NURSING HOME REGULATION
That there is something not right around care homes fo r 
the elderly is evident in the language associated with 
them: it's  swampy, terms do not quite f i t  and categories 
start to slip. A home is not a home but neither is it  a 
hospital nor a hotel. What do we call the old people 
who live (and die) there? Are they residents? Patients? 
Inmates? No word altogether suits. And who looks after 
them? Nurses? Not really since very few of them are 
qualified. As Mam herself pointed o u t... uThey are not 
nurses, these. Most o f them are just lasses. ”
Alan Bennett Untold Stories'
INTRODUCTION
One in ten people in England and Wales aged 85 and over live in 
nursing homes2. Of the 180,000 nursing home residents in England in 
2000, three quarters were women, four out of five were over 65, and 
nearly half were over 85 (Department of Health 2000a). The residents 
of nursing homes are in poor health. The Health Survey for England 
2000 classified 91% of residents as having a severe disability. Over 
80% needed help with personal health care, for example, feeding, 
dressing, washing or going to the toilet. They are more likely to be 
underweight than the non-institutionalised population in the same age 
group and around half w ill suffer from anaemia. Other ad hoc surveys 
suggest that between 60% and 86% suffer from cognitive impairment 
or Alzheimer’s disease (MacDonald 2002; Netten et al 1998). At least 
half w ill be incontinent of urine (Durrant and Snape 2003). The
1 Alan Bennett (2005) Untold stories London: Faber and Faber p116.
2 Based on population estimated and Department of Health Community Care 
Statistics 2000 (see n3 below).
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residents of nursing homes are rendered vulnerable both by their 
disabilities and the fact that many are at the very end of their lives.
As an acknowledgement of these vulnerabilities residents have been 
afforded additional legal protection in the form of the regulation of 
nursing homes. This thesis focuses on “ the resident”  and their 
relationship to this particular regulatory framework.
One simple way of understanding regulation would be to view it  as a 
set of targeted rules. In nursing home regulation, the rules are 
targeted at the nursing home industry with the intent to protect 
vulnerable elderly people against unacceptable levels of care, abuse 
and exploitation. Within the legal language of this traditional form of 
“ command and control” regulation, elderly residents are referred to 
as “ the protected” . The primary legislation, the Registered Homes 
Act 1984, makes little  reference to “ the protected” but where it does 
so, they are referred to as “ persons” . For example:
It shall be a condition of the registration....that the 
number of persons kept at any one time in the homes ... 
does not exceed such number as may be specified in the 
certificate of registration.
Registered Homes Act 1984 c29.
In the secondary legislation and guidance “ persons” have become 
“ patients” . For example:
The registered person having regard to the size of the 
home and the number, age, sex and condition of the 
patients therein ... provide adequate professional, 
technical, ancillary and other staff.
Nursing home regulations 12(1) (Statutory Instrument 
1984/1578).
Thus “ patients” are the point of reference for regulatory rules key in 
providing care. Without a robust construct of “ the patient”  and an 
evaluation of “ adequate” , such rules are without meaning. The term 
“ patient” is one possible way of constructing “ the protected” . A 
slightly different description can be found in the first paragraph of 
this chapter. In this paragraph people who live in nursing homes are 
singled out from the general population by their age and health status
and epidemiological categories are used to describe them as a group. 
This thesis focuses on how the meaning of regulatory rules in nursing 
home regulation is drawn out from different representations of “ the 
protected”  in the various discourses of law, health and social care 
policies.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NURSING HOME REGULATION
For most of the twentieth century, nursing home regulation was based 
on broad rules accompanied by a highly discretionary enforcement 
system. The regulation of nursing homes began with the Nursing 
Homes (Registration) Act 1927. The impetus for legislation was both 
protection of the public and protection of the reputation of a new 
nursing profession, where registration had begun eight years 
previously with the Nursing Registration Act 1919. At that time, 
nursing homes were to provide a space for the new profession to 
practise without competition from unskilled or unqualified nurses and 
without the interference of doctors. Since 1927, the basis of 
regulation has been legally enforceable rules which turn on the vague 
words “ f i t ” , “ adequate” and “ suitable” , used in conjunction with a 
registration or licensing system. The framework remained unchanged 
but the legislation was consolidated in the Registered Homes Act 
1984, to take into account the organisational and administrative 
changes occurring in the intervening sixty years. As this Act was in 
force at the time of the fieldwork, the legislative framework referred 
to in this thesis is the 1984 Act3.
The Registered Homes Act 1984 defined two distinct legal categories 
of homes: “ residential homes” , registered and regulated under Part 1 
of the Act, and “ nursing homes” regulated under Part 2. In c21 (1) of 
the Act a nursing home was defined as:
3 The basic framework changed fundamentally in 2002, when the Care Standards Act 
2000 came into force. The changes brought about by the 2000 Act will not be 
considered in the thesis.
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... any premises used, or intended to be used, for the 
reception of, and the provision of nursing for, persons 
suffering from any sickness, injury or infirmity....
The requirements for a nursing home differed from those for a 
residential home. In particular, a nursing home must be in the charge 
of a qualified nurse or medical practitioner at all times. Significantly, 
there were no requirements for nursing homes to employ doctors or 
other members of a multidisciplinary health care team. That is to 
say, it  was not intended that nursing homes should provide health 
care in general but were strictly for the provision of nursing. The Act 
also made a distinction between general nursing homes and mental 
nursing homes for the mentally ill, with different requirements for the 
latter. This thesis focuses on the former - general nursing homes. In 
2000, more than four out of five beds were in the general nursing 
category (Department of Health 2002a) and this type of home is 
occupied mainly by frail elderly people4.
Over a period of years, the Act was embellished with regulations and 
some guidance. Some of the rules were specific - for example:
The person registered shall provide for the home to be 
connected to a public telephone service.
Nursing home regulations 12(2a) Statutory Instrument 
1984/1578.
But the key rules relating to the care of persons in homes, in both the 
regulations and the guidance, remained broadly framed and referred 
to “ the protected” as “ patients” . For example:
The person registered shall keep a case record in the 
home in respect of each patient which shall include ... an 
adequate daily statement of the patient’s health and 
condition.
Nursing home regulations 7(4) Statutory Instrument 
1984/1578.
4 In 1999-2000, the most recent year for which figures are available, 89% of beds in 
general nursing homes are occupied by people aged 65 and over, 46% of the beds are 
occupied by people aged 85 and over. DH Community care statistics 2000 Bulletin
2001 n
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The legal intent explored further in Chapter 3 was that "adequate” 
and “ suitable” should be interpreted with reference to the nursing 
needs of frail elderly people. Thus the measures required to protect 
residents were legally framed in terms of nursing and nursing work.
With the steady growth in regulation in the latter part of the 
twentieth century, there was a requirement for nursing homes to 
comply with a web of other legislation. This web of legal rules 
included occupational health and safety laws, employment legislation, 
infection control rules, immigration laws, fire regulations and 
consumer protection acts. Some of this legislation, for example, the 
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, provided an important 
additional tool for nurse inspectors. For instance, nurse inspectors 
might use the provisions of health and safety legislation to insist that 
equipment was regularly serviced and safe. The involvement of police 
and the prosecution of individuals for assault of vulnerable adults also 
became an important option. But as nursing homes were heavily 
bound up with nursing, the other regulations with most significance 
remained those requirements which pertain to the professional 
registration of nurses.
Until 2002, the enforcement of the Registered Homes Act 1984 was 
the responsibility of more than one hundred separate Health 
Authorities in England and Wales. Health Authorities usually employed 
nurses as inspectors to carry out their regulatory functions, but little  
was known about these nurses or their activities. Little guidance on 
how the rules should be interpreted was provided by the Department 
of Health. The only guidance of significance that was issued for 
nursing homes -  Registration and Inspection of Nursing Homes: A 
handbook fo r Health Authorities (National Association of Health 
Authorities in England and Wales 1985) -  noted that inspectors should 
ensure the provision and maintenance of “ adequate”  standards of 
care and accommodation “ comparable to good standards in NHS 
establishments” .
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Prosecutions under the 1984 Act were few: five in the two years 1998- 
2000 (Department of Health 2000b) for some 5,800 nursing homes5. 
Therefore courts played little  role in fixing the meaning of the legal 
rules. The regulators — Health Authorities -  and their field 
enforcement officers -  nursing home inspectors -  had considerable 
administrative powers and considerable discretion in their use. The 
most significant sanction was refusal to register or removal of 
registration, which would result in closure of a home, as carrying on 
the activity without registration was unlawful. Where the legislation 
made provision for Health Authorities to apply such sanctions or to 
make rules in relation to numbers of residents or staffing, the owners 
could appeal against a Health Authority’s decision to the Registered 
Homes Tribunal. This independent Tribunal operated under the 
auspices of the Council on Tribunals, with a legal chair and 
membership drawn from health care professionals. It was thus able to 
adjudicate, and to interpret the rules and the Health Authority’s 
actions in relation to both a health care and a legal discourse. As I 
shall discuss in Chapter 6, the Tribunal was one of the few systems for 
potentially providing cohesion for interpretation of particular key 
rules (Day, Klein and Redmayne 1996). But not all rules were subject 
to appeal. So, in the absence of clear guidance, Health Authorities 
or, more specifically, nursing home inspectors -  themselves nurses -  
were left with the task of translating broad rules into practices 
capable of ensuring care for frail elderly people. Clearly, at the 
outset in 1984, there was some ambiguity about how “ the protected” 
should be framed, with inconsistency between the primary and 
secondary legislation. The intention in the latter was that the broad 
rules referring to care should be interpreted using the NHS as 
standard, with “ the protected” viewed as the patients of professional 
nurses. But as I w ill describe in later chapters, over the lifetime of 
the Registered Homes Act, changes in health policy and the structure
5 Figures from Laing and Buisson (2001); the figures include dual-registered homes, 
that is homes registered under Part 1 of the Act as residential homes and under Part 
2 as nursing homes.
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of the market made this framing of rules untenable. First, I consider 
how “ the protected” can be conceptualised within regulation.
“THE PROTECTED” IN THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Galligan (1986a p129) suggests that legal authority can be understood 
in two ways: either through a descriptive account of roles and 
functions of the institutions involved in the exercise of state powers, 
or normatively as a system of rules. Thus regulation may be described 
either in terms of regulatory agencies, tribunals and officials who 
have legal powers within a particular regulatory framework, or as 
“ sustained oversight by reference to rules” (Scott 2003 p xi). How can 
“ the protected” be conceptualised using these two views of nursing 
home regulation? When regulation is considered in terms of legal 
institutions, “ the protected” may be conceived of as agents or active 
subjects interacting with those institutions. Where regulation is 
conceived normatively then “ the protected” are a construct within 
that normative framework.
“The protected” as agents in legal institutions of nursing home 
regulation
Ayres and Braithwaite’s work published in 1992, Responsive 
Regulation, suggested that “ the protected” should be involved in all 
aspects of regulation. Constituted as political actors, public interest 
groups could balance the power of firms and thus provide a means of 
avoiding regulatory capture. Thus the protected should be granted 
procedural rights to be involved at all stages of regulation — rule 
formation, negotiations about compliance, and enforcement. 
Braithwaite and colleagues (1993) suggested that in the nursing home 
context involvement of the users would require residents to be 
involved in discussions about compliance, have rights of access to all 
information available to the regulator and have the same standing to 
sue or prosecute under statutes as the regulator (Kerrison and Pollock
2001). In the US, user involvement in nursing home regulation has 
taken the form of provision of web-based information about nursing 
homes and their regulatory deficiencies (Harrington C, et al 2003ab). 
Although "rights”  for legal subjects as service users are increasingly 
construed by UK and European law as participatory and transformative 
(Clements and Young 1999), such procedural rights within regulation 
are nevertheless controversial. Advocates of public involvement such 
as Graham (1998, 2000) consider that it  is now essential for political 
reasons. The shift from public to private providers in the provision of 
public services, including care of the elderly, has raised major issues 
for public lawyers about the accountability of such services.
Regulation now comes to be seen as "government in miniature” , 
opening up the issue of the arrangements for public participation 
(Prosser 1997). But sceptics cite the US experience, where there is 
evidence that procedural rights for "the protected” encourage 
legalism (Kagan 1994). That is to say, regulatory officials ignore the 
“ spirit”  of the law and enforce the “ le tter” of the law.
In the UK in general, "the protected” have been increasingly 
empowered through regulatory designs and other legal mechanisms 
which provide them with enhanced individual rights. First, wide- 
ranging legislation framed to provide enhanced individual rights has 
been enacted, such as the Human Rights Act 1998, the Data Protection 
Act 1998 and consumer protection laws. Some regulators involved in 
these areas, such as the Office Fair of Trading (1998, 2005), the 
Financial Services Authority (2000) and the Food Standards Agency 
(2001), also have specific policies directed towards consumers, 
including policies which pay special attention to vulnerable 
consumers. For example, the Office of Fair Trading has now 
undertaken two inquiries into consumer rights in the nursing homes 
industry: one in relation to complaints (Office of Fair Trading 1998) 
and the other as a result of a “ super complaint”  into unfair contracts 
(Office of Fair Trading 2005).
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The agency of “ the protected” is also promoted by both involvement 
in negotiations about interpretation of rules and dispute resolution. 
For example, McHarg(1999) reports that utilities regulators, such as 
the Office for Electricity Regulation, encouraged the involvement of 
the protected in dispute resolution processes. Unlike the Registered 
Homes Tribunal described in Chapter 6, where a dispute raises 
matters of general concern, “ the protected” may be involved so that 
the dispute can be re-cast as a means of overt policy development 
rather than resolved as a bipolar issue. Such an approach is 
compatible with human rights principles which argue for interventions 
for all parties who have an interest (Justice 1996).
Yet residents are given little  voice in nursing homes regulation and 
they have no procedural rights in the regulatory system whose aim is 
to protect them (Kerrison and Pollock 2001a). This is in contrast to 
other regulatory legislation -  for example, the Health and Safety at 
Work etc Act 1984 -  where tripartite consultations which involve the 
protected or employees is built into the framework (Hutter 1997). 
Even though consultation is part of the framework, Hutter(1997 p172) 
found that the willingness of inspectors to contact employees varied 
considerably. Similarly, despite policy initiatives which encouraged 
enforcement officers to listen to residents, the Social Services 
Inspectorate (Department of Health 2000c) found little  involvement 
with residents on inspection visits6. Moreover, residents had no legal 
rights to speak in regulatory conversations. In other words, nursing 
home regulation under the 1984 Act was a very traditional model in 
which residents were construed as “ the protected” with no agency 
and no formal mechanisms through which their voice could be used as 
an interpretive force. Indeed, it  was not until 1998 that the reports 
of nursing home inspections became public documents (NHSE 1998). 
Prior to that date they were confidential reports to the Health 
Authority, unavailable to the public or the residents. Regulation was,
6 17% of time on inspection visits was spent in consulting residents. 20% of residents 
surveyed said they had seen a copy of the inspection report (DH 2000).
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quite literally, a private conversation between Health Authorities, 
acting on behalf of the state, and the nursing homes — the regulatees. 
But notions of “ the protected” , based on agency where the individual 
is constructed as an economic, political or legal actor whose power 
can be enhanced through procedural or other legal rights, sit uneasily 
with characteristics of nursing home residents who are likely to be 
physically and cognitively impaired.
“The protected” in the normative version of nursing home 
regulation
When regulation is viewed as a system of norms, then there is debate 
over the relative importance of different types of norms. Some 
scholars regard legal rules as central (eg Black 1995), while others 
place more emphasis on social or organisational norms (Hutter 1997; 
Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2004).
In the version of regulation where legal rules are considered central, 
the framing of rules (Baldwin 1995; Black 1997) and the relationship 
between rules, compliance and system design (Black 1995; Black 
1999a) are all topics for scholarship. As described in the opening 
section, rules may be framed broadly and where this occurs they may 
be referred to “ standards” . Alternatively, rules may be specific or 
detailed. Black (1999a p95) suggests detailed rules are seen to 
provide certainty, predictability, consistency and a benchmark against 
which to assess the regulator’s performance. Regulators associate 
specific rules with greater control. Such rules are thought useful in 
circumstances where the behaviour of the regulated needs to be 
specified in order to get them to act in the required way. When 
associated with appropriate sanctions, specific rules are thought to 
aid enforcement as they are easier to prosecute. Kagan (1994) and 
Hutter (1997) note that specific rules can lead to more stringent 
enforcement, particularly when accompanied by complaints and 
public pressure.
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Broad rules are favoured by rule makers for a number of reasons.
First, to enable the judge to determine the “ true” character of the 
individual (Schneider 1992) -  for example, in Tribunal decisions 
described in Chapter 6, whether the person registered is “ f i t ” , where 
“ f i t ”  is ill defined. Second, the circumstances in which a rule must be 
applied will be so complex that no effective rule can be written. 
Discretion inherent in broad rules allows the decision- maker to deal 
with that complexity (Jowell 1993; Galligan 1986; Schneider 1992; 
Black 1995). Third, the rule maker concludes that better rules would 
be made if the decision-makers were allowed to develop rules for 
themselves as they go along (Schneider 1992). Fourth, because 
members of government bodies responsible for instructing the 
decision-maker cannot agree on rules and deliberately pass 
responsibility to the decision-maker (Galligan 1986; Schneider 1992).
In the context of UK nursing home regulation, broad rules clearly have 
had their advantages. “ Suitable” and “ adequate” have little  intrinsic 
meaning. Elastic and malleable, they can be freely adapted to the 
exigencies of different circumstances and more importantly to the 
complexity of care required for different types of patients. Examples 
of how “ adequate” has been interpreted to f it  different circumstances 
can be found in the decisions of the Registered Homes Tribunal 
described in Chapter 6. For nursing home regulation, these 
circumstances include the type of building and the type of patient. As 
“ adequate” has a temporal dimension, the term can accommodate 
change -  specifically, changing expectations and professional 
practices and a changing policy environment, described in Chapter 3. 
“Adequate” has a potential to allow standards of care to be driven up 
over time to meet contemporary expectations. In addition, the 
changing role of nursing homes within the health care economy can 
also be accommodated. The flexibility of the term, interpreted in 
relation to the type of patient, allows for the change in use of nursing 
homes. This has enabled the regulatory framework to adapt to a 
sector catering for an increasingly dependent type of patient as the
NHS has withdrawn from the care of the frail elderly. Similarly, the 
term also allows the economics of the industry and in particular 
policies in relation to the level of public funding to be taken into 
account. In other words "adequate” can be interpreted in terms of 
what can be expected from the level of funding in a publicly funded 
service.
Yet both types of rules are considered to have their drawbacks. 
Detailed rules can create loopholes, lead to rigidity and inappropriate 
or arbitrary treatment. They can result in a system in which the 
letter of the law trumps its social ends (Black 1999b). Empirical 
evidence from the Australian nursing home sector suggests that the 
numerous precise rules of US nursing home regulation (Braithwaite 
and Braithwaite 1995) appear less reliable than small numbers of 
broad standards. But broad standards can also be vague and 
uncertain, lead to inconsistent and unpredictable treatment, and 
permit inadequate compliance (Black 1999b). Broad rules are 
unsuitable for some circumstances and to work effectively require 
specific conditions. Negotiation and mutual education presume a 
particular type of regulatee, one who is well intentioned and would 
benefit from education. Where the regulatee does not have good 
intentions, broad rules provide an opportunity for arguments with 
enforcement officials. A shared understanding between regulator and 
regulated about interpretation is required to give the rule some 
certainty and predictability (Black 1995). To work well, such rules 
therefore need a closed interpretive system where all regulatory 
actors -  rule maker, regulator and regulatee -  share a common 
understanding of the meaning of the rule (Jowell 1973; Black 1995). 
Courts can cut across such interpretation; broad rules, therefore, 
work best when they are associated with administrative rather than 
legal sanctions. Moreover, in such a closed situation there is no place 
for the involvement of other interests, in particular those of “ the 
protected” . In this situation, both the regulated and “ the protected” 
may develop considerable distrust in the regulator. The framework
for nursing home regulation under the 1984 Act conforms to some of 
these requirements, in that many broad rules are accompanied by 
administrative sanctions. But the key question to be explored in this 
thesis is the extent to which there is a consensus in the interpretive 
community of nursing home regulation about the meaning of such 
rules.
As Galligan (1986b) notes, irrespective of whether rules are broad or 
specific, regulatory officials are never passive appliers of any rules but 
must give them meaning. Discretion is considered to be inherent in 
the application of all rules because of “ the vagaries of language, the 
diversity of circumstance, and the indeterminacy of official purposes” 
(Galligan 1986b p1). But he goes on to argue that:
... these characteristics of rules do not exhaust the 
notion of discretion for they do not accommodate its 
stronger more central sense as an express grant of power 
conferred on officials where determination of the 
standards according to which power is to be exercised is 
left largely to them.
Galligan 1986b p1.
Therefore, for Galligan, discretion is seen as one of the central 
concerns of regulation and of law in general, irrespective of legal 
rules or their structure. This recasts the problem in terms of legal 
decision making where legal actors are viewed as being guided and 
constrained by rules which are not legal, but social and organisational 
in character (Hawkins 1984; Manning 1992; Hutter 1997; Hutter 1999; 
Hawkins 2002). Drawing on the empirical research which explores this 
view (eg Hawkins 1984; Hutter 1998, 1997; Lange 1999), Hawkins 
argues (2002 pviii) that law is not a formal set of rules “ but constantly 
shifting, negotiated, emergent matter, a system of meaning, 
constantly evolving and constantly dependent on social context” .
Thus in this version of regulation legal rules play an ill-defined and 
variable role in their interactions between regulators and firms to the 
point that the centrality and authority of formal law may be called 
into question (Gunningham and Johnstone 1999).
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Discretion is viewed as constrained by non-legal factors — time, 
resources, professional norms and political pressures on the decision 
makers (Jowell 1973; Hawkins 1994, 2002). Alternatively, rather than 
a system of constraint, discretion may be viewed as the process of 
deciding among different courses of action for good reason. Galligan 
(1986 p113) suggests that the factors influencing discretionary 
decisions are
• nature of the task including effective and efficient ways 
for its execution
• political and social environment which provide guidance 
and direction in the exercise of powers
moral background which includes community views as 
well as those of the deciding officials
• economic considerations including those of the agency
• organisational structure
In subsequent chapters, I consider how factors such as economic 
considerations, the social and political environment and moral 
background all shape the construction of "the protected” and hence 
the interpretation of rules in nursing home regulation.
Conceptualising compliance
For analytic purposes legal institutions and norms have been 
considered separately. But when it comes to considering the 
application of rules or enforcement then the two interact. In the 
version of regulation which emphasises the centrality of legal rules, 
three different types of actors, “ the regulators” , "the regulated” and 
“ the protected” are positioned in relationship to each other by a legal 
framework. Legal rules structure this relationship, provide authority 
and are central to communications between the three parties. 
Regulators ensure that the regulated comply with the rules, either by 
persuasion or under threat of sanction. Compliance with rules is seen 
as the key to the system, fulfilling its purpose where the purpose is
18
the public interest objective of protecting individuals, populations or 
the environment (Ogus 1994; Baldwin, Hood and Scott 1998).
In some countries, notably the US, and in some industries, specific 
rules still predominate. The violation of such specific rules is easy to 
record and enforcement is construed as compliance with rules. The 
large datasets thus generated by the regulatory agencies invite a 
particular type of analysis. For example, there is considerable work 
on the US nursing home industry which attempts to relate non- 
compliance with structural factors such as resources or ownership (eg 
Harrington and Carrillo 1999; Harrington et al 2000, 2004). In the UK, 
where enforcement action is less common, compliance, perhaps of 
necessity, has been conceptualised differently. All rules -  broad or 
specific -  are seen as discursive resources providing a source of 
influence for interpretations and a resource to be used in persuasion 
or negotiation or as a defence (Hawkins 1992). For Hawkins (1984), 
enforcement officials will use their discretion to bend or interpret the 
rules to f it  their own broad vision of good regulation. Thus the role of 
inspectors has been reconceptualised from identifying rule violation to 
identifying problems and minimising risks (Hutter 2001). Rather than 
conformity to rules, the aims of regulation are more easily articulated 
in terms of the achievement of socially desirable goals (Hutter 2001; 
Hawkins 2002). How do the actions of inspectors persuade regulatees 
to comply, where compliance is seen in terms of the wider social ends 
of the regulation? The exploration of this question has led to 
increasing awareness that inspectors and regulatory agencies are 
subject to large numbers of contextual influences which determine 
both their interpretation and willingness to enforce rules7.
A focus on compliance or enforcement puts the spotlight on the work 
of inspectors and the regulatory agencies. However, attention has
7 Hawkins (2002), in his book Law as Last Resort has explored these influences in 
relation to prosecution under the Health Safety at Work Act etc 1974 while Kagan 
(1994) reviewed a large number of empirical studies for evidence of the influence of 
organisation and political context on regulatory enforcement.
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recently shifted to a second type of regulatory actor - “ the regulated” 
(Hutter 2001; Gunningham, Thornton and Kagan 2005, Thornton, 
Gunningham and Kagan 2005). How do firms understand and respond 
to regulation? How might they be persuaded by argument, incentives 
or public pressure to comply? How can regulatory frameworks be re­
engineered to increase their effectiveness? Enforced self-regulation 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), meta-regulation (Coglianese and Lazer 
2002; Scott 2003) and smart regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky 
2004) have all been promoted as attempts to redesign regulation in a 
way which encourages firms to redirect their activities towards 
regulatory goals. The attitudes and actions of the public also appear 
high on the horizon when firms are considering their response to 
regulation (Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2004). But the third 
type of regulatory actor, “ the protected”  -  the focus of this thesis — 
has been merged with the general political context for regulation 
receiving far less focused attention.
Although residents do not have an active role as agents within the 
institutions of nursing home regulation, the protection of residents 
nevertheless provides one of its major social justifications. It is the 
social purpose or raison d ’etre of such regulation. This is reflected in 
the literature on nursing homes and nursing home regulation, which is 
marked by a strong concern with what is referred to as “ the 
resident” . There are concerns about how the life in general in nursing 
homes can be improved (eg Weiner and Kayser-Jones 1990; Kerrison 
and Pollock 2001 ab; Braithwaite 2001) and with the design of nursing 
home regulation to meet such ends (Braithwaite 1993). This purpose 
carries through into the regulatory rules where “ patients”  are the 
point of reference for many such rules. With such broad rules it  might 
be expected that inspectors had limitless discretion to persuade, if  
not mould, the behaviour of nursing homes to meet the needs of 
patients.
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In the early days of the fieldwork in a large nursing home with a high 
proportion of fee-paying residents, I recorded the following incident:
We were shown around a newly built wing ... The rooms 
all had en suite bathrooms .. seldom used said the home 
manager.... because the showers had lips and the 
equipment required to get very dependent people in and 
out would not f it  in the en suite bathroom. “ We call 
them ‘the relative's bathrooms’ ... because i t ’s what the 
relatives want to see,” said the manager.
Field notes June 6th 2001.
The Health Authority inspectors must have approved the plans for 
those bathrooms and registered such bathrooms as f it  for use, 
although clearly very unsuitable. Had there been a centralised 
regulatory agency, then all this might have been explained by the 
agency being out of touch with the field. But as described in Chapter 
3, there was little  by way of central guidance and inspectors were le ft 
to decide their own standards. Why did qualified and skilled nurses 
acting as inspectors agree standards and employ inspection methods 
which were so inappropriate to the condition of patients they saw on 
inspections visits? In these circumstances, it  was difficult to 
understand what the requirements for the home to provide services 
“ suitable” to the “ condition” of “ patients”  meant in practice. As 
Hawkins (2002 p431) notes, the conventional notion of discretion as 
the freedom to choose between a range of legally permissible options 
is often routinely constrained in practice by legal decision makers into 
a narrow range of options. So, what constrained and ordered the 
inspectors’ discretion?
The rules of nursing home regulation beg questions. Fit for what? 
Suitable for whom? Adequate for what purpose? Such words point to 
the need to imagine or invoke the image of the raison d'etre  of such 
regulation, the overarching moral or policy point of reference, namely 
“ the protected” . How is the point of reference for this construct 
determined? The initial rationale for regulation of nursing homes 
conceived “ the protected” against a background of professional
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nursing. In the 1984 Act, the primary legislation was concerned only 
with the neutral term of “ persons” , while in the regulations and 
guidance “ the protected” were construed as “ patients” and suggested 
standards were those of the NHS. To what extent do the legally 
sanctioned meanings of the regulation and guidance remain viable 
given changes in the health care system? Where else might one look 
for options for sanctioning to give meaning to the construct?
In the following sections of this chapter, I draw on other constructs of 
“ the protected” in the wider legal and social discourses. In doing so, I 
move from using the term “ protected” , which is a specific legal term 
within regulation, and from the term “ patient” , which is specifically 
associated with health care systems, and use the more general term 
“ resident” .
WAYS OF CONSTRUCTING THE RESIDENT
The social constructionist approach
This thesis has taken a social constructionist approach to 
understanding “ the resident” . For Jorgensen and Phillips (2002 p5), 
social constructionism starts from the perspective that knowledge of 
the world should not be treated as objective truth, as the ways we 
understand and represent the world are historically and culturally 
contingent. Reality is only accessible to us through categories which 
are created and maintained by social processes. Within a particular 
world view, some forms of action become natural, others unthinkable. 
Thus different social understandings of the world lead to different 
social actions, and therefore the social construction of knowledge and 
truth has social consequences (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p5). As 
Wodak and Meyer (2001 p21) note, social actors do not exclusively 
make use of their individual experience and strategies; they mainly 
rely on collective frames of perception. Noting that this is not a new
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idea but one with a long sociological tradition, Wodak and Meyer refer 
to these as social representations. These socially shared perceptions 
form the link between social systems and individual cognitive systems 
and perform the translation, homogenisation and co-ordination 
between external requirements and subjective experience. Or to put 
it  another way, in a tradition stretching back to Goffman which has 
been used frequently in regulatory and organisational research 
(Hawkins 1984; Manning 1992; Dingwall and Strong 1997), “ images” or 
social representations are seen as providing a set of framing 
assumptions that guide how rules are interpreted or decisions are 
made within nursing home regulation. In terms of discourse analysis 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p145), “ the resident”  is a “ myth” - an 
object imagined to make actions in nursing home regulation 
meaningful. By representing “ the resident”  in one particular way 
rather than another, certain types of actions are relevant and others 
are unthinkable.
But as this thesis w ill elaborate, the meaning of the term “ resident” is 
not fixed within any particular discourse. In the quote at the start of 
this chapter, Alan Bennett illustrates this eloquently by noting that 
the terms referring to people who live in nursing homes are 
“ swampy” . ‘Are they residents, inmates or patients?’ , he asks. 
Different actors will attempt to f ill the term with meaning, struggling 
to make their own understanding the prevailing one. In doing so, 
different ways of organising the world are promoted with different 
social consequences.
The various meanings of the term “ resident” are drawn from the 
context in which nursing homes operate, but before moving on to 
discuss this, one final point. Subjects come to understand themselves 
and act reflexively through the meanings attached to terms used to 
describe them. In doing so, they are promoting different ways of 
organising their world and social change. But the ability of nursing 
home residents to act reflexively is highly circumscribed by their
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mental and physical frailty. That is to say the capacity of residents to 
be agents of any form of change is very limited.
The context of nursing home regulation contains a number of separate 
discourses which draw upon each other. Some are legal, others arise 
from health policy or nursing, but as these discourses draw on more 
fundamental cultural ideas about the person, this is where I will 
begin.
The resident as a legal person
Naffine (2003) argues that despite deep divisions in legal thinking 
about the nature of law's ‘person', three different types of legal 
persons can be identified. 1. The pure, legal artifice - a formal 
capacity to bear rights and so to participate in legal relations -  a 
state which applies not just to humans but also to animals. 2. The 
biological and metaphysical human from birth to death. 3. The 
responsible subject with agency and intent. The second definition 
includes people who lack cognition or capacity, as is the case with 
many nursing home residents, while the third has no place for such 
persons. The third type of legal person reflects the key 
characteristics of the self in Western culture (eg Rose 1996 p3) as:
...coherent, bounded, individualised, intentional, the 
locus of thought, action and belief, the origin of its own 
actions, the beneficiary of a unique biography.
This is on the ascendancy in regulatory law in general, but emphasis 
on this image creates an uneasy relationship between law and health 
care, as many seeking help, for example very frail elderly people, do 
not f it this image (Douzinas and McVeigh 1992).
The increased emphasis on rights-based notions of the subject (Sarat 
and Kearns 1997) has led to the institutionalisation of the third type of 
person, the responsible subject. For example, Oliver (1997 p154) 
explains that there are now increased requirements in law to listen to 
subjects:
24
... the law now imposes, through statute and case law, 
duties on the stronger party to consult the weaker party 
and listen to their views, and duties of reasonableness, 
so that the less powerful party is not arbitrarily deprived 
of the social status and security derived from the 
relationship and, at the same time, can retain their 
dignity, autonomy and respect within the relationship... 
i t  is now a matter of responsibility for the state to take 
the interests of individuals into account when making 
decisions, where once decisions were a matter of right 
deriving from sovereignty and authority.
Such notions underpin the current vogue enhancing the agency of “ the 
protected” in regulation referred to above. But in legal terms, most 
residents lack competence, and others must act as proxies, assuming 
or imputing their w ill and wishes. A further problem with this image is 
its individualised nature. Individuals are members of social groups, in 
particular families. Ethnographies of nursing homes emphasise the 
role of relatives, in particular daughters or daughters-in-law (Foner 
1995; Dupuis and Norris 2001; Krause et al 1999). But the law has 
difficulty in accommodating groups. Relatives had no formal role in 
the regulatory framework, although they may have acted as legal 
proxies. Thus the key characteristics which mark out residents as 
needing legal protection, make their engagement with law far from 
straightforward.
Conceptualising people in extreme old age
Hazan (1994) notes that old people are segregated and without a clear 
economic or social role and yet they are the subject of considerable 
“ at a distance” theorising, investigation and measurement by a whole 
range of social science disciplines. The discourses of gerontological 
disciplines combine a vocabulary of moral order with that of material 
need, constructing a picture of the old people as a “ mass of need 
bound together by the stigma of age” (Hazan 1994 p21). But while old 
people as a social group can be meaningfully described by reference 
to other social groups, the same is not true of the individual who is a 
member of that group. For Estes and Linkin (2000), exploration of the
cultural and social meaning of old age as a lived experience is a 
neglected area. In extreme age, cultural representations of the 
person reach the lim it of meaningfulness. Woodward (1991 p193- 
194), quoted by Featherstone and Hepworth (1998), argues that as 
death is approached the tension between the social construction of 
the body, the self as a representation and the lived experience of the 
body, the materiality of the body is sharply encountered. The body 
becomes the “ bottom line” and the natural triumphs over both the 
self and the social.
Yet the conceptualisation of the body as a material entity is a 
complex and contested area in social theory. Turner (1995) notes that 
there has been little  serious attempt by sociologists to understand, 
comparatively and historically, the interaction between various forms 
of human embodiment, the physiological process of aging, and the 
sociocultural definitions of aging. The conceptualisation of extreme 
old age is thus very difficult. On the one hand, Williams and 
Bendelow (1998) argue, there is the tendency in much social theory to 
prioritise the social over the material. At the same time, in extreme 
old age, bodily decay compromises the ability to maintain a coherent 
self which can reflect and report on the experience. Drawing from an 
ethnographic study of dying in a hospice, Lawton (2000), suggests that 
certain physical capacities are required to maintain selfhood. These 
are described as a bounded, physically sealed body and ability to act 
as agent of one’s embodied actions and intentions. A high degree of 
dependency, incontinence or inability to move, which often occurs at 
the end of life, radically compromises a person’s capacity for 
maintaining a sense of themselves as a coherent entity. That is to 
say, an intact, functioning body is the essence of self. Similarly,
Leder (1990) argues that the body is largely “ absent”  until it  becomes 
dysfunctional, when it removes us from activities, alienates us from 
the social world and forces us into its limited sphere (Leder 1990 p84). 
It would thus seem that there are great difficulties in understanding 
extreme old age either as a lived experience or as a sociological
construct. Therefore it  is not surprising that, in absence of other 
coherent ideas, the cultural notion of the self as autonomous and 
independent dominates in discourses of health/illness/disease, 
including those relating to nursing. However, the nursing discourse is 
not unitary and other important strands to theorising about self, such 
as the role of emotions and the body, now appear with increasing 
prominence.
Extreme old age in health/illness/disease and health care
One of the functions of the discourses on health/disease/illness might 
be seen as giving meaning to people who because of bodily or mental 
incapacity do not f it  the contemporary cultural ideal of self.
Similarly, one of the primary purposes of health care might be thought 
of as providing help to individuals whose capacity for thought and 
action are compromised. Yet the basic image of the self which 
predominates in health/disease/illness discourses, sits uneasily with 
health care, as it  marginalises or excludes those with differing 
capacities. Therefore, theorising which attempts to incorporate other 
attributes of self, in particular the body (Lawton 2000; Williams S and 
Bendelow G 1998) and emotions (Williams SJ 2000) is an important 
part of health/illness/disease discourses.
But for much of the twentieth century, being and becoming old have 
not been the subject of expert medical discourse. Old age was 
associated with natural processes and with needs which were 
undifferentiated and uncategorised by medicine (Herkovits 1999).
Thus the problems of old age were of little  interest to medicine as 
they were not amenable to therapeutic intervention. In the face of 
extreme old age medical technology is fairly powerless. As the 
medicine of old age is unable to ameliorate the effects of natural 
bodily declines, it  tends to have more of a social function, with status 
of the discipline and modes of operation linked to social or health 
policies on aging. Grimley Evans (1997), a professor of clinical
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geratology8, notes in his brief history of the discipline that it  was slow 
to develop, with the first chair in geriatric medicine not established in 
the UK until 1965. In some other countries, such as Japan, Italy and 
France, the specialism of medicine focusing on old age is still not 
recognised as a separate discipline. As will be described in Chapter 7, 
the place of medicine of old age within medicine has more to do with 
the organisation of the health care system than with a specific 
knowledge base.
Until the mid-1980s, the nursing home industry was marginal to the 
provision of care to the frail elderly, as care for this group had been 
provided by public sector organisations. From 1980 onwards, a 
strategic decision was taken that the NHS should no longer be the 
provider of long-term care (Klein 1995ab) and the nursing home sector 
was to be expanded. In 1970 there were around 20,000 places (Laing 
and Buisson 2001) in nursing homes. By 2000 there were 180,000, 
around half of the health care beds in the UK9. However, while 
services were to remain publicly funded, the trend was towards a 
mixed economy of providers (Kerrison and Pollock 2001a).
In line with the view of old age as "natural decline” with undefined 
needs, the Registered Homes Act 1984 placed no requirements on the 
expanded sector for the services of health care professionals other 
than nurses. The resident’s need for these services, including those of 
doctors, were to be met by the NHS on an exceptional basis. This 
view of a nursing home fitted well with the politics of nursing at that 
time, as nursing homes were promoted in the NHS as locations where 
nurses could develop their own nursing models for care, practise their 
profession without interference or oversight from doctors or 
competition from other professions (Pearson 1988). Clearly, as well as
8 In the same article, Grimley Evans notes that gerontology is the study of old men. 
Geratology is a gender neutral term.
9 In 1999 there 179,000 NHS beds available in England in 1999. Data from “Bed 
Availability and Occupancy in England" Department of Health published annually. In 
the same year there were 202,000 beds in private or independent hospitals or
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being popular with the nursing profession, this form of home had 
distinct economic advantages as it avoided a medical construction of 
the "elderly person” with the potential requirements for expensive 
interventions. This perpetuated the historic situation where nursing 
homes were closely associated with the nursing profession and other 
forms of care were excluded from the scope of the regulatory 
framework. Therefore the strategy was to transfer care from large 
long-stay hospitals to a mixed economy of providers of 
undifferentiated nursing care in a residential setting (Kerrison and 
Pollock 2001a).
The image of undifferentiated needs to be met mainly by nurses has 
created other problems. First, the exclusion of doctors from the 
regulatory framework means that their work in nursing homes is 
ungoverned by it. In the absence of the other therapeutic strategies, 
the control of residents who have behavioural disturbances associated 
with dementia (Marshall 2001; Denning 2002) means the use of 
psychotropic drugs. The use of such drugs is considered to be 
excessive -  a form of “ chemical restraint” (McGrath and Jackson 
1996; Royal College of Physicians 1997; Furniss 2002) — but the 
control of this is outside the protective scope of nursing home 
regulation as it is prescribed by independent general practitioners. 
Secondly, with the emergence of the disease category "Alzheimer’s 
Disease” in the 1980s, the senility of old age has become a disease 
category with a specific pathology. So, rather than residents having 
undifferentiated nursing needs envisaged by the regulatory 
framework, they have been reconstructed as objects of medical work 
requiring specific interventions. In the case of Alzheimer’s Disease, 
these interventions draw on a conceptualisation of self which is not 
based on autonomy and independence but instead on life histories or 
emotions. These different therapies construct an image of the person 
from their social networks which is used to interpret actions and
nursing homes. Data from “Community Care Statistics” Department of Health, 
published annually
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utterances. For example, the therapeutic model may involve recall of 
life stories and emotional memories10. But with less favourable 
opportunities for continuing professional development in the private 
sector (UKCC 2002), the opportunities for promoting these methods in 
nursing homes are scarce.
Extreme old age in the discourse of nursing
Part of the attempt to professionalise nursing was to discard 
traditional models of care. As I shall describe in Chapter 4 these 
models were based on objectification of the body, in the sense that 
everyday work has focused on its maintenance, care, repair and 
hygiene (May 1992). Task-centred nursing was to be eschewed in 
favour of “ nursing models” . Such models tend to derive from theories 
of “ self” , and, in the main, focus on autonomy and independence.
For example, the philosophy of the widely used Roper-Logan-Tierny 
model (Tierny 1998 p78) is that the patient/client is seen:
...as an active participant in the process, not merely a 
passive recipient, with the emphasis on building on pre­
existing abilities, aptitudes and preferences rather than 
focusing on deficits, deficiencies and norms.
According to this model, illness or other impairment does not exclude 
or excuse people from participating. Patients are seen as agents who 
must co-operate and actively play their role as “ health care” workers 
(Strauss 1985). A further thread is that health is a responsibility and 
an object of work for each individual including taking informed 
choices about risks and lifestyle (Rose 1996). Although adaptations 
are made for people who have limitations, such as children and old 
people, the basis of the underlying model remains.
This philosophy has been carried through into policy. This latter view 
of elderly residents, endorsed by health care professions and in many 
Department of Health policies, such as the National Service
10 eg Mills (1997) ‘Narrative Identity and Dementia: a Study of emotions and 
narrative in older people with dementia’ or Kitwood (1993) Towards a theory of
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Framework for Older People (Department of Health 2001), potentially 
exerts considerable normative pressure on interpretation and 
enforcement. The English National Board, which was responsible for 
the accreditation of courses for continuing professional development 
in nursing, commissioned a two-year study to evaluate the role of 
nurse education in promoting client autonomy and independence. In 
their findings Davies and colleagues (1997) noted common themes in 
empirical studies promoting particular nursing models in the care of 
older people, including encouraging patients/clients to participate in 
decisions about their care and attempts to modify the environment to 
promote autonomy and independence.
What these models share is an expectation that nurses w ill take a 
holistic view of patients’ needs, including exploring the emotional and 
everyday “ lifeworld” of the patient, and will work with them in 
deciding the pattern of care. Despite the fact that much of the 
development work was based on the views of older people who did 
not have significant cognitive impairment (Davies 1997), this image of 
individuality and independence is much promoted in the rhetoric of 
the industry. For example, the advertisement for BUPA care homes 
(undated) states that “ every person we care for is encouraged to 
explore their individual interests and talents ....”  “ for care as 
individual as you are” . Such an image is used to counter the 
Goffmanesque (1961) view of nursing homes as total institutions 
where organisational procedures and imperatives strip residents of 
their identity. In practice, however, there are many factors which 
undermine this image of autonomy.
Despite promotion of a culture of independence and autonomy, much 
work in nursing homes harks back to the older view of nursing as 
“ body”  work. Gubrium and Holstein (1999) have argued that if 
institutions could be said to think, then the language that nursing 
homes would use is that of the aged body. Fieldwork in nursing homes
dementia care: the interpersonal process’
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suggests that most of the work centres around care of the body. Work 
largely consists of a relentless round of lifting, toileting, and washing 
people whose skin is so fragile that it  is easily damaged and whose 
bones are so brittle that they easily break. Fragile skin means not 
only a tendency to bruising but an increased likelihood of open 
wounds that are difficult to heal and require constant dressing. 
Residents may have difficulty swallowing and may need feeding. 
Communication may be difficult as sight fails and hearing is lost.
Minds are often fragile, so residents may be unwilling and unable to 
assist in the process of self care. Finally, nursing homes are places of 
terminal care, although they do not view themselves as such and are 
not viewed so in public policy (Hockley 2002).
The description of people which underpins nursing models, based on 
the dominant contemporary western ideas of self as autonomous and 
independent, exerts considerable normative pressure on nursing 
homes and on the work of inspectors. But if such dominant ideas are 
seen as core cultural values then they are transgressed by many of the 
residents of nursing homes. As Herkovits (1999) notes, the failure to 
meet these cultural mandates damages the sufferer’s status as an 
adult and indeed as a full human. Residents are almost rendered 
inadmissible as objects for contemporary forms of nursing work.
The economic discourse of nursing home regulation
In all public interest regulation a significant tension exists between 
ensuring the economic viability of the industry and protecting the 
public. These two discourses compete to enact ideas of regulation.
By qualifying the rules in a way which gives inspectors discretion to 
balance competing views — for example, the use of the qualifying 
phrase “ as far as reasonably practicable” in Health and Safety 
regulations, a compromise is reached. Evidence presented in Chapter 
3 w ill suggest that the nursing home industry is a marginal industry. 
Profitability is low and the workforce is uneducated and poorly
32
qualified. Therefore in this sector, the tension between the economics 
of the industry and protecting the public is exacerbated. In practice, 
the economics of the nursing home industry was a significant 
constraint or ordering force on inspectors. By 2000, 66% of nursing 
home places were wholly or in part publicly funded (Laing and Buisson 
2001), but profit margins, reported to be around 10% of capital costs 
(Department of Health 2002b), were constrained by government 
funding. In 2000, the average cost of a place in a nursing home was 
around £450 a week. For an elderly person recovering from a hip 
replacement in an NHS acute hospital bed, the cost per day would 
have been £450 (personal communication). In other words, if the 
view was accepted that elderly people at the end of their lives 
needed multidisciplinary health care as opposed to nursing care then 
the costs would escalate. Such financial constraints speak of the 
status of elderly people at the end of their lives.
Laing and Buisson (2001) estimated that, in 2000, 90% of general 
nursing homes were operated by for-profit organisations. There was 
also a handful of NHS nursing homes, but as there were no 
requirements for their registration, no information about these was 
available. Until the late 1990s, the nursing home industry was a 
cottage industry, with many homes owned and managed by nurses. In 
1989, "major” providers with three or more homes accounted for 12% 
of homes and 32% of the beds. By 1999, this had risen to 19% of 
homes and 43% of the beds (Laing and Buisson 2001). However, by 
2001, the majority of nursing homes providers were private 
companies, with one in five homes owned by large corporates, but 
only six out of the 91 major providers were publicly quoted 
companies. Homes were small, with an average size of 34 beds in 
1999 and many were not purpose-built but were converted domestic 
premises, ill suited to meeting the needs of very dependent people. 
Yet in decisions analysed in Chapter 6, the Registered Homes Tribunal 
took the view that the "fitness” of the building did not mean making 
structural alterations which might challenge the financial viability of
the business11. Thus for many physically dependent people, the 
environment itself was likely to be a major constraint on autonomy 
and independence. A resident who could not have a bath because the 
bathroom was too small for the equipment required to hoist her in and 
out of the bath had her agency curtailed by this significant resource 
problem. As w ill be described in Chapter 6, in this decision, as in 
many others, the Tribunal took the view that it  was their role to 
ensure that Health Authorities did not interpret rules in a way which 
destabilised the economics of the industry. In doing so, they legally 
sanctioned the government’s cost-constraints on service provision and 
reinforced an image of the residents as requiring a lesser form of 
care. Drawing on Fairclough’s work (1992), Jorgensen and Phillips 
(2002) note that representations that reproduce a given discursive 
practice also tend to reproduce the social order in which it is 
embedded and the power relationship prevailing there. The effects of 
this might be clearly seen in the increased formalisation of 
organisational life.
As nursing homes increase in size, life in them is more likely to be 
subject to more organisational rules — rules which work against the 
ideals of autonomy and independence. The current vogue to constrain 
professional discretion through standards protocols, audit, and 
requirements to follow institutional policies (Power 1997) leaves less 
room for negotiations of individual patterns of care. Enhanced 
individual legal rights also have a paradoxical effect on the agency of 
residents. Rather than being a matter of professional judgement, 
homes now have legal duties to protect residents. Such duties may 
make homes risk-averse, so that it  is no longer up to the discretion of 
individual nurses whether, for example, an elderly resident prone to 
falls should be allowed to walk around the garden -  the resident’s 
relatives must give consent first, to absolve the home of 
responsibility. Braithwaite (1993) argues that institutional practices 
can have a profound effect on the everyday experience of life in a
11 see decisions 60 and 158 http://www.doh.gov.uk/rht/
nursing home. In the US, for example, he argues that the 
organisational structure of nursing homes has been driven by the 
regulatory structure. In particular, there is a culture of discipline and 
surveillance where the federal government disciplines states, states 
discipline inspectors, inspectors discipline home operators, operators 
discipline staff and staff discipline residents, to the extent that all 
residents are subjected to close surveillance (Braithwaite 1993).
Resources in nursing homes in terms of skills were also subject to 
legally sanctioned constraints. The industry employed older nurses 
with an average age of 45 years (Morrell et al 1995). Ninety per cent 
of the homes in one survey did not employ any graduate staff and 92% 
did not identify any staff who had a specialist nursing qualification in 
the care of elderly people (Davies et al 1999). Despite the regulations 
being framed in terms of a requirement for homes to employ staff 
“ adequate” for the “ condition of the patients therein” , inspectors 
who placed requirements on nursing homes to employ nursing staff 
with particular qualifications faced their decisions being overturned 
on appeal. To keep costs down, most of the work in nursing homes 
was undertaken by untrained low-paid care assistants. In 1998, the 
year before the introduction of the minimum wage, Laing and Buisson 
(1997) in their annual review of the nursing home sector commented 
that its introduction would be a major cost pressure. Similarly, the 
EU Working Time Directive with the right to paid leave was expected 
to have a big impact on the industry (Community Market News 2000). 
These structural problems, reinforced by the Tribunal decisions 
described in Chapter 6, conveyed the view that little  expertise was 
required to care for elderly residents. In other words, residents had 
simple needs which could easily be met by staff with limited skills.
The work force in nursing homes was not at the forefront of the 
nursing profession and practices are therefore likely to be rigid and 
difficult to change, adding to the perception that this was low status 
work. The legally sanctioned structure of the workforce, coupled with 
the stigma of dementia, suggests that it would not be easy for
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inspectors to stamp a meaning on the term “ resident”  that would 
imply complex skills were required.
EXPLORING REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PROTECTED
The central question for this thesis is how nursing home residents are 
represented in the regulatory system which aims to protect them. This 
question is answered through an examination of the work of nursing 
home inspectors, the decisions of the Registered Homes Tribunal and 
an analysis of the key discourses associated with nursing home 
regulation. Full details of the methodology for the fieldwork and 
documentary analysis are given in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 sets the 
scene by providing a historic account of government policy towards 
the sector and its regulation. These policies are also reviewed for 
what they imply about the nature and status of the resident. In 
regulation, the practices of field-level officers are seen as central to 
achieving compliance and thus central to achieving the social aims of 
regulation. In their attempts to persuade and justify their actions, 
nursing home inspectors are seen as drawing upon different 
discourses. These discourses constitute subjects or objects in 
particular ways, making certain types of action relevant and others 
unthinkable (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p145). One important 
discourse for nursing homes is nursing. Therefore chapter 4 sets the 
scene for the fieldwork on nursing home inspection by considering how 
the resident is constructed within the literature on nursing. Chapter 5 
considers the persuasive strategies used by two groups of nursing 
home inspectors in seeking compliance and how those strategies link 
to an image of the resident. Legally, the Registered Homes Tribunal 
acts as a constraint on the inspectors* interpretations of rules. 
Therefore in Chapter 6, I consider how particular constructions of the 
resident are used to justify the decisions of the Tribunal. Social 
policy and the specific discourses of health policy and medicine 
provide an overarching backdrop to nursing, nursing homes and their
regulation, and Chapter 7 analyses how elderly people at the end of 
their lives are constructed within these discourses. The conclusion, 
Chapter 8, suggests nursing homes regulation operates in a perplexing 
world where many differing ideas, generated in different social 
communities, compete to provide an interpretation of “ the resident” . 
The implications of these multiple and competing views of the 
resident for regulation are considered.
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Chapter 2
LOCATING THE RESIDENT -  
METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS AND PRACTICE
INTRODUCTION
The central question for this thesis is: how are nursing home residents 
represented in the regulatory system which aims to protect them? This 
question is of some significance because residents are the point of 
reference and at the centre of many of regulatory rules which are key 
to their care. For example, premises, staffing levels and care should 
be "suitable” and "adequate”  to the number and "condition”  of the 
residents. Without a conceptualisation of the resident, such rules are 
empty and without meaning, providing no firm basis for an 
authoritative argument.
At the outset, a decision needed to be made about where to look for 
evidence to build the picture of "the resident” . In Hacking’s terms 
(1999 ch1), there is a need to identify the social networks in which this 
category works. For the purpose of this thesis, the regulatory system 
itself is seen as a network of various distinct social formations or 
representational worlds. The decision about which formations to 
incorporate was guided by a preliminary analysis of three areas: the 
regulatory literature, the characteristics of this particular regulatory 
system, and health care policy for very old people approaching death, 
the group to which residents belong. The regulatory system for nursing 
homes is a typical command and control system. Rules are 
promulgated by an authoritative agency and a mechanism is in place 
for monitoring and ensuring compliance with these rules. The 
regulatory literature suggests that for such a system, the following 
elements w ill be influential in the interpretation of rules: adjudication 
by the courts (Black 1997; Ogus 1994), appeal systems (Baldwin 1985), 
the policies of regulatory agencies (Hawkins 2002; Kagan 1994) and the
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day-to-day practices of field officers (Hutter 2001; Hawkins 1984). As 
discussed in Chapter 1, there was no central regulatory agency and 
little  central guidance for the interpretation of the vague rules of 
nursing home regulation. Thus inspectors had considerable discretion 
in their work. However, the system was designed to have one check 
on the decisions of inspectors. That was an appeal by nursing home 
owners to an independent appeal tribunal — the Registered Homes 
Tribunal. But law is not the only authoritative influence on nursing 
homes. Homes were uniprofessional institutions, managed and, in 
many cases, also owned by nurses. Few, if  any, other professional 
staff were employed as there was no requirement to do so. Until 2002 
nursing homes were always inspected by professional nurses, and 
empirical studies of their work highlighted nursing as one of their main 
frames of reference, for example Woods (2001 para 1.8). Therefore 
nursing as an institution might reasonably be expected to have a 
significant influence on the interpretation of rules in nursing homes.
There are also good reasons to explore governmental policy in relation 
old people as an influence on nursing home regulation. The state is a 
major player in this sector as two thirds of nursing home places are 
subject to reimbursement by the state (Laing and Buisson 2000). As 
described further in Chapter 3, the Secretary of State for Health had 
overarching powers to define many key characteristics of the nursing 
home industry, for example, the characteristics of staff, including 
what constituted a nurse in the nursing home context. Moreover, the 
Department of Health, as the Registered Homes Tribunal's sponsor 
department, also controlled the conditions under which the Tribunal 
operated. The nursing home industry is therefore highly controlled by 
central government not only through the regulatory framework and 
mechanisms hidden deep within it  but also through mechanisms which 
were outside the regulatory framework. Therefore the policy intent 
towards residents or, more generally, towards elderly people at the 
end of their lives, is one way through which ideas of “ the resident”  can 
be explored.
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As described in Chapter 1, this thesis has taken a social constructionist 
approach to understanding “ the resident” . From this social 
constructionist perspective, reality is only accessible to us through 
categories which are created and maintained by social processes 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p5). Within a particular worldview, some 
forms of action become natural, others unthinkable, with different 
social understanding of the world leading to different social actions. 
Therefore the social construction of knowledge and truth has social 
consequences (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p5). Thus “ the resident”  is 
a construct created and maintained by social processes whose function 
is to make actions in nursing home regulation meaningful. By 
representing “ the resident”  in one particular way rather than another 
certain types of actions are relevant and others are unthinkable.
Fairclough (2003 p31) argues that complex modern societies involve 
the networking together of different social practices across different 
domains or fields and different scales of social life. Texts are crucial 
to these networks, with different social practices requiring the 
chaining together or networking of texts in specific ways. For example, 
governance concerns the appropriation of elements of one textual 
practice within another, and transforming it  in particular ways in the 
process. Texts networked in this way are thought to be important in 
structural relationships between different domains. “The resident”  is 
therefore seen as a creation of the practices, discourses and texts 
from particular constellations of self-referential communities 
significant to nursing home regulation -  some legal and some 
governmental. Discourses of legislation, of government policy, of 
appeal Tribunals, of inspectors and of nursing may be drawn upon to 
give meaning to the term “ the resident” in a particular context.
Actors from within different social communities may compete to make 
their own understanding the prevailing one. In this struggle, different 
ways of organising the world are promoted with different social 
consequences.
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Having identified the relevant communities, the next issue is: what 
methods to use to explore these different representational worlds?
Prior (2004 p317) notes that, in both qualitative and quantitative 
research, there is a focus on “ the knowing subject who reveals to the 
investigator some conscious aspect of social life or social behaviour” . 
Thus knowledge is produced from a particular standpoint — that of the 
subject. However, Flick (2002 Ch1) notes that, in qualitative research, 
knowledge is a co-production between the researcher and their 
subjects. The researcher's communication with the field and its 
members is taken as an explicit part of the knowledge production. The 
emphasis is on understanding the social world of the subjects through 
the subject's own eyes rather than the researcher's. The researcher's 
reaction to the subject and the subject's views are also part of the 
research process. In order to do this, an observer must participate, 
that is engage in activities alongside the research subjects while at the 
same time keeping enough distance to maintain a critical external 
perspective. In the classic ethnographic method, participant 
observation is coupled with interviews and the analysis of documents 
or other artifacts to provide a perspective on matters of interest from 
the viewpoint of the subject.
However, in this thesis, the tenuous nature of access granted, 
described below, meant that methods have been used which do not 
foreground the views either of nursing homes inspectors or of 
residents, with no privileging of the experience of either. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the characteristics of nursing home residents make it  
difficult to access their lived experience. Instead, methods have been 
used which are more relevant to understanding aspects of social life 
and dimensions of human activity not directly accessible to 
respondents or contained in the consciousness of the isolated subject. 
That is, the focus is on the resources available to nursing home 
inspectors from the system as conceived above, to fill the category 
“ the resident” . Because the focus is on authoritative sources in the 
regulatory system as conceived above, no attempt has been made to
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engage with the owners’ views or with the discourses which owners use 
to construct the resident.
The focus for data collection is “ the resident” in the work of the 
inspectors and in other more publicly available discourses influential in 
nursing home regulation. Specifically the two methods used are
(i) observation of inspectors’ routines on inspection visits;
(ii) documentary analysis of
a. decisions of the Registered Homes Tribunal
b. nursing as an institution in relation to nursing homes
c. health policy for very old people at the end of their 
lives
d. inspection reports and publicity brochures from the 
nursing homes visited.
In the case of the former, what is being asserted is that particular 
social representations of the resident are continually reproduced in the 
routinised practices of inspectors during inspections visits. In order for 
inspectors to competently undertake these activities, they must pay 
attention to the social, economic and legal context in which they 
work. These “contexts” are explored using documentary analysis.
Thus the starting point is that the representations of the resident are 
shaped by representational worlds far beyond the immediate 
environment of the nursing homes. This “ multiperspectival” ’ approach 
is based on the premise that different perspectives provide different 
forms of knowledge about a phenomenon so that together they 
produce a broader understanding (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p154). 
More traditionally, this is known as “ triangulation”  where 
“ triangulation” does not refer to convergent to a fixed point or to 
some kind of truth but to the use of evidence from different systems to 
deepen the understanding of or refine of the object of study. As Seale 
(1999 p60) and Dingwall (1997) have noted, triangulation may also be 
used as a way of explaining how actions and accounts in one setting 
are influenced and constrained by those in another.
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OBSERVATION OF NURSING HOME INSPECTORS
Routine inspection visits to nursing homes are undertaken by nursing 
home inspectors to assess the homes’ compliance with regulatory 
rules. Such visits provide an opportunity for observing how the actions 
of inspectors in managing or negotiating compliance construct or 
constitute residents in a particular way.
Requesting access
Gaining the agreement of inspection units to observe inspection visits 
proved a difficult and protracted process. Between September 1999 
and the autumn of 2000, I wrote to twenty-five Health Authority 
inspection units, approximately a quarter of all those in England. The 
majority were contacted after May 2000 using a letter in which the 
fieldwork was described to potential participants in the following way:
The purpose of this study is to establish how, in the 
absence of formal standards, inspectors seek to influence 
the quality of care in homes. More specifically, what 
models of care do inspectors support? What strategies do 
they use to enforce such models? and To what extent are 
the proposed new standards and regulatory framework in 
harmony with those models ?
Extract from letter to participants, May 2000.
I described what I would expect from them and enclosed a copy of my 
CV. All twenty-five refused or did not respond. In an attempt to 
understand their reservations, I telephoned ten of the non­
respondents. But my enquiries were met with comments such as “ I 
don’ t have to explain why” and "... over my dead body” , or they were 
concerned that research coupled with the impending changes would be 
too much work for their staff.
I then approached the Department of Health Unit charged with 
preparing for the introduction of the new regulatory framework. In 
preparation for the reforms, the Unit had commissioned the Social 
Services Inspectorate to undertake a review of six Health Authority
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units (Woods 2001). The Inspectorate had no official jurisdiction over 
Health Authorities or nursing home inspectors and the civil servant 
explained that she was not surprised by my problems. The Department 
of Health itself was also having great difficulty in obtaining access to 
units run by Health Authorities. It was not clear that all the nursing 
homes inspectors would be transferring to the new National Care 
Standards Agency, so any review of work of inspectors at this time was 
a very sensitive undertaking. The Department of Health unit then 
introduced me to the social services inspectors undertaking the 
review. One of the inspectors introduced me to a former nurse 
inspector who was acting as consultant to their team. She arranged 
for me to meet two of her friends who were currently in charge of 
inspection units.
Seven units finally agreed to meet me and four of these eventually 
refused. I visited one unit three times before receiving a final 
rejection. In other units, negotiations were also protracted from 
November 1999 to May 2000. Visiting units also reinforced the view 
that nursing home regulation was something of a neglected area. Two 
of the units were housed in very unsavoury premises — prefabricated 
leaky huts, next to the commercial refuse disposal area. Another unit 
was housed in a building which seemed to have been the subject of an 
arson attack. The front was blackened and boarded up and the 
entrance was at the back, past very large industrial rubbish bins.
At these initial interviews, the proposal to look at how inspectors 
interpreted rules often met with the response that, as inspectors, they 
did not have any discretion. Such meetings usually involved the whole 
team who were keen to tell me that the way they worked was with a 
pro forma and the standard was either met or not met - they had no 
discretion. They were also very concerned that the study would upset 
their relationship with homes. Another potential impediment was that 
units pointed out that they would have to have the agreement of the 
home for me to visit. Homes, they argued, were made very anxious by
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their visits and would need a great deal of reassurance and explanation 
as to what I was doing1. While managers in charge of the unit often 
seemed keen on the study, the inspectors were not, and seemed to 
exercise a veto over it. So, I had difficulties in obtaining access and 
the access which was granted was fragile. For example, I also 
requested access to documents, but this was limited to those in the 
public domain. The period leading up to the implementation of the 
2000 Act resulted in a major increase in paperwork for both inspectors 
and people providing clerical support. This provided a “ good reason” 
to refuse my requests for further documentary information or access.
Units, inspectors and their backgrounds
Access was eventually agreed with three inspections units which, to 
preserve their anonymity, I shall refer to as County, Suburban and 
City. The County unit and the City unit were jo int with their 
respective local authority. The Suburban unit was a commercial 
consultancy contracted by a number of Health Authorities to carry out 
inspections. The City unit had two inspectors. Both inspectors had 
been nurse managers in the NHS, one in the community nursing 
service, the other in a large mental hospital which had been closed. 
The County unit had three inspectors and a head of unit. The head of 
unit was absent on long-term sick leave for the entire period of the 
fieldwork and we never met again after she agreed access. All the 
inspectors in the County unit had backgrounds as nurse managers in 
the NHS: one in mental health, the second in the community nursing 
service and the third in the acute sector. In the Suburban unit, the 
commercial consultancy had four staff, one of whom I never met. The 
head of the consultancy had been a chief nursing officer for an NHS 
community nursing service and also had a background in professional 
risk management. The other two nurse inspectors I observed in the
1 The implications of this reluctance to allow an outsider to observe their work, is 
considered further in the conclusion (Chapter 8).
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Suburban team had managerial experience in the private sector as well 
as in the NHS. One had been deputy manager of a nursing home in the 
UK and the other also had experience of nursing home management.
It is difficult to know to what extent the sample of nursing home 
inspectors was typical. A literature search revealed no information 
about the background or qualifications of nursing home inspectors 
which could be used as comparison. The difficulties in obtaining 
access would suggest that the sample was atypical in that they had 
sufficient confidence in their work to allow observation by an external 
observer.
Non-participant observation
In contrast to participant observation which requires the engagement 
of the researchers with subjects, the aim in simple non-participant 
observation is for the observer to merge into the background so as not 
to disturb the phenomena under study.
Simple observers follow the flow of events. Behaviour
and interaction continue as they would without the
presence of researchers, uninterrupted by intrusion.
Alder and Alder quoted by Flick 2002 p135.
In practice, there is a continuum of interaction or involvement, from 
full participation with considerable disturbance, to observation of a 
public space or covert observation where subjects may be entirely 
unaware of the observer’s presence. In this thesis, the aim was to 
undertake simple observation, so as not to disturb the routine of the 
inspection visit. As Flick notes, the problem with this method is how 
to observe without being drawn into being a participant and thus 
influencing the field. I took notes of the flow of events during 
inspection visits as they occurred, but at the same time maintaining a 
social relationship with the inspector by occasionally commenting or 
answering their questions. Some inspectors would try to involve me in 
the visit by assigning me the role of “ lay person” and asking me to say
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whether the complaint leaflet, for example, was comprehensible.
These interactions provided an opportunity to inquire about the 
inspector's background and as part of this interaction additional 
information was volunteered by the inspector. This often included the 
compliance background of the home, the inspector's relationship with 
the manager and the latter's strengths and weaknesses. But it  was 
difficult to obtain further information from inspectors outside of visits 
— access to inspectors was limited.
Announced visits lasted all day, from 9am to the evening, with both of 
us traveling independently to the visit from home. At the end of a very 
long day, there was little  opportunity for casual conversations with 
inspectors.
As described below twenty of the twenty- two visits were announced 
inspections. For all inspection units, the purpose of this type of visit 
was to check all the relevant documentation, take up any outstanding 
issues from the last visits and any issues arising from complaints, to 
walk round the home looking at the condition of residents and to have 
a very long interview with the manager. Irrespective of the size of the 
home, these announced visits lasted all day. In larger homes, more 
than one inspector would be involved with the visit. Only two were 
“ unannounced” - that is to say the home staff appeared to be taken by 
surprise and clearly were unprepared for the visit. These were 
shorter, as on both visits there was no one on duty who could answer 
questions. Nevertheless the inspectors walked round the home, looked 
at case notes and other matters of interest, and talked to residents 
and staff.
On all visits I accompanied the inspector round the home and observed 
interviews with the home manager, staff and residents. “Open” 
methods of observation were used with a focus on the following 
questions:
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(i) What rules, standards or other concerns formed the 
focus for the inspector's attention?
(ii) What information was sought out and used as evidence 
for compliance/non-compliance?
(iii) What issues were taken up and what evidence was used 
with managers to support claims about compliance or 
non-compliance?
(iv) What inferences about the inspector's image of 
residents can be drawn from the visit, the information 
sought and the evidence used?
As there was little  direct access to the inspector’s or the home 
manager's perspective, I was required to “ construct meaning for 
myself which I supposed directed the actors in the way I perceived 
them" (Merkens quoted by Flick 2002 p138). No tape recorder was 
used as I fe lt that this was likely to be too intrusive, potentially 
jeopardising the fragile access. The field notes consisted of single 
words, sentences, quotes and records of activities which were 
expanded into a full account written the next day. Inferences about 
how inspectors imagined the resident were then drawn from their 
patterned actions.
Although non-participant observation provides data which is not 
enriched by an inspector's perspective, Flick (2002 ch12) notes that 
the spontaneous activities and statements observed and recorded can 
to be more reliable than responses to an observer's direct question.
The further advantage of non-participant observation is that it  requires 
a focus on factors which are not necessarily obvious or of interest to 
the participants. Remaining an outsider, it is possible to doubt 
routines whose purpose is self-evident to insiders. But, as an outsider, 
some activities were undoubtedly hidden from view. For example, the 
impending reforms had generated anxieties about the impact of the 
new legislation both on inspectors and home managers. Inspectors 
were concerned about whether there would be a job for them in the
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new agency. Thus the homes were chosen for me by inspectors, as 
homes where my presence was unlikely to cause any difficulty with 
managers- for example, my presence might be particularly unwelcome 
when the visit might involve discussions over a contentious matter.
This meant that I had difficulty in establishing what behaviour 
inspectors would find totally unacceptable or unlawful. The method 
also suffers from the limitations common to all observations, 
participant or otherwise, that events or practices which seldom occur 
can be captured only with luck, if  at all. But according to Flick (2002) 
the main problem with simple observation is that the restriction to an 
external perspective with no access to the interior perspective of 
either inspectors or nursing home managers is a major difficulty in 
assessing interpretations. The important question is how likely the 
observed activities and statements are to occur independently of the 
observations. Observations of the visits were supplemented by analysis 
of each inspection unit's standards for nursing homes in their area and 
the publicly available inspection reports of nursing home visited.
Homes and inspection visits
Table 1 shows the number of inspection visits carried out with each 
inspector. Only two inspection visits were carried out with the City 
unit. The chief inspector left shortly after the fieldwork began and 
the temporary staff employed were unwilling to be observed. Ten 
visits were carried out with the County unit and 10 with the Suburban 
unit. The analysis in Chapter 5 focuses mainly on the work of these 
two units.
49
Table 1 HOMES AND INSPECTORS





Hanson Rise Mary Small corporate 15
Apple Tree Mary Owner/Manager 15
House
Robin Walk Mary Owner/Manager 9
Trafalgar Court Mary Large corporate 67
Lewis Hall Mary Large corporate 94
The Pines Mary Small corporate 30
Holly View Violet Owner/manager 23
The Strand Violet Large corporate 72
Beatrice Lodge Violet Owner/Manager 14
Prince Regent Violet Not for profit 39/31
Table 1 HOMES AND INSPECTORS (Contd)
County Unit
Victoria House Derek Large corporate 30
Cherry Lane Derek Small corporate 27
Greenwood Derek Large corporate 25
Grange
St Alsagers House Denise Small corporate 52
Abbots Court Denise Owner/Manager 33
West Tuns Hall Denise Small corporate 13
Spiney View Fillipa Large corporate 71
The Oaks Fillipa Large corporate 31
White Sands Fillipa Large corporate 38
Lodge
Penlee Court Fillipa Large corporate 48
City Unit
Glenburn House Judy Not for profit 40
Pear Tree Lodge Frank Small corporate 15
The homes visited can be categorised in a number of ways. First, size 
- eight of the homes had less than twenty beds, ten had between 
twenty and fifty  beds and four had over fifty  beds. Three of the small 
homes have since closed - probably as part of general reshaping of the 
sector to larger homes which occurred as a consequence of the 2002 
reforms (Holden 2002). The types of ownership of the other twenty
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homes are shown in Table 2. In line with the definitions used in the 
Laing and Buisson annual survey of care homes (see for example Laing 
and Buisson 2000), large corporates have been classified as companies 
owning three or more nursing homes. Nationally in 2000, 19% of homes 
were owned by large corporates, therefore the sample of homes 
visited is disproportionately represented by homes of this type (Laing 
and Buisson 2001).
Table 2 TYPES OF OWNERSHIP OF "FOR PROFIT” 
NURSING HOMES (n=20)_____________________
Owner/Manager Small corporate Large
Corporate
Suburban 4 2 3
County 1 3 6
City 0 1 0
Total 5 6 9
The type of premises is shown in Table 3. Some premises were 
situated in quiet rural areas, others in suburbia and one in an inner 
city. About half the premises were modern and purpose built, others 
were small converted domestic residences or other converted 
property.







Suburban 3 3 6
County 1 3 4
City 0 0 2
Total 4 6 12
Coding and categorising the data
Guided by the first three questions above, the data from each 
individual inspection visit was coded using “ open” coding, that is 
coding without the use of predefined categories. Although there were
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differences between inspectors in the same units, the analysis focused 
on similarities in their approach. For example, it  was noticed that all 
inspectors in County Unit spent a considerable time talking to 
individual residents and then pursuing individual complaints. As Flick 
(2002 ch15) points out, attitudes deduced from activities in the group 
are most likely to be shared by the group, because otherwise activities 
would have been corrected or commented on by other members. 
Throughout the coding process, the presence or absence of “ residents” 
was noted and where present the rationale or justification for 
reference to them was coded. The different foci for the inspectors* 
visits and the evidence referred to in compliance negotiations with 
home managers were used to build a category to describe the 
inspection “ style”  for the unit. The similarities and differences 
between the two units were compared to further flesh out and clarify 
the different “ styles” of inspection. The characteristics of these 
nascent categories were compared with publicly available discourses 
which inspectors might draw upon to organise their practices. The 
styles of the two units in terms of their content and arguments were 
most resonant with two separate discourses: “ risk management”  and 
“ professionalism” . Having clarified and built the categories, these 
were then applied analytically to the data : and the data was re­
coded using these new categories until no further material could be 
found which could be related to them -  that is, until the categories 
were saturated. This approach has been referred as “ focused coding” 
(Nagy Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2004, Introduction to Part IV). Inferences 
were then drawn about how the resident was constructed through the 
operationalisation of these inspection styles.
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DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS
Approaches to documentary analysis
There are a number of different perspectives on the analysis of texts. 
First, texts might simply be analysed for information they contain. But 
the use of texts in this way when the text is the sole empirical data 
source is usually cautioned against, as all texts are seen as artfully 
produced or contrived (Wolff 2004). Second, on the basis that the 
production of texts is artful, texts are analysed as sources which point 
to underlying social phenomena associated with their production 
(Wolff 2004 p285). Analysis from this perspective is usually achieved 
by conducting research with people or organisations responsible for 
production of such documents. But even so, work from an 
ethnomethodological perspective suggests that documents can only be 
understood by competent actors in the social world in which they were 
produced. That is to say, documents, such as hospital case notes, may 
be difficult to interpret when taken “out of context” and read by 
actors who are not part of that social world which produced them.
From a third perspective, official documents in particular are seen as 
'institutionalised traces’ . Thus such documents can be used to draw 
conclusions about activities, intentions and ideas of their creators or 
the organisations they represent (Wolff 2002p284). In a variation of 
this, Prior (2004) notes how documents have been constructed to 
enable people to think. That is they are used as tools to enable people 
organise and systematise their symbolic worlds.
Scholars working from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (eg 
Fairclough 2003; Wodak and Meyer 2001; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 ) 
suggest that texts work in many different ways, simultaneously. They 
have “ ideational” , “ interpersonal” and “ textual” functions. Fairclough 
(2003p 27) notes that texts simultaneously
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...represent aspects of the world (the physical world, the 
social world, the mental world); enact social relations 
between participants in social events and the attitudes, 
desires and values of participants; and coherently and 
cohesively connect parts of texts together and connect 
texts with their situational contexts.
Within both sociology and anthropology, it  is increasingly being 
claimed that language is the cultural force. As one commentator 
noted
...language is now auditioning for an a priori role in the 
social and material world, a role that carries 
constitutional force - bringing facts into consciousness 
and therefore being. ...our representations may well 
come first, allowing us to selectively see what we have 
described (Van Maanen 2004 p 435).
As language is now seen as making notions of thought and culture 
inseparable (van Maanen 2004, Swidler 1995), the analysis of language 
and text is seen as fundamental to any understanding of the social 
world.
Approaches to the exploration of language as a cultural force are 
usually referred to by the umbrella term “discourse analysis”  (Gill 
2000; Parker 2004). The basic premise of discourse analysis is that 
when representations “ come first” , subjectivity is constituted by 
language. But as there is no clear consensus of what discourses are or 
how to analyse them (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p1), different 
approaches are used. For example, there are fundamental 
disagreements about the extent to which individuals are both products 
of discourse and producers of discourse. In some versions of discourse 
analysis, individuals are viewed solely as the subjects of discourse 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p1) positioned by the discourse in a 
particular way (Gill 2000). Thus through language, a network of 
symbolic connotations is evoked - connotations which not only refer to 
the world but reflect an unchanging and universal order of things
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(Parker 2004). In the interactions between groups and individuals, 
discourses work in the sense of being persuasive because they evoke 
these wider systems of power and ideology. Meaning can be thus 
located in public symbols and rituals rather than in ephemeral 
subjectivities (Gill 2000). A further difference is that some analysts 
are concerned with everyday social interactions, while others 
concentrate on public discourses which circulate in wider society 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002).
The focus for this thesis is on how representations of residents are 
constituted in documents or texts associated with nursing home 
regulation. “The resident” is viewed here as a “ floating signifier” — 
that is, one whose meaning is not fixed by any particular discourse 
(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). Different actors attempt to f ill the term 
“ resident”  with content, struggling to make their own understanding 
the prevailing one. In this struggle, different ways of organising the 
world are promoted. The aim in this thesis is to find out how “ the 
resident” is ascribed meaning discursively and the social and practical 
consequences this has for the regulation of nursing homes.
Discourse analysis has been criticised for the reliance it  places on the 
subjective views of the researcher. As there is no clear 
methodological technique, there is lack of transparency about how the 
researcher’s subjectivity has come into play. However, in a sense, all 
qualitative data is authored by the researcher, as interpretations or 
analysis of subjects’ views and experience must be made in the 
process of writing up the research. But as in discourse analysis, 
subjects do not speak directly, nor is data enriched by the subject’s 
perspective. These factors add to the charge that insight is lost and 
the work is biased (Seale 1999 p60). Other critics argue that discourse 
analysis is largely concerned with power relationships. As such it is 
largely employed by researchers engaged in emancipatory projects 
(Denzin 2004) or those explicitly concerned with the analysis of power 
relations and mechanisms of domination (Wodak and Meyer 2001).
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This is explicit in Critical Discourse Analysis where such analysis is 
described as taking the part of the underprivileged and trying to show 
up the linguistic means used by the privileged to stabilise or even to 
intensify inequities in society (Meyer 2001). As a method for exploring 
power relations and mechanisms of domination, discourse analysis 
would seem a relevant technique for the analysis of regulation where 
one of the main purposes might be construed as social control. A form 
of discourse analysis is used in this thesis to analyse the decisions of 
the Registered Homes Tribunal and the nursing and health policy 
literature.
Analysing decisions of the Registered Homes Tribunal
The Registered Homes Tribunal was set up shortly before the 1984 Act 
to provide a specialised legal forum for home owners to appeal against 
the administrative decisions of Health Authorities and their inspectors. 
As w ill be described in Chapter 6, the Tribunal has a legal chair and is 
primarily a legal forum. Residents or their representatives have no 
direct voice in the Tribunal. The Tribunal heard the first appeal under 
the 1984 Act in 1986 and the last appeal under the same Act was heard 
in 2004. Between 1986 and 2004, 86 appeals pertaining to general 
nursing homes were heard. The decisions of the Tribunal were first 
printed then published on the web, initially at 
http://www.doh.gov.uk/rht and from 2002 at 
http://www.carestandardstribunal.gov.uk/rht. Sixty cases of these 
were available for analysis. As indicated in Table 4, around half the 
appeals were about withdrawal of registration, three quarters about 
registration and around one in four about conditions of registration.
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Table 4  APPEALS W ITH FULL HEARING (n = 60 )
Refusal of registration 14
Withdrawal of registration (n=32)
Emergency (Section 30) 7
Other (Section 28) 25
Condition of registration (n=14)
Buildings/number of residents 9
Staffing 5
In the two decades of the Tribunal’s operation, there have been no 
appeals from a large corporate about the withdrawal of registration. 
The only appeal from a large corporate was about the conditions of 
registration. This appeal concerned staffing levels. In the late 1990s, 
19% of homes and 43% of beds (Laing and Buisson 2001)were owned by 
large corporates, so owner/managers and small corporates are 
disproportionately represented in appeals.
Tribunal decisions form part of the public record for nursing home 
regulation but the audience to whom they are primarily addressed is 
nursing home inspectors, nursing home owners and their legal advisors. 
This thesis is not concerned with the practices of production of these 
decisions -  for example, by observation of Tribunal hearings -  instead 
they are analysed as communicative acts aimed both at regulators and 
home owners. Their function is to persuade the audience that the 
Tribunal did the “ right thing”  (Brooke and Gewirtz 1996 p10) and thus 
they set out moral as well as a legal framework for nursing home 
regulation. So the focus of interest is the impact of these decisions, if  
any, and on the messages they convey. From a discourse analysis 
perspective, the analysis of such institutional texts provides an insight 
into the operation of authority in this context (Miller1997 p91) and 
hence the presence or absence of “ the resident”  in the construction of 
that authority.
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The analysis of the Tribunal cases was primarily concerned with the 
following discursive strategies which were applied to the entire corpus 
of Tribunal decisions relating to nursing homes:
i. strategies of argumentation -  that is, the logic of the 
legal argument and the evidential and authority claims or 
“warrants” used to support the argument for dismissing 
or supporting the appeal.
ii. referential strategies or strategy nomination where the 
linguistic devices of interest were membership 
categorisations of “ the resident” and “ the home owner” .
The Tribunal cases were initially coded using predefined or “ closed” 
categories. Two initial categories were used: appeals concerned with 
refusal or cancellation of registration and appeals concerned with the 
imposition of conditions on the registered person. These categories 
were chosen because they provide a fundamentally different context 
for the appeal. In the first type, appeals are about whether the home 
owner should be allowed to participate in the nursing home market. 
The second type brings into play economic factors such as staffing 
levels. Within each category, cases were then coded into those which 
succeeded and those where the appeal failed. The nature of type of 
evidence used to support the Tribunal’s decision was analysed in each 
of these four categories, with the data coded to note the presence or 
absence of “ the resident” and “ the home owner”  in the argument and, 
where present, their function in the argument.
Nursing and the nursing subject
As noted above, there is good reason to think that nursing as an 
institution is a key part of the context for nursing homes. In terms of 
discourse analysis, the discourses of nursing evoke wider systems of 
power and ideology, laying out one field of action in which individuals, 
nurse inspectors and nursing home nurses understand themselves and
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others, including “ the resident” . Two publicly available discourses on 
nursing were used:
• the literature directed internally to members of the 
occupation
• the sociological or policy literature which provides an 
external commentary on nursing and nursing activities
The first type includes literature drawn from two databases: the 
British Nursing Index (BNI) and the Cumulative Index to Nursing and 
Allied Health Literature (CINAHL). The former is aimed at the UK- 
based nursing profession and is comprised of “over 250 of the most 
popular and important journal sources in the nursing and midwifery 
fields” . It is indexed from 1992. CINAHL database, indexed from 
1982, is described as a comprehensive source of information for nurses 
and allied health professionals. It indexes over 1200 publications, and 
includes books, book chapters, standards of practice, government 
publications and pamphlets. It also includes nursing magazines such as 
Nursing Times and Nursing Standard which are more directed towards 
the non-professional nursing sector. Additionally, the catalogues of 
the Royal College of Nursing, the Bloomsbury Health Care library -  one 
of the major libraries for nursing publications in London — and the 
King's Fund Library were used to locate key nursing textbooks. For the 
second type of literature, bibliographic searches in the sociology of 
nursing, health policy and administration were undertaken.
Information about non-professional nurses or “ health care assistants” 
was also sought from trade unions and research units concerned with 
the labour force and health policy, such as the Institute of Public 
Policy Research.
The analysis of the nursing literature used the following search terms: 
elderly, old people, dementia, nursing homes, nursing home owners, 
care homes, care home managers, nurse managers, geriatric nursing, 
gerontological nursing, long term care, health care assistants. These 
searches identified the key authors -  Davies, Nolan, McCormack and
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Nazarko -  and further searches were conducted using their names.
The subjects and roles within nursing were identified. Clearly, with 
such a body of literature one cannot analyse the entire corpus.
Instead, Jager (2001 p51) notes that the arguments and content about 
what can be said or heard on a particular theme in a particular societal 
location at a particular time are limited. Therefore the analysis of 
typical examples or exemplars of common positions or arguments is 
justified (Wodak 2001). So, the following discursive strategies in 
relation to these groups in typical texts were explored:
(i) What typifies the categories of professional nurses, 
non-professional nurses and “ the nursing home 
resident” ?
(ii) What arguments are used to justify inclusion or 
exclusion of professional and non-nurses to particular 
categories?
(iii) How ideally should (a) elderly people and (b) nursing 
home residents be treated by both professional and 
non-professional?
The resident and health policy
As a starting point for this analysis, residents were categorised a priori 
as “ very old people at the end of their lives” . The information 
presented in Chapter 1 suggests that this is a fair assumption. An 
analysis of how this “ subject” was constructed in the following 
discourses was then undertaken:
• the medical literature -  in particular, the literature of 
old age
• health and social policy literature
• the sociological, anthropological and social history of old 
age.
That is to say that at the outset “ residents” were located within the 
discourse of health and social policy. The medical literature was
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accessed through the Medline bibliographic database using the 
following search terms: geriatric, elderly, old age, geriatric medicine, 
gerontology, care homes, long term care, nursing homes and 
dementia. Additional resources included University College Medical 
School Library which was used to locate texts including textbooks by 
key geriatricians. Again rather than analysing the whole corpus, 
examples or exemplars of common positions or arguments were sought 
(Jager 2001; Wodak 2001). The analysis focused on the following 
discursive strategies:
(i) Within the medical discourse, what typifies the 
category of “ very old” ? Are they classified as sick, 
dying or just old? That is, referential or nomination 
strategies where the linguistic devices of interest were 
membership categorisations.
(ii) strategies of argumentation used to justify inclusion or 
exclusion of people to these categories
(iii) delineation of different voices or discursive logics in the 
text, concerned with “ health/disease” , “ dying” and 
“ old age” , particularly those originating from other 
texts. This strategy is based on the discourse analytical 
premise of intertextuality -  that is, the premise that all 
utterances inevitably draw on, in corporate or challenge 
earlier utterances (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002 p151).
LIMITATIONS
Selection of social formations to study
Two potentially important discourses are absent from this thesis. For 
the reasons given in Chapter 1, the lived experience of nursing home 
residents is very difficult to access. Therefore the thesis does not 
explore the views of the residents themselves. Neither does it explore 
the industry's view of the resident. As described in Chapter 3, when
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the field work was planned, the nursing homes sector had entered a 
period of change from a cottage industry to corporate ownership and 
there was no easy access to a data source for the industry’s view, as 
the sector lacked a cohesive voice (Holden 2002). With the 
consolidation in ownership and the reforms, organisations representing 
owners, such as the Registered Nursing Homes Association, came to the 
fore and there was, therefore, a potential for a view of “ the resident” , 
separated and distinct from nursing to emerge. During the fieldwork, I 
was approached by a group of home owners who wanted to talk to me. 
However, the inspection unit became very alarmed at this and said 
they would withdraw their co-operation if I met the home owners. It 
appeared that they were in dispute with these owners and were afraid 
that I would be co-opted on the side of the owners. A decision was 
therefore taken not to pursue this for fear of jeopardising access, 
which had been difficult to achieve and maintain. The views and 
policies of the sector and, in particular, large providers would be 
important to any future study of nursing homes.
Limitations in the study of individual communities
The exploration of each of the chosen social communities of nursing 
home regulation also has some limitations. The impending regulatory 
reforms had major effects. When the study was being planned, 
nursing home regulation was at a point of major change. In the latter 
two decades of the 20th century, the nursing home sector had 
expanded fourfold and become central to health care policy. Yet, as 
will be described in more detail in Chapter 3, the regulation of nursing 
homes was a neglected area, with the regulatory framework largely 
unchanged for eighty years and with little  known about the activities 
of registration or inspection. However, in 1997 a new Labour 
Government announced a reform of care home regulation with the 
establishment of a new central agency - the National Care Standards 
Agency - which was to be operational from 2002. Therefore, in 2000 
and 2001 when access was negotiated and the fieldwork undertaken,
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change was in the air with all that brings in terms of anxiety about the 
unknown and expectation for improvements. More importantly, there 
was the feeling that a dark — and, perhaps, for some -  a murky 
corner, was about to be exposed to a searching bright light.
The thesis suffers from the limitation common to many forms of data 
collection in that it is difficult to know the typicality of the sample or 
of any particular situation or context. Hence it  is difficult to draw 
robust general conclusions. In particular, because of the methods used 
and the lack of speaking subject, the interpretation is more open to 
question than when methods which involve greater participation are 
used. In this thesis no attempt has been made to privilege the category 
of experience either of the nursing home inspectors or of the 
residents. The reasons for the former were pragmatic, for the latter 
the extent to which the experience of nursing home residents can be 
assessed or filled with meaning is debatable. However, this means 
that my own voice as author is privileged over others, but, as van 
Maneen(2004) argues, this is the case with all such work, even that 
heavily based on the experience of subjects.
The Care Standards Act 2000 marked a major reform of nursing home 
regulation, as that Act abolished the term “ nursing home” as a legal 
category. As a consequence, no comparative information is available 
about the nursing home sector after 2002. Therefore the study is 
bounded by a particular historic moment for health and social policy, 
concerned with a particular type of resident, a particular type of 
ownership, and regulation of a particular design. Nevertheless, by 
employing different methods a ‘snapshot’ of a particular regulatory 
system has been obtained. Not only can this snapshot be used as a 
comparator for other regulatory situations but the thesis also offers 




Over the period of researching and writing this thesis, research ethics 
in social sciences has come into increasing prominence, with the 
British Sociological Association issuing a statement in 2002 and the 
Economic and Social Research Council issuing a report in 2005 (ESRC 
2005). The increasing attention being given to research ethics could 
be attributed to three factors: rise of emancipatory politics, 
discourses of the contemporary self as unique rational, autonomous 
subject, particularly the discourse associated with legal rights and 
spill-over from increased external regulation of medical research. The 
aim of all research ethics is to set out a normative framework for 
conduct of the relationship between the research subject or research 
subjects and the researchers.
The British Sociological Association’s Statement of Ethical Practice is 
based on the following principles: professional integrity including 
requirements to comply with legislation such as the Data Protection 
Act, respect for the rights of research participants and awareness of 
their responsibilities towards them, and careful management of 
conflicts of roles, obligations and interests. The document notes that 
the aim is not to be prescriptive but to set out basic principles which 
could be further developed by the discipline and enforced by self­
regulation. The ERSC framework is far more prescriptive and in many 
ways mirrors the Department of Health Research Governance Strategy 
(Kerrison, McNally and Pollock 2003). The six key principles are: 
focus on quality of design, full information should be supplied to 
research subjects except in exceptional circumstances, confidentiality 
of research subjects must be respected, participation must be 
voluntary, harm to participants must be avoided, the independence of 
the research must be clear and any conflicts of interest explicit. To 
implement these principles there is an expectation of ethical review by 
the institution seeking or holding the reward. That is to say each
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institution must put into place appropriate policies to ensure that 
research complies with these regulations.
But within social sciences the ideal characteristics for such a 
normative framework are highly contested, partly because particular 
frameworks are seen as jeopardising the research enterprise itself. 
Putting such principles into practice can be tricky. In the US and, 
increasingly, in Europe, informed consent is asserted as a universal 
right for all research, social as well as medical. As Thorne (2004 p159) 
points out, developing a relationship with those one wants to study has 
always raised ethical questions about what to te ll them, how the 
identity of the researcher should be portrayed and issues of 
confidentiality and publication. But when consent is highly formalised, 
it can raise many further difficult issues. At what point in the process 
of negotiating access does one ask for consent? Often qualitative 
researchers do not know the precise focus of their research or the 
analytical framework in advance, so how can they inform the subjects 
about this? Highly formalised processes which ask subjects to sign 
consent forms can have the effect of making the research seem more 
“ risky”  than is warranted. Others have advocated consent as a process 
not a one -off event which therefore should be renewed periodically 
throughout the research, so that subjects are reminded that the 
researcher is not a friend or confidant. But as trust is necessary to 
obtain good data this can seem like an attempt by the researcher to 
sabotage the research. A further problem is that the need to obtain 
informed consent can give elites the opportunity to refuse outside 
scrutiny of their activities. For example, the difficulties in gaining 
access for this study led me to question whether it was appropriate for 
inspection units to so strongly resist my attempts as an outsider - just a 
student - to look at their work of protecting a very vulnerable group, 
nursing home residents.
More generally, consent in this study might be considered as far from 
straightforward, for the initial focus or subject was the resident, but
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the resident through the eyes of the inspectors and others, so no 
consent was sought from residents. Had I done so, then I would have 
come up against one of the more fundamental problems with the 
doctrine of consent. The types of people who are most vulnerable and 
most in need of protection cannot give consent, for they do not f it  the 
ideal of rational and autonomous subjects. For these reasons, a 
normative framework for protecting research subjects which rests on 
consent alone, is unlikely to be effective. The consent of the 
inspectors in this study was implied in the sense that in allowing me to 
observe their activities, inspectors had consented.
A further criticism of the emphasis on consent is that it  is “context” 
free (Root Wolpe 1998). Little emphasis is placed on balancing the 
rights of groups or collectivities. In both social science and medicine 
this is counteracted by the advocacy of the involvement of the 
participants in shaping the research and its outputs, particularly where 
the participants are from a “ disempowered” social group such as 
ethnic minorities or women. But again, in practice, these principles 
have proved controversial. What happens when there is a fundamental 
difference of view between the researcher and the participants ?
Viewing participants as active subjects with fu ll information and voice 
can divert attention away from a requirement for researchers to 
elaborate and operationalise a sophisticated code of moral conduct 
towards vulnerable people. In the “ the age of Innocence” , as van 
Maanen (2004) terms it, there was an assumption that subjects or facts 
spoke for themselves. Now this has ended and there are concerns with 
ethical values embedded in the “ authoring” of texts. For example, 
Denzin (2004) notes that ‘Women of Color' are concerned with the 
creation of texts where ethical values of caring, personal 
accountability and of solidarity are apparent and where texts have 
emotional content that the other can enter into. Although this might 
be of value for some groups, this has little  meaning for the most 
vulnerable nursing home residents who are precluded from using such
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texts as an emancipatory resource. Some vulnerable people cannot be 
treated as just another disadvantaged group.
Finally, if  research ethics is about the generation of a normative 
framework for the relationship between research subjects and 
researchers then who decides what the rules should be? The 
preference of professional groups is for rules agreed internally within 
their profession or for the matter to be left to their own professional 
conscience (Hopf 2004), both a form of self-regulation. But the 
increasing advocacy of formal review by “ research ethics” committees, 
as recommended by ESRC, can call this into question, particularly 
where such review is external. For one unit in this study, access was 
conditional on a review by, and approval of, the local NHS District 
Research Ethics Committee. An application to the committee was 
made and at the meeting many questions were asked as to why I did 
not want to interview residents. Weren’t their views important? My 
explanation that many of the residents in nursing homes were likely to 
be cognitively impaired and therefore this would required special 
techniques to obtain their views was accepted. Approval was granted 
unconditionally.
But where it is left to the individual or profession then there are 
further concerns about their capacity to withstand the factors which 
might bias research or distort findings, or potentially or actually affect 
the rights and welfare of research subjects. Usually referred to under 
the umbrella term of conflict of interest, included within this are 
individual or institutional conflicts of duties, role, responsibilities and 
financial interest. Such factors are perceived to be increasing 
because, as funds become tighter, researchers have multiple 
competing roles and institutions are required to commercialise their 
activities. The most obvious example of such a conflict is one which 
can develop into clear pressure from funders not to publish, or to 
publish distorted findings. For institutions, “ conflicts of interest”  are 
a “ reputation risk”  and institutions have developed policies to manage
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such risks. While these are usually concerned with individual conflicts, 
occasionally the policy may include the stance of the whole institution 




POLICIES FOR NURSING HOMES REGULATION: 
PLANNED NEGLECT ?
INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets the scene by reviewing the policies - legal, social 
and economic — which have had a major influence on the dynamics of 
nursing home regulation in latter decades of the twentieth century. I 
explore these factors with a dual purpose in mind, first as an 
introduction to understanding regulation in this sector and, in 
particular, as a context for the interpretation of regulatory rules. The 
second aim is to review the public policy context for what this implies 
about the status and nature of nursing home residents.
The choice of factors which may influence enforcement has been 
adapted from Kagan's (1994) review of this subject. Kagan identifies 
four major explanatory factors in enforcement style: regulatory legal 
design, the agency's social and economic environment, its political 
environment and its internal leadership. But as there was no central 
agency in nursing home regulation under the 1984 Act, this chapter 
concentrates on legal design and the political, economic and social 
environment. In relation to the former, Kagan (1994) identifies three 
important characteristics of legal design relevant to enforcement 
style: (1) the way the authorising legislation defines the regulatory 
mission; (2) the powers granted to regulators and the rights granted to 
regulatees and the advocates of strict regulation; (3) the specificity of 
standards to be employed. These are considered in some detail in this 
chapter.
The nursing home sector primarily provides institutional care for old 
people at the very end of their lives who are deemed to be incapable 
of living independently because of physical or mental frailty. The first
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point of focus for this chapter is therefore the nature of institutions 
which provide such care, institutions dedicated to the care of such 
people have always existed. But from the inception of the post-war 
welfare state to the mid eighties, the major part of institutional care 
was provided by state institutions, either NHS long-stay hospitals or 
local authority residential care. From the 1980s onwards, the NHS and 
local authorities withdrew from the care of this group. At the same 
time, the privately owned nursing home sector and the sector 
providing social care -  the residential home sector -  began to expand 
to such an extent that private sector homes, governed by regulation, 
became central to the care of the most frail group of very old people. 
Therefore, the first major factor to be considered is how health and 
social care policies have shaped the care provided, the market for 
nursing home places and the economics of the sector. But, while 
government policies since the 1980s have led to major expansion in 
nursing homes and a concentration of ownership, as noted in chapter 
1, the regulatory framework has remained unchanged for the major 
part of a century. Nevertheless, despite the stability of the 
regulatory arrangements, changes in government policies have clearly 
influenced the standards employed, their interpretation and the 
institutional organisation of enforcement.
The evidence on which the analysis of nursing home policy is based is 
dispersed within a fragmented and disparate literature. There is a 
long consistent thread of published academic policy research on the 
residential care homes sector. Such homes have until recently been 
run by local authority social service departments and thus have come 
within the ambit of the longstanding Department of Health-funded 
research unit, the Personal Social Services Research Unit. This unit 
has helped to develop and provide cohesion for research on residential 
care homes. In contrast, the academic literature on the UK nursing 
home sector is disparate and sparse. Because the very dependent 
elderly have sometimes been cared for in the NHS and, more recently, 
in nursing homes, the literature is fragmented between different
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disciplines — geriatric medicine and nursing — with a very sparse 
health policy literature in the UK. While there is much of relevance in 
the residential care sector literature, it  does not deal with health care 
matters. Issues central to nursing homes, such as the role of health 
care professions, the regulation of nursing homes by the health care 
sector, and the health needs of the client group, are largely absent 
from the residential care home literature.
Turning to availability of routine data, there is little  centrally 
collected official data on the care home sector in general. Apart from 
the decennial census, the only source of official data for the nursing 
home sector is the Department of Health publication, Community 
Care Statistical Series - Private Nursing Homes, Hospitals and Clinics, 
published annually. This publication focuses on the capacity of the 
sector by geographical area and contains little  other information. As 
regards other official sources, a Royal Commission on Long Term Care 
reported in 1999 (Department of Health 1999a) but as its focus and 
terms of reference were the demand for and funding of long-term 
care for elderly people, the information contained is not central to 
the matters considered below. However, since 1987, the private 
company Laing and Buisson have surveyed the sector annually to 
provide market intelligence. Their survey provides an important 
source of information. More recently, the baton of collecting 
information seems to have passed to the Office of Fair Trading. To 
fu lfil its requirements to protect vulnerable consumers, the Office of 
Fair Trading has recently completed a very thorough market survey of 
the care home sector (OFT 2005). Although this report is packed with 
data on the sector as a whole, it  does not distinguish between care 
homes with nursing provision and other homes. As a result 
information about provision for the most vulnerable groups is hidden.
This chapter concludes by considering the information available about 
the residents of nursing homes and implications of the foregoing policy 
analysis for the status of this group.
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DEVELOPING THE NURSING HOME SECTOR
Before the inception of the NHS, the bulk of care for very dependent 
old people was provided by local authorities, either in former 
workhouses or in residential homes. The 1921 census enumerated 
2,189 nursing homes with 26,000 residents in England and Wales and a 
further 133,000 people categorised as "inmates”  of public 
workhouses. The workhouses were subsequently taken over in 1947 by 
the NHS as long-stay institutions, while the residential homes 
remained with local authorities as the residential care sector. Thus 
until the 1980s, nursing homes were marginal to the health care 
system, with the number of places in the independent nursing home 
sector estimated to be 20,300 in the 1970s (Laing and Buisson 1999). 
Such homes catered either for women giving birth or for the well-to- 
do who had the means to pay for nursing care in their old age (Klein 
1995b p 158).
Favourable times for expansion
From the mid-1980s onwards, the state began to withdraw from the 
provision of care for all dependent groups — not just the provision 
designated for the very old, geriatric and psychogeriatric provision -  
but also the provision of care for those with learning disabilities and 
long term mental illness. The decline in state provision and the 
change from state to private care can be charted through the official 
Department of Health Annual Statistical series and the Laing and 
Buisson market survey. As Figure 1 shows, between 1974 and 1999 
there was a major decline in the number of NHS long-stay beds 
designated, while at the same time a major increase in care home 
places in both nursing homes and residential homes, as illustrated in 
Figures 2 and 3. The main decline was in NHS beds for the mentally ill 
and those with learning difficulties. Many old people who were 
“ senile” — suffering from what now would be termed as dementia -  
would have been classed as mentally il l and would have occupied a 
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But there was no commensurate expansion in the numbers of 
specialist places for these groups in the independent sector. Instead, 
the main expansion occurred in residential homes or homes providing 
general nursing care. The private nursing home sector expanded 
tenfold between the 1970s and 1997, when the sector peaked at 
around 195,000 places -  more than the number of NHS acute hospital 
beds in the UK (Department of Health 2002b). General nursing homes 
are mainly occupied by elderly people, with some 82% of the beds in 
2000/01 occupied by people aged 65 and over, and 38% occupied by 
people aged 85 and over (Department of Health 2002a). The average 
age of nursing home residents aged 65 years and over in 2000 was 
around 84 years (Bakejal 2002). The other point to note is that there 
was a change in ownership of the care institutions from state to 
private ownership as most of the growth was in the private sector. By 
2001, around 90% of the beds were in nursing homes operated by for- 
profit providers (Laing and Buisson 2004).
The development of the sector was fuelled by a number of 
government policies favourable to its expansion. An uncapped social 
care budget (Barlett and Phillips 1996; Klein 1995b p158) was 
considered to be a major factor aiding that expansion. Under a little -
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known provision of the 1948 National Assistance Act, social security 
offices had discretion to make allowances to those living in nursing 
homes or residential homes. By 1983, the cost of these payments to 
some 16,000 people had reached £39 million a year. Through this 
mechanism, which became increasingly visible in the 1980s, financial 
need rather than health need became the criterion for admission to 
institutional care with costs and places expanding to meet the 
demand. By 1992, when these arrangements came to an end, the 
costs had risen to £2,530 million a year and contributed to the care of 
some 271,000 people (Klein 1995b p158). This arrangement provided a 
secure guaranteed income for owners (Andrews and Philips 2000; 
Holden 2000) and a demand-led expansion of the market was 
stimulated. A property boom and relaxation of planning controls which 
allowed conversion of domestic properties were further helpful 
factors (Andrews and Philips 2000). The irony was that, despite 
explicit policies to de-institutionalise the long-term care of elderly 
people, discussed below, the expansion of the sector was fuelled, 
albeit unintentionally, by government funding policies (Klein 1995b 
p159).
But in the 1980s and early 1990s this was not the only major policy 
favourable to the sector. For the Conservative government of the 
1980s and early 1990s, small businesses like private care homes were 
seen as the cornerstone of a thriving economy. To aid such 
businesses, deregulation was in vogue (Baldwin 2005). However, this 
did not go unquestioned. Using Braithwaite’s (1993) cross-national 
comparisons of regulation in the nursing home industry, questions 
were raised about the most appropriate type of regulation design (Day 
and Klein 1987). Arguments for deregulation persisted through the 
first part of the 1990s. In 1995, the Department of Health issued a 
consultation document — Moving Forward (Department of Health
1995) — where one of the options for residential sector was 
deregulation. Concerned by these proposals to deregulate the 
residential sector, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation commissioned a
review of regulation in the sector. Published with the title  Why 
Regulate?, Day and colleagues (1996) concluded that regulation of the 
sector was essential to protect vulnerable residents. There were 
problems with regulation, in particular the lack of a central 
organisation to coordinate experience and develop cohesive 
standards, but rather than deregulate the problems of obtaining 
cohesion should be addressed.
In the mid-1990s the National Health Service Management Executive 
issued guidance (HSG (95) 41) to Health Authorities about the conduct 
of regulation in the nursing homes sector. The general tone was one 
of dialogue and negotiation with the industry. Thus Health Authorities 
were required to operate according to the principles outlined in the 
DTI’s Working with Business: A Code fo r enforcement agencies, where 
a “ reduction in paperwork” and “ transparency” were among the 
requirements. They were also to ensure that the process “was not 
unnecessarily onerous to ... nursing homes” . Clearly, the climate was 
that regulation should be undertaken with a light touch. In the same 
year, the National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts 
produced “ Raising the Standards”  (NAHAT 1995). This document set 
management standards for Health Authority regulation and inspection 
units based on the HSG (95) 41.
As well as economic and regulatory circumstances conducive to 
expansion of the sector, care policies were also favourable.
Goffman’s famous work on Asylums formed part of academic critique 
of institutionalisation in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, this was 
taken up by the government in Department of Health and Social 
Security consultative documents such as Priorities fo r Health and 
Personal Social Services in England (1976) and The Way Forward 
(1977), where the aim was to shift resources to the community. Care 
in institutions in general, and in large institutions in particular, was 
seen as depersonalising and promoting dependency, and “ care in the 
community” was promoted as an alternative. The advantages of
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independent living in the community in a small homely environment 
were emphasised, despite the fact that this is an unrealistic aim in 
this group of highly dependent people whose powers and skills are 
declining (Sainsbury 1989). Finally, as explored more fully in Chapter 
4, nurse-led units were also being promoted and several NHS nursing 
homes were set up. These favourable policies contributed to the 
expansion of the nursing home and the residential sector, primarily as 
a cottage industry in which nurses left the public sector to become 
owner entrepreneurs (Andrews and Kendall 2000).
An end to expansion
In the early 1990s, this favourable climate for the expansion of nursing 
homes changed fundamentally as the government began to recognise 
the extent of the uncapped expenditure. The NHS and Social Care Act 
1990, which came into force in 1993, introduced an internal market 
for residential and nursing home care with the local authority as the 
lead purchaser for both. With this Act the government put in place 
arrangements to ensure that the level of fees paid by local authorities 
were fixed by central government reimbursement policies. The 
consequence was to produce a cash-limited budget for nursing and 
residential home care. Throughout the 1990s, the cash-limited fees 
failed to keep pace with the cost pressures on nursing homes (Andrews 
and Gavin 2000). Nursing homes residents were becoming more 
dependent as places in the NHS declined dramatically. Partly as a 
consequence of increased dependency, general practitioners began to 
charge retention fees for their services to the sector, as the BAAA 
(1987) considered that providing care to a large nursing home with 
residents with multiple pathologies and requiring polypharmacy was 
outside the generally accepted meaning of the GP contract to provide 
“General Medical Services” (Livesley and Ellington 1996 para 3.22- 
3.48). In the late 1990s, the cost pressures of other legislation such as 
the minimum wage and the European “Working Time Directive” began 
to bite. Machin and Wilson (2004) report that, in 1999, 32% of workers
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in care homes were paid less than the minimum wage of £3.60 per 
hour for workers 22 and over, £3 for those aged 18-21 years. Their 
survey data suggests that introduction of the minimum wage had a 
moderate negative effect on employment but little  effect on home 
closures could be demonstrated.
The plans to revise the regulatory framework and introduce new 
standards, published as Fit fo r the Future (Department of Health 
1999b), gave rise to further unease among small nursing home owners. 
The proposed standards included requirements for new minimum 
staffing ratios which required one third of the staff in nursing homes 
to be registered nurses, and new space standards requiring single 
rooms. The Department of Health’s own regulatory impact 
assessment, published with Fit fo r the Future, estimated that one in 
ten nursing homes would not meet the space standard and over half 
would not meet the staffing standards. Thus, in 1998, research 
published by Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Laing 1998) suggested that 
there was a disparity between the fees paid by state providers and the 
level of fees which would provide a reasonable return on investment. 
This, despite the fact that providers with a good reputation also 
introduced “ top-up”  fees, that is they charged residents or their 
relatives fees even though their care was reimbursed by the local 
authority. With major problems in profitability, it  is not surprising the 
sector began to contract and homes surveyed by Andrews and Philips 
(2000) cited cost pressures and financial problems as a major reason 
for their closure.
Thus towards the end of the 1990s, the owners of small nursing homes 
operating in less efficient converted buildings and faced with new 
space standards began to leave the market and the sector began both 
to contract and to concentrate into the hands of fewer providers 
(Holden 2000; Netten et al 2005). Large organisations were more able 
to weather the adverse financial conditions. Their ability to borrow 
capital at favourable rates to invest in large purpose-built homes was
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advantageous (Holden 2000) and larger homes could more easily carry 
vacancies. In addition, local authority purchasers seemed to favour 
such homes, despite the rhetoric about community care in small 
homely environments. Some also reported that the corporate 
providers were prepared to run at a loss in order to obtain a strategy 
position in the UK health care sector, as they foresaw the state 
releasing its hold on the provision of other health care facilities 
(Player and Pollock 2001). Thus while in 1989 providers with three or 
more homes accounted for 12% of homes and 32% of beds, by 1999 this 
had risen to 19% of homes and 43% of beds (Laing and Buisson 2000). 
The average size of a home had also risen, from 28 places in 1989 to 
38 places in 2000. However, despite this concentration, the majority 
of nursing home providers are still small businesses -  mainly private 
companies with only a handful publicly quoted.
Quality of care
The change between NHS care and nursing homes was not just a 
change in ownership; there are other differences that place 
constraints on the type and quality of care which can be provided. As 
noted in Chapter 1 and described further below, little  is known about 
the needs of residents in nursing homes. In the official literature, 
their needs are largely undifferentiated, categorised simply as 
“ general nursing” . Apart from the requirement to ensure that there is 
a registered nurse on duty at all times, the staffing of nursing homes 
is a matter of negotiation between the inspectorate and the nursing 
home manager. There are no requirements for nursing homes to 
employ doctors or other members of the multi-disciplinary health care 
team, such as physiotherapists. As described further in Chapter 7, the 
1960s marked the beginning of a new interest in health care and the 
elderly. But under these arrangements for nursing homes, 
geriatricians who are expert in the care of elderly people at the end 
of their lives would have no institutional base in the sector. They 
were forcibly disengaged from the majority of their client group.
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Medical care was left to GPs, who when a large nursing home opened 
in their area, suddenly found themselves unable to cope with 150 
elderly patients with complex medical needs (Livesley and Ellington
1996).
With the expansion of the sector, the number of registered nurses 
employed in nursing homes more than trebled between 1985 and 
1995, when it  reached 42,428 whole time equivalents (WTE) for 
around 200,000 beds (Royal College of Nursing 2003ab). But compared 
with other sectors this is a low ratio of qualified nurses to beds. For 
example, the independent hospital sector employed some 8,000 WTE 
for around 10,000 beds. Although the independent care home sector 
is the largest employer of nurses outside the NHS, there is plenty of 
evidence to suggest that professional nurses employed by nursing 
homes are not the cream of the profession (see chapter 4). Such 
nurses are likely to be older and less well educated. In addition, 
nursing in nursing homes is something of a thorn in the side of the 
profession. Since 1992-93, the nursing home sector has been the 
single largest source of complaints to the registration authority for 
nursing — the UKCC, now the Nursing and Midwives Council. Between 
1994 and 1998 complaints from the sector ranged from a quarter to a 
third of all cases before the Council's professional conduct 
committee. In 1994, the Council issued a special report expressing 
concern about the standards of care in nursing home (UKCC 1994). 
Their concerns included lack of training, lack of records, 
mismanagement of residents' monies, lack of supervision, abuse of 
residents and unsafe systems for the administration and storage of 
medicines.
Although nursing homes employ professional nurses and provide 
nursing, the majority of care is not carried out by professional nurses. 
The majority of “ general nursing”  in nursing homes is provided by 
unqualified care assistants, paid at the minimum wage; care homes 
compete with supermarkets for workers. Thus it is unclear whether
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nursing homes should be considered to be part of the health care 
sector or some other type of provision. Recently changes in the 
regulatory framework and arrangements for enforcement have moved 
nursing homes even further away from being characterised as part of 
the health care sector. In the Care Standards Act 2000, the category 
of "nursing home” was abolished and such establishments are now 
called "care homes with nursing” . Such homes are now regulated by 
the Commission for Social Care Inspection, rather than by the 
regulator for the health sector, the Healthcare Standards Commission, 
and there is no requirement for inspectors to be nurses or have any 
expertise in health care. But even before these changes, it  was 
difficult to f it  nursing home care into any distinct category. Are they 
part of the health or the social care sector? Do they provide 
professional nursing care or social care? As nursing homes, and the 
care they provide, cannot easily be put into any category, then there 
are problems in deciding which norms of practice apply. How should 
standards be framed? Exploring this question is a major focus of 
further chapters in this thesis.
THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR REGULATION
As the independent nursing home sector has expanded to become 
central to the provision of care for the elderly, regulation has 
assumed increasing importance. Kagan (1994) identifies three 
characteristics of legal design which have influence on enforcement 
style: (1) the way the authorising legislation defines the regulatory 
mission; (2) the powers granted to regulators and the rights granted to 
regulatees and the advocates of the strict regulation; (3) the 
specificity of standards to be employed. Each of these factors is 
considered below. This is followed by an analysis of the situation and 
context of Health Authority inspection units, whose activities were 
central to registration and enforcement.
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The authorising legislation and the regulatory mission
The focus for this thesis is the Registered Homes Act 1984, in force in 
between 1986 and 2002. But the regulation of nursing homes began 
with the Nursing Homes (Registration) Act 1927. In 1926, a select 
committee was set up to consider whether “ the general condition of 
nursing homes rendered it advisable or necessary, in the public 
interest, that the institutions should be liable to supervision by a 
public body” and to recommend the most effective means of 
supervision (Select Committee 1926). After fourteen meetings, 
hearing evidence running into some 200 pages from thirty-six 
witnesses, the committee concluded that there was an urgent need 
for registration and supervision.
The committee recommended that inspecting officers should consider 
the following:
(i) suitability of the person in charge
(ii) suitability of the structure of the buildings
(iii) sanitary arrangements
(iv) accommodation for staff and patients
(v) adequacy of the staff both as to numbers and training
(vi) preparation and storage of food for both patients and 
staff
(vii) general domestic arrangements such as the cleanliness of 
rooms
(viii) arrangements for the prevention of infection
(ix) arrangements in the event of a fire.
This resulted in a Bill where the conditions for registration were:
(i) “ the applicant is to be a f it  person”
(ii) “ the situation, construction and accommodation and 
staffing and equipment are all to be in accordance with 
the needs of the situation”
(iii) “ there is to be a proper proportion of qualified nurses 
engaged” .
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In moving the second reading of the 1926 Bill (Nursing Homes 
(Registration) Bill Second Reading Hansard 1927 Vol 207 c1628), the 
intent was summarised by Mrs Mabel Philipson MP as follows;
...a safeguard against abuse without unduly interfering 
with well equipped and well run establishments and 
without impairing the privacy of treatment that patients 
and their medical advisers desire ... it  aims at raising the 
standards of the condition under which the sick are 
treated.
The regulatory intent remained the same throughout the century - not 
to be prescriptive about how well-run establishments should 
undertake their business, to exclude unsuitable poor providers and to 
raise standards. Moreover, the Registered Homes Act 1984 turns still 
on the same vague but common legal terms -  the "fitness”  of the 
registered person and the "suitability”  of the premises.
Part II of the Registered Homes Act 1984 set out the legal framework 
for nursing homes, which were defined as any premises used or 
intended to be used for nursing. Part II also divided nursing homes 
into two categories — mental nursing homes and general nursing 
homes. In the late 1990s, 15% to 20% of all nursing homes were 
designated mental nursing homes - around 900 homes and 30,000 
beds. A further complication is that nursing homes, with the 
agreement of the registration authority, could decide to designate the 
home or the beds for a specific client group, such as learning 
disabilities, physical disabilities, alcohol and drug abuse, although 
there was no reference to this in the primary legislation. However, 
irrespective of the potential for the creation of places for other client 
groups, in 2001 some 82% beds in general nursing homes were 
occupied by people aged 65 and over (Department of Health 2002a).
Powers of regulators and rights of home owner and residents
The Act gave the Secretary of State for Health powers to register 
homes, to make conditions of registration, withdraw registration,
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make regulations and authorise persons to inspect homes. District 
Health Authorities were authorised to inspect homes and all of the 
Secretary of State’s powers, apart from the power to make 
regulations, were delegated to them. As it was unlawful for any 
person to carry on a nursing home without being registered in respect 
of that home, all nursing homes had to be registered. The Act 
operated in the following way. An application specifying the type and 
number of patients catered for had to be made to the Health 
Authority for registration in respect of a particular home. The 
applicant named in the application, if  registered, was issued with a 
certificate of registration. Under c25 of the Registered Homes Act 
1984 the Health Authority could refuse to register the applicant in 
respect of a home on the following grounds:
(i) that the applicant was not a " f i t ”  person whether by 
reason of age or otherwise to carry on a home of the 
type described in the application;
(ii) that any person employed or proposed to be employed
by the applicant at the homes was similarly not a “ f it  
person” ;
(iii) the home was not, or any premises used in connection 
with the home were not, “ f i t ”  to be used for such a 
home. The reasons for refusal were those connected 
with the situation, construction, state of repair, 
accommodation, staffing or equipment;
(iv) that the home was not or w ill not be in the charge of a
person who was either a registered medical 
practitioner or a qualified nurse;
(v) that the number of nurses possessing the qualifications
specified in the staffing notice must be on duty at the 
times specified.
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In preparing the notice in (v) above, Health Authorities were legally 
required to take into account the type and number of patients 
provided with nursing care in the home.
In c28 of the Registered Homes Act 1984, Health Authorities were also 
delegated the powers to cancel registration on the following grounds:
(i) any grounds which would entitle them to refuse an 
application for registration
(ii) that the person had been convicted of an offence 
against Part 2 of the Act
(iii) the person had been convicted of an offence against 
the regulations
(iv) the person had not complied with any condition of 
registration
(v) the annual registration fee had not been paid
The registered person could be prosecuted both for offences under 
the Act and offences under the regulations. As the registration also 
could be withdrawn, the regulatory framework had both legal and 
administrative sanctions. Offences against the primary legislation 
included non-compliance with conditions of registration -  in 
particular, non-compliance with the Health Authority’s requirements 
in relation to the number and type of person accommodated, the 
qualification of the person in charge and the numbers of nurses on 
duty. Offences against regulations included failure to notify the 
Health Authority of specific events, failure to keep the required 
records, failure to provide the Health Authority with required 
information and failure to comply with the provision of regulation 12 
-  the requirement to provide "adequate” facilities and services. For 
such offences, Health Authorities were required to serve notice on the 
registered person in writing before bringing proceedings in a 
magistrates court. With the possible exception of refusing to allow an 
inspector admission to the premises, which was punishable by three
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months in prison, the fines for offences were low, not exceeding level 
4 on the standard scale, a sum of £2,500.
As regards the administrative sanctions, registration could be 
cancelled in two ways: by giving notice to the registered person or 
with immediate effect by order of a Justice of the Peace. In the 
latter case, the Health Authority was required to demonstrate that 
there was a serious risk to the life, health or well-being of patients in 
the home. In the case of administrative decisions such as refusal of 
registration, cancellation of registration and changes to the conditions 
of registration, home owners had the right of appeal. Such appeals 
were heard by an independent tribunal - the Registered Homes 
Tribunal. The impact of Tribunal decisions on nursing home regulation 
is analysed in Chapter 6.
With the increase in all types of regulatory legislation in the last 
decades of the twentieth century, the Registered Homes Act was not 
the only legislation important to the protection of nursing home 
residents. Of relevance were the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
and its accompanying regulations concerning fire and control of 
infection, the Medicines Act 1968, employment regulations and 
registration of nurses. In the late 1990s, the Office of Fair Trading also 
began making important excursions into the sector, discussed below. 
The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 is of considerable 
importance, as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) inspectorate has 
successfully prosecuted a number of nursing homes. The potential 
fines are considerably larger than those available under the 
Registered Homes Act. Convictions are also publicised on the HSE 
website1. Between 1998 and 2002, there were 16 convictions of 
nursing homes under the Health and Safety at Work Act and, in four of 
those cases, the fines were in excess of £25,000. In one case, the fine 
was £50,000 plus costs for fatality involving lack of assessment in the 
use of bed rails. In another, where a 72-year-old drank de-greasing
1 http://www.hse-databases.co.uk/prosecutions accessed Aug 5th 2005
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fluid which had been left unattended, the fine was £40,000. Many of 
these incidents had resulted in the death or serious injury of 
residents.
The specificity of standards for nursing homes
Both the regulation and the standards for nursing homes were in the 
main non-specific, and referred to residents as patients. In Statutory 
Instrument 1578, The Nursing Homes and Mental Nursing Homes 
Regulations 1984, the Secretary of State for Health made 
requirements to keep records, in particular an adequate daily 
statement of the health and condition of the patients, to furnish 
inspectors with information and to notify the Health Authority of 
events, in particular the deaths of residents. Regulation 12 set out a 
large number of requirements in relation to facilities and services. 
The registered person was required to provide "adequate” 
professional, technical, ancillary and other staff, and "adequate” 
food, furniture and equipment. The arrangements for the disposal of 
waste, prevention of infection, handling and disposal of drugs must 
also be “ adequate” . "Adequate” precautions must be taken against 
accidents and "adequate” facilities must be provided for patients to 
be interviewed or to receive visitors in private. In the preamble to 
the regulation, "adequate” is defined as meaning “ sufficient” and 
"suitable”  for the size of the home and the number, age, sex and 
condition of the patients. Thus the Act and regulations allow Health 
Authorities to set specific conditions in only three key areas: the 
number of patients, types of patients and the number of staff. Some 
nursing home regulations were also clear cut. For example, a 
registered nurse must be on duty at all times and the home must be 
connected to the public telephone system. But a major part of the 
regulatory requirements required local interpretation by Health 
Authorities.
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In 1985 and 1988 the National Association of Health Authorities 
(1985,1988) issued guidance to assist District Health Authorities with 
drawing up their own guidelines and with the interpretation of 
regulatory rules under the 1984 Act. The guidance advised Health 
Authorities that, where no statutory legislation existed, standards 
“ should be comparable to good standards in NHS establishments” . 
Similarly, officers were to use their own expert opinion or “ subjective 
impressions of the quality of care at the home” . This is tantamount to 
saying that the rules rested on the authority of Health Authorities and 
their officers. With over 100 separate Health Authorities regulating 
nursing homes, as we shall see in Chapter 6, this soon led to charges 
of inconsistency and partiality. Moreover, home owners challenged 
the authority of Health Authorities to interpret rules by appealing to 
the Registered Homes Tribunal and, in some key cases, such 
challenges were supported by the Appeal Tribunal.
Vague rules in key areas relating to provision of care and facilities, 
coupled with neglect of the Health Authorities enforcement functions, 
described below, would not have been conducive to stringent 
enforcement activities.
Arrangements and context for inspection and enforcement
Under powers delegated by the Secretary of State for Health, Health 
Authorities became responsible for the registration and inspection of 
nursing homes under the Registered Homes Act 1984. During the last 
decades of the twentieth century, Health Authority inspection units 
were neglected by the Department of Health with no information 
about their activities collected centrally. However, to plan for the 
new regulatory framework implemented in 2002, the Department of 
Health undertook an ad hoc survey. Unfortunately, in this survey, the 
Department of Health did not use the same classification of homes as 
in its own statistical series but instead used the categories frail 
elderly and elderly mentally infirm (EMI). Despite these
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inconsistencies, the survey provides useful information about the 
workload of Health Authority inspection units. Data from the 
Department of Health survey can be compared with information 
collected by Day and Klein (1987) some twenty years previously, as 
shown in Table 1. This suggests that the resources of the inspectorate 
did not keep pace with the expansion of nursing homes. By 1999, 
each inspector was covering twice the number of homes and places as 
in the mid-1980s.
Table 1. Changes in workload of nursing home inspectorate
1983 (i) 1999 (ii)
Number of homes 820 5692







Beds per inspector 284 640
Source: (i) Day and Klein (1987); 
(ii) Department of Health 
(2000ab)
In 1999, inspectors visited each home on average 2.1 times a year 
(Department of Health 2000b) -  only slightly above the legal minimum 
number required of two visits per year. Overall Health Authority 
expenditure on registration and enforcement of the 1984 Act was 
estimated to be £11.3m -  in a sector valued at £3.3bn in 1998-99 
(Department of Health 2000b) -  or £1.18p per bed per week -  a very 
small proportion, about 0.33% of the national average cost of a bed 
per week of £360. Yet at that time, in the mid-1990s, the NHS 
Executive remained “ unconvinced that the current fees are 
insufficient to enable authorities to carry out their statutory functions 
to ensure the standards required ... are being met” (NHS ME HSG (95) 
41).
To carry out these duties, Health Authorities usually employed nurses 
as inspectors but occasionally the inspection responsibilities were
contracted out to specialist contractors. In the fieldwork for the 
thesis, the inspection activities of one such contractor were observed. 
As part of the preparation for the new regulatory framework, the 
Social Services Inspectorate also carried out inspections of six Health 
Authority Inspection units. The Inspectorate concluded that although 
nurse inspectors did well in promoting aspects of nursing care, there 
was some evidence that the regulatory function was not properly 
understood (Woods 2001). This was also apparent in the criticisms of 
the Registered Homes Tribunal described in Chapter 6. Given that this 
group was largely neglected by their employer, the NHS, this is hardly 
surprising. Nurse inspectors did not form one of the several hundred 
categories of nurses in the annual census of NHS staff (Department of 
Health, personal communication). Thus, for the purpose of counting 
NHS staff, they officially did not exist. Neither was there any formal 
recognised training or qualifications for the work.
Between 1984 and 1997, the Department of Health took little  interest 
in Health Authorities’ responsibilities for nursing home regulation. 
Apart from HSG (95) 41 referred to above, emphasising a light 
regulatory touch, no other guidance was issued until a new 
government came into power in the late 1990s. Similarly, after an 
early flurry of activity to coincide with the 1984 Registered Homes Act 
coming into force, the National Association of Health Authorities 
issued no advice apart from that associated with HSG (95) 41. Nursing 
home regulation was something of a backwater, with even 
government inspection bodies for the NHS, such as the Audit 
Commission, showing no interest at all in NHS registration and 
inspection units. Similarly, inspection activities seldom reached the 
courts -  between 1998 and 2000, the only years where figures are 
available, there were only five prosecutions under the Act 
(Department of Health 2000b). As inspection reports on nursing 
homes were not public documents until 1998 (HSC 1998/047), nursing 
home regulation was, quite literally, a private conversation. It was an 
activity with low public visibility and internally lost among the more
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pressing duties of Health Authorities implementing the government 
reforms of the NHS of the 1980s and early 1990s.
With the introduction of the internal market in the early 1990s, the 
main duties of Health Authorities were concerned with the planning of 
local services in line with government policies and purchasing care 
according to those plans. As one of these key policies was to 
withdraw from long-term care, Health Authorities were required to 
close long-stay services for the elderly. This meant there was often a 
conflict of interest between the promotion of nursing homes, which 
Health Authorities required to enable them to meet government 
objectives, and their responsibilities to regulate the sector. The most 
obvious example was that, under s.42 (2) (1D) of the 1990 NHS and 
Community Care Act, local authorities were not allowed to 
commission services from homes which had been convicted of 
breaches of the Registered Homes Act or its regulations. As the period 
of this requirement coincided with the period when Health Authorities 
were under the greatest pressure to close beds, this must have 
provided a major disincentive to prosecute. A further possible reason 
for the lack of prosecutions is that vague rules do not lend themselves 
to securing prosecutions easily (Hawkins 2002 ch12; Hutter 1997; 
Lloyd-Bostock 1992), as the court may operate with a different 
interpretive framework from the Health Authority (Black 1997). This 
makes the evidential requirements uncertain. Yet, the withdrawal of 
registration is a drastic act, a form of corporate capital punishment.
In a sector where the public is aware that the quality of care was low, 
this act has the symbolic effect of preserving public confidence in 
regulation.
Just as the currents from the deregulation movement were strong 
enough to reach the backwater of nursing home regulation, so too 
were the waves from “ consumer empowerment” . For local authority 
registration and inspection units, implementing the Citizen’s Charter 
meant a requirement to appoint lay assessors and set up advisory
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groups to be consulted about standards. No such requirements were 
placed on Health Authority inspection units. However, as a third of all 
nursing home residents pay their fees in full, the sector has not 
escaped the attention of the Office of Fair Trading. In 1997, as part 
of a project to assist vulnerable consumers (OFT 1998a), the Office of 
Fair Trading initiated research into older people as consumers in care 
homes. The research found that fewer than one in five residents were 
aware of being a signatory to a contract. Moreover, many contracts 
examined by the Office of Fair Trading broke regulations on unfair 
terms. The Office also found that relatives and residents had serious 
criticisms of the way inspection units handled complaints. It 
considered that complaints were handled in a way that favoured the 
regulatee and were unfair to the complainant. As described further in 
Chapter 7, relatives who are aware of the interest of the Office of 
Fair Trading are now keen to use this regulator for their grievances 
against the sector.
Relatively few scandals about nursing homes seem to attract national 
attention, rather there tends to be a low rumble of public concern. In 
1992, the Royal College of Nursing indicated nurses’ concerns about 
quality of care in a publication entitled A scandal waiting to happen. 
However, one scandal coinciding with a change of government did 
attract considerable public attention. East and North Hertfordshire 
was required to close long-stay geriatric beds to meet government 
policy objectives. But in the view of its inspection unit, the proposed 
alternative provision provided by a nursing home operated by Takare 
was inadequate. In particular, the unit had argued that the home was 
proposing to operate with a level of staffing far below the dependency 
levels of the patients. The Health Authority would have been well 
aware of the needs of these patients as it was already caring for 
them. The Health Authority was advised by the Strategic Health 
Authority that it  could not refuse to register the home on these 
grounds as the provider would appeal, and it  was highly likely that the 
appeal would be successful. The home was registered, opened and
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patients transferred, then many allegations about poor care were 
made. A subsequent TV programme and independent report (Livesly 
and Ellington 1996) revealed many problems with the home. The 
relatives pursued their complaints with the Health Service 
Ombudsman and matters were finally reviewed by the Parliamentary 
Committee on Public Administration. The behaviour of the Health 
Authority in transferring patients to this home, where they knew 
staffing standards were below acceptable levels, was heavily 
criticised. The home remained open and standards improved after 
consistent monitoring by the Health Authority. Yet despite the 
unfavourable reports on the home and surrounding publicity, this had 
little  effect on the standards in nursing homes in general. As noted in 
Chapter 6, an appeal by the same provider later that year to use 
similar staffing levels was upheld by the Registered Homes Tribunal, 
as Takare had convinced the Tribunal that it  was an exemplary 
organisation.
A further scandal erupted in 2002 around Lynde House - a nursing 
home in Twickenham owned by Westminster Health Care. One of the 
directors of Westminster Healthcare was Chai Patel, a member of the 
Better Regulation Taskforce and adviser to the government on private 
health care. The concerns were poor care and failure to listen to the 
complaints of relatives, some of whom were paying in excess of 
£70,000 a year for the care of their parents. The relatives were very 
successful in targeting Patel, who was subsequently removed as a 
government advisor and investigated by the General Medical Council 
for serious professional misconduct. The GMC investigation was 
dropped after a successful judicial review. These developments 
suggest a growing consumer rights movement. However, it  is a 
movement where the consumers are not the residents but their more 
powerful relatives — an issue discussed further in Chapter 7.
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WHO ARE THE RESIDENTS OF NURSING HOMES ?
What is known about nursing home residents is their number and their 
broad age group. Apart from these facts, no other information is 
routinely collected on this group. Despite the availability of many 
tools to measure health needs in this group -  for example, the 
Resident Assessment Instrument developed by the US federal 
government (Challis et al 1996), and one developed by the Royal 
College of Nursing (2004) — the Department of Health has avoided the 
standardised collection of data, even though this would be the logical 
development of the new requirement to assess eligibility for NHS care 
in care homes. Chapter 7 describes how, unlike the case of NHS 
patients, no comprehensive data set is routinely collected on this 
group of people.
The lack of administrative data is compounded by the fact that all 
major government surveys, apart from the decennial census, take 
households as their sampling frame and therefore gather no data on 
the institutionalised population. There are just two official surveys 
which included this institutionalised population in the past 30 years: 
the 1987 OPCS survey of disabilities, and the 2000 English Health 
Survey (Bajekal 2002). While the latter found residents to be more 
underweight, more anaemic, and with high levels of severe disability 
when compared with the non-institutionalised people in the same age 
group, the survey provided little  information about other disabilities 
important for the management of shaping of services for this group, 
such as the prevalence of dementia and urinary and faecal 
incontinence. Information about such people must be obtained from 
ad hoc surveys which, because of their nature, provide different 
definitions and a range of estimates. These surveys suggest that 
between 60% and 80% of residents w ill be cognitively impaired (Netten 
el al 1998; MacDonald 2002).
Apart from their high care needs, nursing home residents are marked 
out in other ways. If nursing home care is considered health care,
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then the rights of residents to care are provided on a different basis. 
The care provided in nursing homes is subject to co-payment, unlike 
health care which is free at the point of delivery. In the late 1990s, 
around two-thirds of residents contributed to their fees wholly or in 
part (Laing and Buisson 1999). Although recommendations of a Royal 
Commission, and several court cases -  discussed in Chapter 7 — mean 
that the boundary has shifted, with the NHS now paying for more 
care, the principle of co-payment remains. Socially, residents are 
marked out as old people close to death, with around a third of all 
nursing home residents dying each year. As one geriatrician notes, 
they enter what is referred to as the stone age of old age where mind 
and body are stone (Issacs 1981). The body begins to disintegrate and 
becomes unbounded, leaking fluid, skin becomes like tissue paper and 
bones break very easily. Incapacity of mind means that the 
personality disintegrates to the extent that the reciprocity of human 
relationships disappears. Thus nursing home residents appear to 
transgress the contemporary ideals of what constitutes the category 
of human (Herkovits 1999).
CONCLUSION
In the 1990s, there were in effect over 100 Health Authorities 
operating as separate enforcement agencies for nursing home 
regulation. They were operating in a climate which favoured light 
touch regulation, in a market with low profitability and with a 
regulatory framework designed some seventy years previously for 
different market conditions. The Department of Health took little  
interest in the activity and there was little  central co-ordination. By 
the end of the 1990s, the sector had changed from a cottage industry 
to one where nearly half the beds were owned by large providers.
The rules were vague, turning on words such as “ type” , “ fitness” , 
“ suitability” , “ adequacy” and “ condition” - terms which are elastic 
and malleable with little  intrinsic meaning. The anchor point for key
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rules was meant to be “ the condition”  of the patient. But contrary to 
recent trends in other sectors of health care to formalise and codify 
practice, central developments to codify nursing home activities were 
resisted. No attempt was made to further develop standardised 
measurement tools to specify different “ types” or “ conditions” . These 
problems were exacerbated by the fact that residents, as a group of 
very old people, have very questionable status as people. For women 
in particular, becoming institutionalised and dependent results in 
reversal of social role from carer to being cared for, with a complete 
loss of social identity (Evers 1981). In the absence of such socially 
defined points of reference, interpretation of rules which require an 
idea of the resident tended to be based on the expert opinion of the 
Health Authority or its officers. As explained in future chapters, such 
interpretations are open to challenge.
Such broad rules are advocated to set the tone of enforcement as 
educational and as a means of driving up standards through 
negotiation to meet changing expectations, professional practices and 
a changing policy environment. Rules framed in this way can be freely 
adapted to the exigencies of different circumstances. Indeed, they 
allowed the changing role of nursing homes to be accommodated 
within the health care economy, enabling the regulatory framework to 
adapt to a sector catering for an increasingly dependent type of 
patient as the NHS withdrew from the care of the frail elderly. While 
in other contexts such discretion may have been useful, in this 
context it  allowed rules for which there was no anchor, with a strong 
possibility that standards would drift downward. As Kagan (1994) 
found, where standards are broad, the possibility of excessive 
leniency is greater, particularly where industries are economically 
marginal. The government’s increasing reliance on the sector to 
provide care, coupled with the strained profitability, meant that 
stringent enforcement of the Registered Homes Act 1984 seemed 
unlikely. In fact, it  would seem that the sector had far more to fear 
from other regulators, such as the Health and Safety Executive, the
Office of Fair Trading and the United Kingdom Central Council for 
Nursing and Midwifery. Coming under the provisions of other 
government departments, some of these other regulators were not 
subject to the same conflicts as Health Authorities, whose regulatory 
decisions had to be taken with one eye on the overarching objectives 
of its departmental masters. In the mid-1990s, in their defence of 
regulation of the residential sector, Day and colleagues (1996 p30) 
argued that the function of any regulatory system must be to ensure 
that standards are not compromised by pressures on purchasers' 
budgets. However, for the nursing home sector in the UK, this was 
happening. As Cheng and Chan (2003) describe in the case of nursing 
homes in Hong Kong, when an industry is economically marginal, 
compliance only improves when the government injects a large 
quantity of both educational and economic resources.
What does this reveal about residents? The major neglect of the 
regulation of the sector would suggest that, at least to the 1990s, the 
government was not very interested in the care of elderly people. 
This group was a low priority.
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Chapter 4 
A DIFFERENT VERSION OF NURSING
TWO VERSIONS OF NURSING
At first sight, professional nursing as an institution would seem to be 
central to the culture of nursing homes and hence central to the 
development of effective regulatory strategies. Indeed, care in 
nursing homes is provided not by a multidisciplinary team as in other 
areas of health care, but by nurses alone (see Chapter 7). Yet, as 
Dingwall and colleagues (1988) pointed out, nursing never has been a 
unified occupation. Different versions of nursing — as a profession or 
an occupation with a “ trade” -  are played out in different historical 
or political contexts. Prior to the twentieth century, nurses were 
tradeswomen or handywomen (Abel Smith 1960). They made a living 
by assisting women in childbirth and preparing the dead for funerals - 
“ the lying in”  of women and “ the laying out”  of the dead. At the 
start of the twentieth century, when entry to the professions in 
general was largely barred to women, nursing came to be seen as the 
route to obtaining professional status for middle class women.
Sections of the occupation aspired to having the same status, financial 
rewards and control over their own work as doctors. Yet, professional 
closure on elitist terms has never been allowed to succeed, mainly for 
economic reasons (Dingwall, Rafferty and Webster 1988; Abel Smith 
1960; Davies 1995). As a consequence, two main versions of the same 
occupation - the professional nurse or nurse clinician and the 
“ tradeswoman” or handywoman - still coexist (Dingwall et al 1988).
The nurse clinician is described (Dingwall et al 1988, Porter 1992) as 
aspiring to a model of a relationship with clients, in terms similar to 
nineteenth-century private medical practice. Nurse clinicians have 
their base in academia, in the Royal College of Nursing and in some 
large teaching hospitals. They are influential in the training of nurses
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and In the development of nursing theory and models of practice. 
Throughout the occupation's history, the professionalist segment has 
sought to “ squeeze out the handywoman class from the care of the 
sick”  and “ gentrify the plot of work owned by the occupation” 
(Dingwall et al 1988 p227). As I shall describe, the dynamics of this 
struggle has created a new occupational group, essential to the 
nursing home labour force - the health-care assistant. Nursing 
histories written from the profession's perspective have always 
excluded the so-called “ pauper nurses” , the inmates of poor law 
institutions who assisted the master by feeding and looking after the 
sick (Kirby 2002; Lorenzon 2003). Similarly, the workforce in the 
nursing home sector have low status and are largely isolated from the 
mainstream of professional activity and debate.
This chapter explores the version of nursing enacted in contemporary 
nursing homes in two ways. First, through an exploration of how the 
characteristics of nursing home residents relate to the professional 
nursing subject discussed in professional nursing journals - the 
presumption here is that, where professional nurses practise, the 
ideals of professional nursing might be enacted irrespective of the 
organisation or setting. Second, through an analysis of the 
professional qualifications and credentials of those undertaking 
nursing in nursing homes. I conclude that nurses in nursing homes 
have difficulties in drawing on the strength and knowledge of 
professional nurses. They have little  access to the discourse of 
professional nursing. The version of nursing being acted out in nursing 
homes has more similarities with the “ tradeswoman” version of the 
occupation than the professional version. Nursing home nurses - 
qualified and unqualified - are primarily concerned with the harsh 
reality of making a living from dealing with the social problem of 
people at the end of their life. Where nursing homes are owned by 
the same nurses who manage them, then concern with making a living 
is to be taken literally.
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As described below, these different versions of nursing give rise to 
different ideas of the resident — one concerned with the professional 
nurse-patient relationship, the other with images of the resident 
which attract business. In the case of the former, the predominant 
ideal of the subject who can articulate, participate and reciprocate 
has posed considerable conceptual difficulties in developing 
professional nursing models appropriate to the characteristics of 
nursing home residents as demented individuals. But, although more 
appropriate models have been developed, the struggle for 
professionalisation, coupled with social policy in relation to old age, 
has created conditions which militate against the likelihood that such 
enlightened models could ever be put into practice in nursing homes. 
In this sector, elite forms of nursing and social policy are 
irreconcilable. The implication for regulatory compliance is that any 
strategy that rests on persuading nurses to comply with “ a 
professional nursing licence” , w ill be far from straightforward.
NURSING IDEALS
Maintaining growth, supporting the self and nurturing reciprocity
All concepts of health rest on an ideal view of what it  is to be human. 
Nursing, and health care in general, are concerned with restoration to 
the ideal and, where that ideal cannot be restored, providing support. 
Thus a more extreme definition of nursing (Boykin and Schoenhofer 
1993 p15) is that it:
...focuses on the knowledge needed to understand the 
fullness of what it means to be human and on the 
methods to verify this knowledge.
However, definitions of what it  is to be human and the aspects of 
humanity which are legitimate objects for restorative or supportive 
nursing work have varied. The Royal College of Nursing and the 
Association for Care of Elderly People (1996 p6), in one of their few
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publications about nursing homes, quotes the following as one of the 
most widely accepted definitions of nursing:
...primarily helping people, sick or well, in the 
performance of those activities contributing to health, or 
its recovery, or to a peaceful death, that they would 
perform unaided if they had the necessary strength, will 
or knowledge. It is likewise the unique contribution of 
nursing to help a person to be independent of such 
assistance as soon as possible, the nurse is temporarily 
the conscious of the unconscious, the love of the life of 
the suicidal, the leg of the amputee, the eyes of the 
newly blind, .. a voice for those too weak to speak....
Thus there are models of nursing which are restorative or supportive 
of the physical, mental, emotional, “ holistic”  and more recently 
existentialist functioning of an individual - that is they aim to provide 
restoration of the self.
But not all aspects of supportive work are valued. Supporting people, 
who, through illness or disability, can no longer undertake everyday 
activities means engaging in tasks that involve “ dirty”  work. That is 
work which involves contact with bodily fluid and excreta - activities 
which, from an anthropological perspective, are usually thought to 
contaminate or devalue the people who undertake them (Lawler 1991 
p75-83). Nursing has developed two ways of dealing with this. One 
strategy is to expel such work from the remit of professional nursing 
by delegating these “ dirty” activities to unqualified staff (Jervis
2001). For most of the 20th century, student nurses undertook these 
tasks as a rite of passage to the profession. However, when nurse 
training moved to universities, these tasks were delegated to 
untrained nursing assistants. The alternative strategy has been to 
transform the work from the profane to the sacred — historically this 
was through the association of nursing with a religious calling. In its 
modern manifestation, either this becomes a special calling for 
women who have the essential feminine quality of “ caring” (McCance 
et al 1999; Davies 1995), or such tasks become framed by highly 
sophisticated theories. In developing such theories, nurses have
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sought to carve a different space, avoiding science and technology as 
masculine - a space occupied by doctors. Instead, nursing theories are 
dependent on a sophisticated psychosocial analysis of the 
interpersonal which involves ideas such as “ reciprocity”  and 
maintaining a sense of “ identity”  or “ self” . Thus nursing is heavily 
dependent on, and reflective of, developments in social theory - 
particularly sociological theories of illness. But some such theories do 
not sit easily with the characteristics of nursing home residents.
The philosopher, Agich (1993), in his book Autonomy and Long Term 
Care, written as a result of work for the US Retirement Association, 
notes that models of human growth and development assume a steady 
progress towards a particular finished product - the autonomous 
subject, the independent, competent, rational and free decision 
taker. Human development seems to end with this product as 
development models have no analysis of subsequent human aging or 
decline. Such models, which place great importance on the 
empowerment of patients, independence, participation and 
reciprocity, are strategically attractive to the nursing profession 
because they offer the potential for an alliance with patients against 
the hegemonic power of medicine and/or the health care system.
Thus, a major review of how seventeen nursing models might be used 
to support the process of ageing found that the models were based on 
the restoration of functions, emotional state, or health, seen as 
“ growth” (Wadensten and Carlsson 2003). None explicitly took into 
account the problems of decline in old age.
Another ideal, central to much modern nursing theory but often not 
realised in old people who are mentally and physically frail, is 
reciprocity. Clearly, in order to reciprocate, residents must be helped 
to maintain a sense of self or identity. Traditional nursing models 
were based on the objectification of the body, where everyday work 
focused on its maintenance, care, repair and hygiene (May 1992).
With criticisms of the “ medical model” by sociologists such as Stacey
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(1977) and Strauss (1985), this traditional model has fallen from 
favour, at least with the professional elite. As part of the struggle of 
nursing to develop its own knowledge base distinct from that of 
medicine, “ holistic” , “whole person”  or “ biopsychosocial” approaches 
to nursing were developed (May1992; Pearson 1988). In a process 
called “ primary nursing” , patients are seen as active participants in 
the therapeutic endeavour (Savage 1995; Manthey 1992; Pearson 
1988). In vogue in the late 1980s, this model attempts to merge 
aspects of the life world. So, for example, for the patient with a 
gangrenous foot, there are a number of possible nursing approaches. 
To treat the foot as a disconnected object: how is your foot ? To 
address the patient’s psychological concerns: how to you feel about 
your foot ? Or to try and treat the issue in a holistic way: how do you 
feel now you have seen your foot? (Lawler 1991 p162). Primary 
nursing would advocate the last of these approaches. But in practice 
even empirical studies of elderly people who are cognitively intact 
have found that their active involvement in decision making is an ideal 
which is difficult to realise in practice. Baar, a Dutch nursing home 
doctor, notes:
It has been our experience that the capacity of nursing 
home patients to assert autonomy is overstretched ... 
patients no longer have the strength to voice their 
desires and requests ... often their w ill has to be 
reconstructed before a decision concerning their care 
can be made. Baar and van der Kloot Meijburg 2002
p112.
McCormack (2001) found that it  was impossible for elderly people to 
be involved in decisions about their care, as their limited knowledge 
of the health and social care system and their lack of understanding 
of the professional decision-making framework and the need for 
decisions to be made quickly, all acted as barriers to participation.
Estes and Linkins (2000) suggest that recently there has been an 
emergence of “ humanistic gerontology”  -  that is, a concern with the 
lived experience of old age. Thus, for theorists such as Cohen (1994),
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Agich (1993) and Kitwood (1995, 1997) the problem of old age is 
viewed in existential terms, echoing ideas about chronic illness 
representing a loss of self (Charmaz 1983, 1993). In old age, an 
individual must attempt to hold together an idea of the self while 
body and mind are in decline. These assaults on the self are 
exacerbated by admission to a nursing home (Davies and Nolan 2004; 
Lee et al 2002). The many losses prior to admission, such as the loss 
of their own home and the financial loss associated with the costs of 
paying for nursing home care, produce a devalued sense of self worth. 
As Agich (1993) notes, entry into a nursing home represents economic, 
social and psychological instability and for many residents the 
challenge is retaining any sense of self. This is exacerbated when 
nurses encourage and reward dependent behaviour in order to control 
the residents, as suggested by ethnographies of nursing homes (Nay 
1998; Evers 1981).
The caring/health care task then is to instigate processes which 
support individuals in maintaining their sense of self against these 
assaults. For Vallis and Boyd (2002), this means that, in the nursing 
home context, the well known medical, ethical or bioethical 
principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
justice need to be enhanced by further principles -  those of 
protective responsibility, narrative integrity and candour. Kitwood 
(1993) suggests that this means taking seriously the personhood of 
those with dementing illness by focusing on the communicative act, 
with efforts made to find out the need that is being expressed. Agich 
(1993) refers to this as a phenomenological approach. He argues that 
autonomy should be seen as the precarious active engagement of 
particular agents in the social world striving towards particular ends. 
Well-being is about support for the rhythms and patterns that make up 
daily life and maintaining a sense of functional integrity in those areas 
that the individual values. Thus for Agich, Kitwood and Cohen the 
issue is not loss of choice but loss of meaning or loss of a world that is 
open for meaningful action. This constitutes a fundamental assault on
the very nature of being a human person. Thus the problem of the 
self becomes re-framed from physical or emotional functioning to 
support for the existential self.
One of the characteristics of the nursing which is based on such 
theories is that it  requires intimacy or closeness with patients 
(McCormack 2001). Nurses are expected to get alongside the patient 
or resident in their suffering in a relationship built on reciprocity 
(Nolan and Grant 1993; Nay 1998 p403):
....caring requires that the nurse be with the resident, to 
recognise the resident as a whole and unique individual 
in a relationship grounded in reciprocity and transmit to 
the resident a sense of genuine caring which assures 
them they ‘matter’ .
The literature suggests that, in general, the unpleasant aspects of 
nursing work are eased when the patient is able to reciprocate. For 
example, one US nursing aide is reported to have said “ some folk’s 
shit don’t  stink” (quoted by Agich 1993 p60). But with nursing home 
residents and patients who are dying, very little  reciprocity may be 
possible and the model breaks down. The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists (2000) note in their report on institutional abuse of older 
adults, that there is need to enable staff to deal with patients who 
raise strong unpleasant feelings. Patients are “aggressive, resistive, 
irritating, repetitive, ungrateful, demanding and physically disgusting” 
(RCPsych 2000 p9). The report considers that repressing such 
unwelcome feelings increases the likelihood of abuse. Staff working 
in these situations need considerable support, as such patients are 
likely to raise a mass of primitive emotions which have the potential 
to disrupt care situations. In her study of nursing and the body,
Lawler (1991 p185) quotes one nurse:
...the people I find difficult are the people who go on the 
longest and suffer and their bodies show it. They 
actually rot... they rot... During this time the patient is 
totally dependent on the nurses for all body care.
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Lawler (1991 p187) also observes:
The care of patients during their dying days or weeks, 
often when they are no longer able to hold a meaningful 
conversation... is typical of women’s work. Nothing is 
produced... in that the patient w ill not recover. It is 
dirty work, and demanding of those who do it. In many 
ways it  amounts to little  more than physically tending 
the body...
In the late 1990s, the Royal College of Nursing developed an 
assessment tool for nursing older people (Ford 1999; Wills and Ford 
2000/01), which explicitly acknowledged the contribution of Agich 
(1993). The key aspects of this contain many of the elements 
described above: partnership between nurses and older people; 
person-centred care; building on individual biography and maximising 
an individual’s potential needs, wants and aspirations, with an 
emphasis on ability (Wills and Ford 2000/2001). With the 
development of the Royal College of Nursing tool, a revised view of 
nursing home residents has become part of a nursing ideology, 
although some (Hockley 2002; Davies and Seymour 2002; Froggatt 
2001 ab) argue that the sector still lacked a coherent model for 
palliative care.
In 2006, models of care in nursing homes were further articulated 
when the National Care Homes Research and Development Forum 
(2006) was commissioned by Help the Aged to undertake a literature 
review of “ best practice” in Care Homes. The Forum, which was 
established in 2003 by academic nursing departments, was described 
as providing a platform for researchers and practitioners in nursing 
homes to network and to share information and ideas. The aims of 
the review set out by Help the Aged included “ capturing the voice of 
those living in care homes” and providing “evidence as to how older 
people can be supported to have a voice” . Perhaps to reflect these 
aims the review was entitled “My Nursing Home — "Quality of Life in 
Care Homes”  (their italics). But the review could be read as the 
academic nurses’ vision of a care home. Traditional models of quality
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of care which place emphasis on independence and choice are 
criticised as unrealistic and unachievable. Instead, the perspective 
should shift to maintaining the residents* identity through person- 
centred approaches to care which involve looking at the quality of life 
from the perspective of older people themselves. A number of 
initiatives which involve residents in discussing quality of care and 
their environment have been developed (Reed 1999; Nolan et al
2002). Although accessing the views of those with cognitive 
impairment represents a particular challenge, with time and skilled 
techniques this can be achieved (Tester et al 2004; Murphy et al 
2005). As described below, these models were developed through 
action research in care homes - research which attempted to change 
the institution itself.
What is absent from these ideals is the sense that much work in 
nursing homes harks back to a traditional view of nursing, that is work 
with bodies. Gubrium and Holstein (1999) have observed that work in 
nursing homes is structured by the needs of the aging body. The 
development of appropriate models for care is always dependent on 
social theory, but the body as a material entity is a difficult and 
contested theoretical area. As Turner (1995) observes, there has been 
little  serious attempt to understand the relationship between the 
physiological process of aging and its sociocultural definition. Even 
Agich’s work (1993) avoids much discussion of the body, despite the 
fact that he describes his model as phenomenological. However, 
recent research in anthropology, in particular, Lawton’s (2000) study 
of death in a hospice, have taken an embodied view. Lawton suggests 
that people cannot maintain a coherent sense of self when their 
bodies reach a certain point of decay. It remains to be seen how this 
w ill be taken up in the context of care in extreme old age.
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Creating institutions for ‘ ideal’ nursing care
A number of experimental wards and nursing units were set up in the 
late 1980s to develop the “ primary nursing” model (Pearson 2003; 
Pearson 1992; Savage 1995). Despite research which suggested that 
outcomes were better, such units were closed in the NHS reforms 
which introduced the internal market. Requiring a high level of 
trained staff and commitment to clinical support, they were 
economically untenable when severe cost containment measures were 
introduced to the NHS (Savage 1995). But the model has survived as a 
nursing ideal which has been carried through into nursing profession 
recent re-engagement with nursing homes.
In 2003, the National Care Homes Research and Development Forum 
was established by a group of academic nursing departments whose 
concern was with the learning experience of nursing students they had 
to place in nursing homes. They were all involved in attempting to 
improve the quality of the learning experience by engaging in “action 
research” in nursing homes (Meehan et al 2002; Nolan and Keady 
1996; Nolan et al 2002; Hockley and Dewar 2005; Davies et al 2003) -  
attempting to change nursing homes from the inside. The model of 
care they advocated is based on the nurturing of meaningful 
relationships with both staff and relatives as well as with the residents 
(Davies 2001). Attention must, therefore, be paid to whether staff 
and relatives share a sense of security, continuity, belonging, 
purpose, achievement and significance (Nolan et al 2002) in their work 
or in their relationship with the home. Thus the home must be seen 
as a “ community”  which recognises rights, roles and responsibilities 
and in which the significance of relationships is understood. 
Opportunities for giving and receiving and for meaningful activities 
should also be created (Davies 2003). This model takes on the 
systemic challenges of working in care homes instead of reducing the 
complexity to individual staff practice.
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But whether such ideals will become part of general nursing home 
practice is another matter. The Forum acknowledges that such a 
quality environment requires resources, leadership, continuity of 
staff, self-awareness and a passion for gerontology nursing - 
conditions which are unlikely to apply in a nursing home. Moreover, 
many regard such views as the work of an academic elite who have 
lost touch with everyday practice. Indeed, there are competing 
models of care which find more favour in the industry. The main 
contender is the Minimum Data Set — Resident Assessment Instrument 
(MDS RAI — Challis, Carpenter and Traske 1996), which was developed 
by the US Federal government to provide a medical or functional 
assessment of residents. The nursing profession’s criticisms of this 
tool include lack of residents’ perspective, failure to promote the role 
of professional nurse within the nursing home (Wills and ford 2000/01) 
and failure to recognise or acknowledge palliative care needs (Parker 
and McLeod 2002). Nevertheless, as MDS-RAI provides case-mix 
assessment for nursing home reimbursement -  that is to say it can 
identify the costs of care — it  has proved popular with industry (see 
interRAI website http://www.kent.ac.uk/chss/interrai.htm accessed 
29/09/04).
Unlike medicine, nursing as an occupation is not able to control the 
nature of the work or conditions under which nurses practice. The 
future of nursing models, whether or not they come into common use, 
is dependent on much wider issues of interaction between social 
policy and the occupational struggles of nursing. I shall argue below 
that those struggles have contributed to the creation of conditions in 
nursing homes which make the adoption of these new nursing models 
difficult.
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THE TRADESWOMEN OF THE NURSING HOME WORKFORCE
The creation of the health-care assistant
As described in the first section of this chapter, the traditional view is 
that the purpose of nursing is to provide assistance with activities of 
daily living that the sick are unable to carry out themselves. Thus it  is 
never clear whether nursing should be a service industry or part of the 
private everyday activities of families. This ambiguous nature means 
that the level of skill required and the extent to which the activity 
should be publicly funded have been continually contested. 
Professionalisers, such as those whose work is described above, argue 
that nursing is a highly skilled activity which should only be carried 
out by skilled people after the appropriate training. But if  this 
argument is accepted, it  gives rise to economic problems. With a 
contemporary workforce of nearly 1 million, shown in Table 1, nursing 
salaries are reported to be one of the largest single items of UK public 
expenditure, consuming almost 3 per cent the total (Dingwall et al 
1988).










Total 760,000 220,000 980,000
Source: Support Staff in Health and Social Care - an overview of Current Policy 
Issues (Rogers J and IPPR 2002).
i
No separate figures are available for Nursing Homes but in the early years of the 
twenty-first century there were only a small number of beds in the independent 
acute sector — 10,000 compared with around 200,000 beds in nursing homes. The 
UKCC (2002) have also reported that just over half of nurses working in the 
independent sector were working part time. The total number of Whole Time 
Equivalents (WTE) was around 51,200.
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A calculation based on public expenditure and the average wage of 
registered nurses in 2000 produces a similar figure. Therefore, 
successive governments have recoiled at the cost of 
professionalisation of the entire nursing occupation. Significantly, in 
the National Health Service Act 1977, the power to define “ nursing” , 
unlike medicine, was retained by the Secretary of State for Health.
This has allowed the Minister to decide which elements of care should 
be considered health care, and therefore paid for by the state, and 
which are subject to co-payments by individuals.
When broadly defined, the demands for nursing can be unending, but 
the supply of professional nursing is constrained. For much of the 
mid-20th century, the resource problem was resolved by the creation 
of a large apprentice workforce of low-paid nursing students. But as 
other professions became open to women, nursing found itself in 
competition for middle-class entrants and in the late 1980s 
recruitment to the profession was in crisis (Dingwall et al 1988). The 
profession’s solution was to argue that the status of nursing needed be 
raised by making nursing an all-graduate profession. The 
recommendation in UKCC Project 2000 was to transfer nurse training 
to universities. This found favour with the latter due to their own 
straitened financial circumstances. It also had the added advantage 
of wresting the control of training from hospitals, where it  was seen 
be much too influenced by the needs of their employer, the NHS. The 
question about who would undertake mundane nursing tasks when 
students were no longer so available, never engaged the profession.
At that time, the RCN envisaged that care would be delivered by a 
wholly qualified graduate workforce, while the nursing regulator, the 
UKCC (1987), considered 70 percent of care would be delivered by 
registered practitioners. However, the NHS Training Authority (1987) 
envisaged a much larger role for support workers and began to 
develop policies for the employment of people limited by past
112
educational opportunities (see Dingwall et al 1988). The term 
“ health-care assistant” was introduced with the 1990 NHS and 
Community Care Act. Dingwall and colleagues, writing in 1988 (p229), 
commented on the newly published Project 2000 that:
If we ask who will be standing beside the patient’s bed... 
providing the direct hands on routine care in the year 
2000, it  is difficult to resist the conclusion that it  w ill 
still be the handywoman class in the new guise of 
support workers.
Dingwall’s prediction has turned out to be extremely prescient. There 
are no official data on numbers of nursing or health-care assistants 
employed in the NHS or nursing homes, as they have never been 
included in official workforce surveys. But ad hoc surveys, such as 
those which form the source of the data in Table 1, suggest that 
health-care assistant numbers and duties rapidly outstripped official 
accounts of their limited role (Thornley 2000). The growth of this new 
untrained occupational group in health care has been officially 
unrecognised with attempts by the profession to ignore their 
existence. As recently as 2002, the British Medical Association were 
still envisioning a future where all nursing care would be provided by 
qualified nursing staff (see Rodgers 2002). For the government, 
creation of health-care assistants not only provided a solution to who 
would provide care in the NHS but also created an occupation which 
could undertake work at low cost in the expanding private nursing 
home sector.
However, the history of nursing is that this excluded group of 
tradeswomen, although more economic to employ, becomes a 
problem both to the government and the nursing profession. Health­
care assistants are low paid, with wages on a par with those in large 
supermarkets — around £10,000 pa — half that of a registered nurse 
and well below the Council of Europe level for low pay (Thornley 
2001). Scandals abound, and the image of the profession is sullied by 
the public perception that this unqualified group is “ doing nursing”
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and are in effect “ nurses” (Spilsbury and Meyer 2004). For example, 
activities of health-care assistants are reported in the nursing press in 
the following ways: To catch a thief, abuser, k iller -  registration of 
health-care assistants to minimise malpractice (Nursing Times 1997 
17th Sept p12-13). As health-care assistants are unregulated, it is 
possible for poor carers to move from one home to another with very 
little  check. The excluded unprofessionalised workforce also tends to 
unionise to combat the low pay and low status. This then poses a 
political problem -  90,0000 health-care assistants are reported to be 
members of Unison (Nursing Standard Vol 17 (31) April 16th 2003 p19). 
The solution for both the profession and the government is to 
neutralise the group by reabsorbing health-care assistants into the 
profession. As a result, the excluded group gets better pay and 
working conditions and professional nurses can exercise more 
ideological control over them. Initially, there was no career 
progression in the NHS and very few training opportunities for health­
care assistants, particularly in the nursing homes sector. But the new 
regulatory standards introduced in 2002 brought a requirement for 
training up to NVQ level 3. In 2003, after much debate (see “ Friend 
or foe? Debate over health-care assistant membership of the RCN ” , 
Nursing Times 1998 Apr 15th p26-29), the RCN agreed to admit health­
care assistants with NVQ level 3 into the College. The government has 
indicated that it intends to regulate health-care assistants 
(Department of Health press release 2004/0086), but by mid-2005 
there were still no firm plans (“ Healthcare assistants still unregulated, 
despite pledges” , Guardian March 15th 2005). Regulation of health­
care assistants w ill produce a unified nursing workforce of lower 
status and the argument for professionalisation is likely to begin 
again. This pattern of events, played out in the 1930s and in the 
1960s with State Enrolled Nurses (Abel Smith 1960; Dingwall et al 
1988) may be repeated with health-care assistants.
In 2001, there were approximately the same number of beds in the 
NHS as in the nursing home sector -  around 200,000 (see Chapter 1).
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But, as Table 1 suggests, there are many more unqualified nurses in 
the nursing homes sector than in the NHS and far fewer qualified 
nurses (for the care home sector in general see Henwood 2001). The 
Royal College of Nursing (2003b) employment survey found that care 
homes had a ratio of registered nurses to untrained nurses of around 
28 per cent during the day, compared to 60 per cent in independent 
hospitals. There was also a higher ratio of residents to registered 
nurses — 18 residents to each registered nurse on the day shift, 
compared with four residents in a hospice and eight on a hospital 
ward. Staff in care homes lack qualifications with only three per cent 
of qualified nurses having a degree compared with 12 per cent in the 
NHS. Thirty-one per cent of staff in care homes responding to the 
Royal College of Nursing survey are from Black or Minority Ethnic 
groups compared with eight per cent in the NHS. With lower ratios of 
qualified to unqualified staff, there is less opportunity for supervision. 
Thus most of the care in nursing homes is supplied by an unregulated, 
uncontrolled and untrained group of individuals. Such an occupational 
group is unlikely to have awareness of, or understanding of, the elitist 
nursing models described above. Nor are they likely to have the skills 
necessary for developing new models particular to the nursing home 
situation. The people who work in nursing homes, including the 
professional staff, tend to occupy a marginal position in the labour 
market.
A search of nursing and other databases- the British Nursing Index and 
the Cumulative Index of Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
(CINAHL), identified no studies of health-care assistants in nursing 
homes in the UK. Studies in other countries and other settings 
(Spilsbury and Meyer 2004) suggest that health-care assistants 
concentrate on the routinisation of bodily tasks -  hygiene and keeping 
the residents clean and tidy. Holistic care was too demanding. Nay 
(1998) set out to explore the contradictions between nursing as caring 
and reports of nursing home care in Australia where uncaring practices 
such as neglect, fostered dependency, infantilisation and
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depersonalisation were frequently cited. Interviewing both nurses and 
residents, she found that unqualified staff drew heavily on their 
experience as mothers or focused on bodily tasks. Staff who had 
worked or trained in the acute sector also had patterns of behaviour 
inappropriate to nursing homes. They had been socialised into “ the 
medical model”  where they had learnt to concentrate on body parts 
and diseases rather than on the whole person. This was particularly 
the case where nurses perceived the patient to be difficult to care 
for. Staff tended to revert to an approach which involves a focus on 
tasks, routines and “ doing to” ... as this offers protection when the 
demands of caring are seen as too great (Forrest 1989; Menzies 1960). 
While residents wanted someone to listen to them, nurses never 
appeared to have time, nor did the residents see it  as part of the 
nurses’ job. This led to dehumanising practices. Nay (1998) 
concluded that insufficient numbers of appropriately qualified staff 
and overwhelming demands were the reasons for poor care.
Nurse owners and nurse managers as “tradeswomen”
The organisation and management of care in all settings -  hospitals, 
wards, and nursing homes — has always been an important aspect of 
nursing. But it  is an aspect that can be talked down by the nursing 
elite as managers are thought to constrain professional autonomy.
Part of the nurse's management skills include the managing of people 
-  not only other nurses, but sick people or patients. The iconic figure 
of Florence Nightingale, celebrated by nurses for the care she 
provided, is celebrated by social historians for her management 
abilities. Nightingale was responsible for organisation of the care to 
the injured in the Crimean War, not for providing individual nursing.
She was also one of the first people to collect management data — 
“ outcome” data on infection rates in childbirth (MacFarlane, personal 
communication). Similarly, one study of nurse training in the US in 
the early twentieth century suggested that student nurses were 
evaluated solely on their ability to manage wards and patients (Olson
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1996). Recognition of the significance of this work in the NHS came 
recently when the job title  "ward sister” gave way to "ward manager” 
with very little  change in the nature of the work. However, nurse 
managers can be seen as undermining their profession, as their 
concerns for cost and efficiency are likely to bring about the 
employment of cheaper unqualified staff.
Throughout their history, professional nurses have sought to construct 
environments where they can develop nursing without interference 
from doctors or managers. In recent times, these have been referred 
to variously as "nurse-led units” , "nursing beds” or "nursing 
development units” (Pearson 2003). Nursing homes were one of the 
first settings to be framed in this way. The debate around the 1927 
Nursing Home Registration bill which followed hard on the heels of the 
regulation of nursing was described by its proposer as a "logical 
consequence” of the Nursing Registration Act of 1919. The College of 
Nursing declared that they were appalled by the fact that there were 
institutions which called themselves nursing homes although there 
were no qualified nurses on the staff. The prevalence of such 
institutions was “ dragging through the mud the name of the noble 
calling which they pursue” (Nursing Homes (Registration) Bill Second 
Reading, Hansard 1927 Vol 207 c1629).
The aim of the Nursing Home Registration bill was, therefore, twofold
(To raise)... the standards of the conditions under which 
the sick are treated, and also the conditions under which 
the nursing profession performs their duties.
(Nursing Homes (Registration) Bill Second Reading,
Hansard 1927 Vol 207 c1628).
Nurse-led units within the NHS have a celebrated but controversial 
history. Critics argue that it has never been clear as to whether their 
purpose is to improve care of patients, or if  the units should be seen 
as an opportunity to claim a higher status for nurses (Pearson 2003).
In the 1980s, when nurse-led units were at their height, the NHS
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opened three “ experimental nursing homes” for elderly people with 
no psychiatric problems (Department of Health and Social Security 
1983). The evaluation proved positive (Lancet 1990; Bond and Bond 
1990) but shortly afterwards came the strategic withdrawal of the NHS 
from long-term care, although a handful of such homes survived.
Nursing homes were one of the first nurse-led units and recently there 
has been an attempt to rebadge them in this way. Nursing Values, 
Nursing Homes (Royal College of Nursing and Association for the Care 
of Elderly People 1996 p17) states that
as nurses in charge of nurse-led units they have a unique 
opportunity to deliver high quality research based 
holistic care. The old image of nursing homes as the last 
refuge of the unemployable is now totally outdated .
Similarly, as noted above, there are now attempts to re-engage with 
nursing homes through action research projects, development 
networks and joint nurse training (Meehan et al 2002; Nolan and 
Keady 1996; Nolan et al 2002; Hockley and Dewar 2005; Davies et al
2003). But the status of nursing homes still stands in sharp contrast to 
the public sector nurse-led units of the 1980s. The extensive 
evaluations of such units and their work (Pearson 1988, 1992, 2003) 
found that they attracted good-quality nursing staff intent on 
furthering their profession. As described in Chapter 2, nursing homes 
expanded in the 1980s in what was then a subsidised business 
environment (Andrews and Philips 2000; Andrews and Kendall 2000) 
that encouraged nurses to leave the NHS to set up their own nursing 
home businesses. Surveys suggested that most of these nurses wanted 
to be their own boss and hoped for personal fulfilment and financial 
rewards (Andrews and Philips 2000; Andrews and Kendall 2000). 
However, when less favourable reimbursement policies were 
introduced many became trapped, in debt and unable to sell the 
business as an economically viable operation. Moreover, the 
requirements for higher standards of accommodation, such as single 
rooms, meant they were forced to mortgage property to raise
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standards. Servicing the debt required reduction in staffing costs, 
which compromised care (Andrews and Philips 2000).
Partly as a consequence of these straitened circumstances, nursing 
homes have low status among the professional elite. The nurses 
working there are perceived as less skilled and knowledgeable and 
homes are seen as “ unrewarding places with unrewarding back 
breaking workloads and little  job satisfaction”  (Warner and 
Goodfellow 1995). Working on salaries lower than those in the NHS 
and with few training opportunities (UKCC 2002), nurses believe that 
they will be asked to put profits before patients. Going from the NHS 
to the nursing home sector is seen as a one way move - there is no 
going back, as employers w ill think they w ill have little  motivation 
and their skills w ill have atrophied (Warner and Goodfellow 1995). As 
Stannard (1978) commented many years ago, in a nursing home, the 
lofty goals of professional practice learned during training give way to 
more realistic goals of custody and the maintenance of order. This 
perspective is not counterbalanced in any way as, with a lack of 
recognised leaders in the sector, few nurses in nursing homes are seen 
to be promoting their work (Nazarko 1996). A search of nursing 
databases — the British Nursing Index and the Cumulative Index of 
Nursing and Allied Health Literature -  reveals that nearly all the 
articles about the management of nursing homes are written by one 
person, Linda Nazarko. Over a period of years Nazarko, who owned 
and managed a nursing home, has written about matters which 
concern tradeswomen -  cost savings, skill mix, marketing, regulatory 
rules and avoiding disciplinary action -  all aimed at the individual 
proprietor (Nazarko 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000ab, 2002).
The lack of nursing leaders in the sector means a general lack of 
involvement with professional development, nursing policy 
development and nurse education. Innovative work is not published 
and there is little  concern with academic pursuits such as teaching 
and writing. Academic departments and NHS providers who have
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ventured into care homes to try and improve practice have found the 
going very tough. Factors such as high turnover of staff and frequent 
use of agency staff mean that care homes are resistant to change 
(Hockley 2002). The UKCC (2002) report that less than half of 
qualified staff in nursing homes get time off work for training, and at 
a practice level activities which would allow nurses to share 
information with each other are limited. Reflecting on this, Nazarko 
(1996) notes that in stand-alone homes, the proprietor is isolated not 
only from mainstream nursing but also from other colleagues, as they 
are in competition in the local area for residents. The barriers to 
developing a coherent nursing view of the sector are identified 
(Nazarko 1996) as pressure of work and lack of clear goals, as the 
sector is at the mercy of changes in government policies in relation 
both to funding and to its position within the health-care economy. 
Unlike the NHS there is no funding for innovative schemes, no 
leadership programmes and little  public money to fund the 
educational development of nursing home staff initiated by nursing 
homes themselves (RCN 1996). That is to say, the NHS considers this 
to be matter for the commercial sector.
In the 1990s, as described in Chapter 2, the sector changed from a 
cottage industry to one where corporate owners began to dominate 
(Holden 2002). Corporates were more able to provide support and 
opportunities for networking. But the manager in a corporate 
environment may have little  opportunity to develop professional 
practice (Hockley 2002). Moreover, in order to run the home, they 
are heavily reliant on a marginal workforce of health-care assistants 
who are devalued by their own profession.
Models of care and the tradeswomen
The implementation of a model of care which required a sophisticated 
understanding of phenomenology does not sit well with the nature of 
the nursing home workforce as tradeswomen with few educational
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opportunities and only ad hoc contact with the professional nursing 
elite. Nursing homes; Nursing values (RCN 1996) notes that nursing 
home managers must be concerned with hiring and firing, training 
staff, purchasing all the supplies and maintaining the cash flow. One 
of the main issues for these tradeswomen is filling beds, as 
profitability is dependent on a high level of occupancy. Thus the 
tradeswoman must be concerned with marketing her home for local 
purchasers. With around two thirds of the places in nursing homes 
funded by local authorities, marketing must be directed to this group 
as well as to the private payer or their family. As well as costs, local 
authorities have an ethos which promotes independence — as Nazarko 
(1998) notes, local authority purchasers like single rooms, a number of 
small lounges and a homely atmosphere.
Private payers are concerned with the quality of facilities. In an 
article entitled “ Staying ahead of the competition” , Nazarko (2000b) 
writes that every nursing home claims to offer high-quality care in 
luxurious surroundings. Potentially this leads to the development of 
new bathrooms unsuitable for the client group as described in Chapter 
1, or the avoidance of hospital beds when the condition of the 
residents would make their use appropriate. Advertising a home as 
providing services for people with cognitive impairment may also be 
unattractive to prospective clients looking for luxurious surroundings. 
Instead, Nazarko (2000b) advises that homes should provide value- 
added services such as hairdressing, daily newspapers or chiropody 
within the fee. Successful homes need to convey to the prime 
decision maker that the residents receive care and stimulation.
Nazarko (2000ab) notes that this meant residents w ill be provided 
with not only a high quality of care but also a high quality of life. As 
the BUPA advertising notes:
...every resident is treated as an individual combining the 
care you need with the freedom you want... each 
resident is able to exercise choice in all aspects of their 
care.”
http: / / www.bupacarehomes.co.uk accessed 05/05/05.
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Both types of purchasers — local authority and private payers -  tend 
to avoid the trappings of dependent life. Thus the separation of care 
from life is perpetuated and the myth of independence and choice is 
sustained. As Agich (1993 p6) notes, the provider’s ready-made 
vernacular of rights and obligations seems at first glance to provide a 
hedge against that which bothers us about long-term care, the 
effacement of autonomy, dependency. He adds that “ the 
existentialist conditions that define the need for long term care make 
the concept (autonomy and independence) remarkably unsuited to the 
purposes of concrete ethical assessment” . In extreme old age, when 
people have most need of protection, choice and autonomy have little  
meaning and ethical systems based on this will be very weak.
Ethnographies of nursing homes, very few of which have been 
undertaken in the UK (Gubrium and Holstein 1999; Nay 1998; Stannard 
1978), tend to stress that, in practice, nursing homes are concerned 
with “ body work” . The old nursing models of hygiene and care of the 
body come to the fore in this context. Indeed, the fieldwork with 
nursing home inspectors, described in Chapter 5, suggests that they 
too were concerned with the presentation of residents — whether or 
not they looked well care for. That is, whether they were acceptably 
dressed, had clean fingernails and teeth, did not smell and, in the 
case of the men, were well shaven. Indeed it could be argued that 
such an approach is intrinsic to the care of very old people, 
irrespective of sector. For example, Evers (1981) notes that in NHS 
long-stay geriatric hospitals, patients are “ mechanically processed” in 
a regime that emphasises custody and control.
For a nursing home, however, there is a sense in which the 
presentable body of an elderly resident is the most visible part of the 
marketing image of the home. Obtaining that effect, for many 
residents, requires considerable work — work that is not tailored to 
the individual but governed by the requirements to get a number of 
residents presentable within time and cost constraints. As others
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have remarked in relation to primary nursing, staff are not rostered in 
a way that suggests communicating with residents is a priority. More 
staff are on duty in the morning, when more physical work is required 
to get residents up, toileted and dressed. Staffing levels are then 
reduced for the afternoon. As noted above, this is partly because 
nurses find that the demands of caring for elderly residents in other 
ways are too great. As Henwood (2001) notes, a lack of training 
results in technical, attitudinal and coping difficulties. Disengaged 
“ body work” is a defence against anxieties raised by debility, death 
and decay (Menzies 1960; Agich 1993).
CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to explain how different social groups within 
an occupation can form different ideas of the resident. Because the 
characteristics of nursing home residents call into question their 
status as fully human, there is an added imperative to work in ways 
which support and accentuate the humanity of residents. This is a 
difficult and sophisticated task, as it  requires the adoption of a 
conceptual framework which goes against the predominant cultural 
view of the individual. Moreover, engaging with people who are 
perceived as “ physically repulsive” , “ rotting”  or dying places great 
demands on those who attempt it. Yet, in the 1984 regulations, there 
were no statutory requirements for nurses to demonstrate special 
knowledge, skills and expertise in the health and social care needs of 
older people in care homes. Moreover, nurses in nursing homes do not 
consist of a professional elite but instead might be better described as 
“ tradeswomen” . Such nurses have little  opportunity for professional 
development and little  professional support, and are more concerned 
with the market conditions and economics of their trade. There are 
difficulties in one segment of the occupation understanding, adopting 
and using products developed by a different segment. These problems 
are exacerbated by little  public funding being available for the 
development of approaches to care tailored to meet the specific
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conditions of nursing homes and their residents. Funding regimes 
based on separation of health and social care mitigate against the 
adoption of “ lifeworld” models of care. Therefore the structural 
conditions in nursing homes enhance the image of a resident as “ an 
object” — a body. Other models are irreconcilable with government 
policy, both on nursing and on care of the elderly.
Finally, the two groups of nurse inspectors observed as part of the 
fieldwork in Chapter 5 might also be seen as enacting different 
versions of the occupation. One group's practice appears underpinned 
by a nurse-client model which emphasises the autonomous subject — 
they expected nursing homes to respect resident autonomy defined in 
a straightforward way. The second group were more concerned with 
nursing home owners and managers as tradeswomen. As a result of 
being tradeswomen, inspectors impress upon managers their exposure 
to considerable legal risk — in particular from the Health and Safety at 
Work Act. The emphasis was on creating systems and procedures 
which would protect the elderly person’s body from harm.
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Chapter 5
THE PROTECTED IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICES 
OF NURSING HOME INSPECTORS
INTRODUCTION
Ostensibly, the role of nursing home inspectors is to ensure that nursing 
homes comply with the regulatory requirements, either through 
persuasion or by employing legal or administrative sanctions. But behind 
this deceptively straightforward regulatory task lies a great deal of 
conceptual complexity. This chapter explores how "the resident” is 
constructed in the interactions between nursing home inspectors and 
nursing homes engaged in this complex activity of “ compliance” . 
Expressing the problem in this way situates the analysis of compliance 
within a social interactionist approach. From this perspective, 
compliance is a process “of extended and endless negotiation”  (Hutter 
1997 p12, quoting Manning 1988) or “ the outcome of a discussion” 
between the regulator and the regulatee (Lange 2004 p549). Viewed in 
this way, regulatory goals are not fulfilled by seeking conformance to 
regulatory rules and sanctioning those who do not comply, but the 
objective is seen as seeking “ to prevent harm rather than punish evil”  
(Hawkins 1984 p4). Compliance proceeds by “ remedying existing 
problems and, above all, prevention of others” (Hutter 2001 p15).
In such negotiations about compliance, the boundaries of interpretation
for formal legal rules may become so broad the rules lose their salience
(Lange 2004). As Gunningham and colleagues (1999 p22), quoting
Hopkins, notes, “ the real problem... is not to select the best strategy for
achieving compliance but to decide what it  is the regulated are being
asked to comply w ith” . Clearly, if  regulation does not achieve its effects
through the adherent to formal rules, then through what mechanism are
125
any effects achieved? For Hutter (2001 p16), ideally rules are 
“ internalized within the company to the point that there is no longer 
need to refer to the law since the distinction between the rule and the 
ruled activity disappears” . Regulation is seen as positively constitutive 
and controlling. In some highly technical areas, both Lange (2004) and 
Corneillsson (2005) have suggested that the professional practices can 
become adopted by the inspectors as “ customary” rules for regulation.
As Lange (2004) observes, this then raises difficult conceptual questions 
about whether compliance and non-compliance be meaningfully 
differentiated.
Empirical research suggests that in regulation in the UK, law is used as a 
last resort (Hawkins 1984 p190) and negotiative or “ accommodative” 
practices predominate. Deterrence strategies which emphasise 
confrontation and sanctioning of rule-breaking are less common. 
However, Gunningham and Johnstone (1999 p113) argue that a pure 
compliance strategy has severe limitations: “The regulated enterprise 
knowing that, even if  it  is detected no serious enforcement actions will 
be taken ... is unlikely to undertake expensive remedial action” . A 
credible enforcement strategy must include a significant deterrent 
component. As described in Chapter 3, the Registered Homes Act 
provided a pyramid of sanctions of the type argued for in the literature 
on regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992): formal notices, prosecutions, 
removal of registration and finally, immediate closure by order of a 
magistrate. Such a pyramid is thought to provide a flexible way of 
escalating action and putting controlled pressure on homes which do not 
comply. Yet, the information presented in Table 1 suggests that 
inspectors seldom prosecute, although they are more likely to take the 
ultimate step of removing a home’s registration and forcing its closure.
In 1988, the National Association of Health Authorities issues advice to 
Health Authorities about how to use their enforcement powers.
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Table 1. Homes for frail elderly and Elderly Mentally infirm: — 








Other closures 1143 185
Source : Activity, Workload and Resources of Local 
Authority, Health Authority and Joint Inspection Units:
Summary results of a survey in England 1999-2000 
(Department of Health 2000b).
This advice suggested that prosecution was the most appropriate 
sanctioning route, as evidence which led to a conviction could not be 
subsequently challenged in appeal against a decision to cancel the 
registration. Yet, despite this advice, there were only a small number of 
prosecutions. To prosecute, regulators would have had to crystallise the 
vague rules of nursing home regulation into an offence. Instead, a 
significant number of homes had their registration cancelled. In 
addition, over a hundred formal notices of non-compliance were issued. 
So, rather than a smooth escalation of action from enforcement notices, 
to prosecutions, to withdrawal of registration, enforcement consisted of 
either enforcement notices or removal of registration. There is little  
evidence that the intermediate stage of prosecution was used to escalate 
pressure on homes.
Such patterns of enforcement also occur in other industries. Gunningham
and Johnstone (1999) note that enforcement pyramids for health and
safety are also fractured, with inspectors only prosecuting in cases of
industrial accidents. Hawkins (1984, 2002) also found that the law was a
last resort for regulators who were unlikely to prosecute except in cases
where there was clear evidence of harm. An explanation for this
phenomenon can be found, not in studies of inspectorates, but in recent
work which explores firms motivations to comply. Kagan, Gunningham
127
and Thornton (2003) have suggested that, in the context of environment 
performance, firms have a “ multifaceted ‘ license to operate’ ”  -  social, 
economic and political. Firms may be controlled by what is described as 
a “ social license” to operate where local communities, environmental 
activists and the wider political climate all have considerable influence in 
ensuring that reputation-conscious firms comply with environmental 
objectives. The terms of that “ social license” are determined by a wider 
social and political community rather than legislators or regulatory 
agencies, and enforcement is by the public engaging in political or 
economic activity against the firm. Similarly, serious occupational 
injuries or deaths at work, can be seen as transgressing the terms of a 
firm ’s “ social license” .
The pattern of enforcement suggests that nursing home inspectors may 
also operate with a type of “ social license” . In the case of nursing 
homes, rather than enforcement by community activists or public 
pressure, an unequivocal punitive response on the part of inspectorates is 
required. Homes are closed when they violate their “ social license” 
rather than when they violate regulatory rules. As w ill be described in 
Chapter 6, the removal of a home’s registration is usually only sanctioned 
by the Registered Homes Tribunal when a home is operating at a level 
which is socially unacceptable, with evidence of severe neglect, abuse, 
risk to life or gross financial mismanagement. In legal terms, the home 
owner is deemed “ unfit” , but alternatively the home could be seen as 
transgressing the terms of its “ social license” , with the regulatory rules 
reframed to enforce the “ social license” . Drawing a parallel with work 
on pollution by Hawkins (1984), enforcement is a consequence of moral 
rather than technical evaluations. Other types of licences may also be 
relevant to nursing homes. In particular, nursing homes may be subject 
to a “ professional nursing” licence, as described in this chapter.
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With so few prosecutions or cancellations of registration, inspectors are 
operating purely through persuasion. The empirical evidence suggests 
that this is unlikely to be effective with large chains. Research suggests 
that inspection is likely to have more effect with small firms than large 
chains (Gray and Shadbegian 2005; Mendellof and Gray 2005), and 
prosecution has been found to be more effective with large chains 
concerned about their reputation. Prosecution of small firms is likely to 
be counterproductive as they divert resources to contesting legal claims. 
For example, Troyer JL and Thompson HG (2004) found that litigation 
against nursing home chains in the US improved measures of quality of 
care, while it had little  positive measurable effects on quality in small 
firms. Overall, compliance is affected by the financial and technical 
resources which firms can devote to the task. For example, Cheung and 
Chan (2003) describe how when licensing of nursing homes was first 
introduced in Hong Kong, the economics of the industry was such that 
very few could comply. The situation only changed when the government 
injected a large quantity of both educational and economic resources. 
Similarly, nursing homes in the UK operate with scarce expertise and low 
economic resources. As the figures for prosecution in Table 1 suggest, 
the “ social license” is enforced but there is little  legal enforcement of 
other rules. Thus, in this chapter, the inspector’s style does not refer to 
whether deterrence or accommodation is the dominant mode of 
interaction but to the nature of the techniques or arguments used for 
persuasion. In a study of US nursing homes, Braithwaite argues that such 
styles of regulation have a profound effect on the everyday life of 
residents (Braithwaite 1993). But other studies -  of farmers (Winter and 
May 2001), and the construction industry (May and Wood 2003) -  have 
found that enforcement styles, whether rigid and picky or supportive and 
helpful, have little  effect on regulated groups’ willingness to comply with 
rules. The authors argue that vague styles do little  to reinforce rules and 
can leave the regulated confused as to what is expected.
COMPARING HEALTH AUTHORITIES -  STANDARDS AND INSPECTORS
In a comparison of Australian and US nursing homes, Braithwaite (1995) 
demonstrated that broad rules or standards are more effective than 
precise ones in obtaining compliance with regulatory objectives. The 
former forced a negotiative relationship on the regulated (Black 1995) 
whereas the latter were open to creative compliance — compliance with 
the letter rather than the spirit of the law. But where, as is the case in 
nursing homes, rules are broad, what arguments are used to persuade 
homes to comply with objectives? The two Health Authorities, A and B, 
and their inspection units, on which this chapter is based, had different 
solutions to this problem. Apart from attempting to enforce the 
minimum standards of "fitness” , both avoided basing arguments on the 
Registered Homes Act and its requirements and looked elsewhere for the 
means to gain purchase on nursing homes. In doing so, they employed 
very different ideas of "the resident” .
While the arguments used by inspectors to persuade were different, the 
standards published by the two authorities were similar, although the 
standards for Health Authority A were published in 1993 and those for 
Health Authority B in 2000. In 1995, the Department of Health issued 
guidance requiring all Health Authorities to produce standards for the 
inspection of nursing homes (HSG (95) 41) and both authorities based 
their standards on guidance endorsed by the Department of Health some 
ten years previously (National Association of Health Authorities 1985). In 
both sets of standards, residents were referred to as "patients” , 
reflecting the terminology in the regulations and guidance. With the 
exception of laundries, where Unit B required separate areas for clean 
and dirty linen, both units had very similar standards for buildings. The 
standards covered the requirements for the number of toilets and 
bathrooms, type of lifts, decoration, kitchens and laundries. There were 
also a large number of requirements for the keeping of records in three
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areas: safety of services, personnel records and nursing and medical 
care. Records were required on tests, maintenance and insurance for all 
electrical, gas and mechanical equipment, including hoists, assisted 
baths and wheelchairs. To comply with requirements under the Health 
and Safety at Work Act etc 1974, homes were required to keep Control of 
Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) registers and accident books, 
and to record the temperature of hot water and of fridges used for food 
and drugs. The requirements for personnel records included employment 
records, for example, references and UKCC pin number, and training 
records, which included requirements for staff training in fire safety, 
food hygiene, moving and handling, an induction programme for new 
staff and a training programme for untrained care assistants. In terms of 
the care provided, homes were required to keep care plans for residents, 
a daily record and assessment on pre-admission and on admission. 
Residents must also have access to health-care services, such as a 
general practitioner. In addition, Health Authorities were required to set 
staffing rules, known as a staffing notice, particular to each home and 
the needs of the residents.
Given that many of the Health Authority standards could only be 
enforced by education and persuasion, could ways be found to “ talk up” 
the powers of the inspector? Similarly, how could a coherent message be 
presented with such a large number of standards? Ways of reducing 
complexity were needed. The two authorities where the majority of the 
fieldwork was undertaken had different strategies to address these 
problems. Although they had basically the same standards, these were 
presented to regulatees against a very different background.
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Appealing to professionalism — Health Authority A
The Health Authority document which governed the work of Unit A 
tended to underplay the authority of regulatory law. Referred to as "A 
handbook for nursing home proprietors”  1, the publication emphasises the 
importance of norms, in particular those deriving from professions. That 
is to say, the Health Authority aligned itself with professional norms 
rather than with the Registered Homes Act.
Legal documents and regulations can not, however, deal 
effectively with the intangible aspects of taking good care 
of people who are dependent... it  is a service which calls for 
staff who can meet the highest standards in clinical nursing 
practice and the personal care of people.
(Health Authority A 1993.)
The handbook also firmly places an emphasis on the 
institution providing a homely environment, for example:
...this Health Authority is concerned that your home will 
endeavour to provide the best possible substitute setting for 
the patient’s own home. (Health Authority A 1993.)
While the document sets out the requirements in all the relevant areas, 
these were seldom backed up by reference to the Nursing Homes 
Regulations or other regulatory law, such as the Health and Safety at 
Work Act. Thus the status of many of the requirements is unclear. 
Moreover, there is no mention of any penalties or sanctions for non- 
compliance. This distancing from law leaves open the question of the 
derivation of the inspectors’ authority.
Such a view is understandable, as for many years the NHS claimed Crown 
Immunity from much regulatory legislation. The Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 was the first regulatory legislation that applied to the 
NHS. Instead, the normative framework was Department of Health 
guidance and standards of professional practice. Even when there was a 
requirement to comply with the legal regulations, norms tended to be
1 “Taking good care: a handbook for proprietors of private and voluntary nursing homes 
and independent acute hospitals registered with the health authorities”.
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refracted through Department of Health guidance obscuring their legal 
origins. Having never been required to comply with regulatory legislation 
or to introduce a system of compliance, nursing home inspectors, as 
officers of the Health Authority, without any training would have little  
understanding of how to construct legal authority. They were much more 
familiar with the way the Health Authority operates in the nursing 
profession and in NHS management. The Social Services Inspectorate's 
review of six Health Authority inspection units carried out in 2000 
suggests that an approach based on professionalism rather than the law 
was not uncommon. The inspectorate overall assessment was:
(T)here was some evidence that the regulatory function was 
not properly understood. The problems concerned 
regulatory activities across registration, inspection and 
ensuring compliance and did not concern nurse inspectors' 
clinical knowledge and skills (Wood 2001 para 1.8)
Talking up legal risk — Health Authority B
In contrast, the introduction to Unit B's document, 
published by the Health Authority in 2000 and called 
“ Standards and Guidance''2, suggested that their authority 
would be derived from the law. The aim of Unit B’s 
guidance was: to assist prospective proprietors and persons 
registered in understanding and complying with the 
numerous statutory requirements regarding nursing homes... 
the guidelines continually refer to legislation and associated 
regulations concerned with physical standards of nursing 
homes and the qualifications and suitability of staff. The 
statutory requirements have been emphasised, as it  is fe lt 
that a good understanding and compliance with these 
requirements w ill lead to high standards of care.
Health Authority B (2000)
By 2000, the growth of regulation had increased to such an extent that 
most of the Department of Health’s guidance could be underpinned by 
legislation other than the Registered Homes Act. Thus, each section of
2 The Registration and Regulation of Nursing Homes, Independent Hospitals and Clinics: 
Standards and Guidance
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the document was headed with a reference to the appropriate 
legislation. The legislative requirements were reinforced by reference to 
the risks of non-compliance with respect not only to the regulatory 
powers but also to the risk of private litigation. Thus good records were 
a defence in an “ increasingly litigious environment” . Records of 
accidents and incidents not only met legislative requirements but 
“ provide the organisation with useful data and evidence in the event of 
possible compensation claims” . The clinical record, as well being a key 
document in the care of the patient, was central to “ the defence of 
compensation and clinical negligence claims” . Health Authority B also 
linked the requirements to the offences, so while Unit A simply said that 
“ a register of all patients” must be kept, Unit B reminded proprietors 
that it  is an offence not to do so.
Unit B also reminded owners that the Health Authority 
expected them to comply with other regulatory legislation, 
not just the Registered Homes Act. “ Inspection by other 
statutory agencies w ill be required by the Health Authority 
and w ill be followed up by written report or letter ie Fire 
Authority and the Environmental Health Officer” .
It is an interesting point as to whether a change in climate towards 
nursing homes occurred between 1993 and 2000 which meant that 
standards written at the later date could be written in a more 
threatening way. As noted in Chapter 3, deregulation was in vogue for 
much of the early 1990s. However, the new Labour government elected 
in 1997 was more interested in reform than deregulation (Baldwin 2005), 
and was pledged to reform regulation in the nursing home sector. This 
may have allowed authorities more licence to assert themselves.
Irrespective of any possible differences in political climate, these 
differences in emphasis followed through into the approach to 
inspection. In line with the philosophy set out by its Health Authority, 
Unit A avoided using reference to law when attempting to persuade home
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managers. The exception was where homes fe ll below minimum 
standards of “ fitness”  -  that is to say, where there was evidence that 
the home had transgressed its “ social license” . Otherwise, a persuasive 
rhetoric of professional improvement which emphasised the “ needs” and 
“ choices” of residents was the mainstay of inspectors in Unit A. Unit B 
attempted to consolidate the large number of rules into overarching 
schema which, as described below, owes much to modern “ risk” 
management techniques. This emphasised the development of “ risk” 
management systems to protect owners and managers against the risks of 
litigation and regulatory action, not from the Registered Homes Act but 
from other regulators who enforced a web of legislation which enmeshes 
homes and surrounds residents. Legal risks were exaggerated and 
presented as all-pervasive but there was just enough reality in this to 
make this bluff a credible threat. Possible explanation for the 
differences in approach between the authorities and their inspection 
units may lie in the background and experience of the inspectors or the 
institutional arrangements for the units.
The inspectors and their backgrounds
In Unit A, staff were directly employed by the Health Authority and all 
three nurse inspectors had worked exclusively in the NHS as senior nurse 
managers (their backgrounds are described in Chapter 2). The unit was 
jointly managed with the local authority. This meant that where the 
home had dual registration, that is to say both under Part 1 of the Act as 
a residential home and under Part 2 as a nursing home, then the home 
would be inspected jointly by both a local authority and a Health 
Authority inspector. There was also some harmonisation of standards and 
policies. In particular, lay inspectors were employed to undertake visits 
to nursing homes. Apart from the Health Authority’s own pharmacy
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inspectors and the local authority inspectors, the inspection unit had 
little  formal contact with other regulatory agencies.
Unit B was a private company commissioned by a number of Health 
Authorities to manage all aspects of the regulation of nursing homes. At 
the time of the fieldwork, this company was responsible for regulation of 
nursing homes in some four district Health Authorities (the background of 
the manager and the team is described in chapter 2). Two members of 
the team were evangelical Christians and nursing home regulation was an 
important expression of their faith. They were inspectors with a mission 
to ensure the best for residents.
Although this was not a jo int unit, it  worked closely with other local 
regulatory agencies. The Unit had regular meetings and training sessions 
with agencies who formed part of the regulatory web in which nursing 
homes were embedded. As well as local authorities, this included the 
police, the Health and Safety Executive, the fire brigade, pharmacy 
inspectors, immigration services, and the UKCC, which at that time was 
responsible for the regulation of the nursing profession.
BACKGROUND TO HOMES AND VISITS
As described in Chapter 2, ten inspection visits were made with each 
unit. The homes were chosen by inspectors as ones where my presence 
as an observer was unlikely to cause difficulty with the managers. The 
homes visited, their ownership, size and location are described in detail 
in Chapter 2. Homes in a variety of locations and of different types were 
visited. Some were in quiet rural areas, others in suburbia and or in the 
inner city areas. The majority of homes were privately owned. Nine 
were owned by large corporate enterprises and five had owner managers. 
In size, they ranged from a small home of nine residents to one with
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some 94 residents. Some premises were modern and purpose-built, 
others were converted domestic residences. As we shall see, the 
structure of the building limits the type of care that can be given to 
residents and provides a constraint for “ suitable”  and “ adequate” .
The regulations required that all homes receive two announced and two 
unannounced inspection visits per year. Usually these were undertaken 
by the same inspector. The majority of visits observed were announced 
inspections. While unannounced inspection visits had the advantage of 
the home being unable to put on a show for the inspectors, they had the 
disadvantage that there may be no managers present to hold to account. 
Nobody with authority would be on hand to provide information which 
would enable the inspector to assess whether a worrying observation was 
part of a general pattern, or unusual, with a reasonable explanation. 
Unannounced inspections were more likely to be used to collect 
information rather than exercises in compliance.
Most inspections with both units were tense, stressful and very tiring, 
with nursing staff occasionally bursting into tears during the visit. For 
large homes, visits usually began around 9am and often did not finish 
until 7pm, with only a short break for lunch. Visits to smaller homes 
would finish in the middle of the afternoon. Two of the inspectors had a 
practice of not accepting anything from the home, including food. While 
some inspectors accepted lunch, resources in nursing homes were so 
tightly allocated that only on one occasion was sufficient food available 
to provide a cooked lunch for two extra people. But sandwiches could 
always be rustled up. On the one occasion where a cooked lunch was 
taken, it  provided a valuable opportunity not only to sample the food in 
the home but to chat informally with residents about the quality of care. 
Hutter (1997 p188) reports that whether inspectors accepted offers of 
lunch depended on whether the inspector wanted to keep a distance
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from the manager. Lunch would be accepted where they had a close co­
operative relationship.
For both units, inspection visits usually followed a common pattern which 
would be heavily focused on the home manager or "person in charge” 
(PIC). There would be an initial interview with the “ person in charge” .
A walk around the home followed, with inspectors collecting information 
about the environment and interviewing staff and residents. The 
inspection would finish with a further meeting where the "person in 
charge” was interviewed about the inspector’s findings. Although 
inspection visits in both units followed this pattern, the type of 
information collected and the way the “ person in charge” was held to 
account differed between the units. For other regulators (eg Hawkins 
1984), the reputation of the regulatee was a major factor in shaping the 
inspector’s stance to the firm. But in this case, it  was not the reputation 
of the firm that was a major influence. Reputation did not necessarily 
rest with the owner — the person or body corporate with legal 
responsibility -  the “ registered person” — but with the home manager or 
the “ person in charge”  . As Hutter (1997 p173) notes, the inspector’s 
emphasis is on the management. A good owner could be let down by a 
poor manager, conversely a good “ person in charge” could occasionally 
change the behaviour of a poor owner. Thus the work for a nursing home 
inspector was focused on holding the manager to account for what had 
been observed during the visit or what had come to light between visits. 
As with factory inspectors studied by Hutter (1997 p173), good managers 
were seen as the key to compliance. And, similarly, a good manager was 
one who accepted the inspector’s recommendation, was able to identify 
and remedy a problem and who generally could get things done.
The ’’registered person”  or their representative would sometimes attend
the inspection, voluntarily. Exceptionally, if  the inspectors fe lt that the
“ person in charge” was incompetent or unco-operative, or that problems
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were getting out of hand, the “ registered person” would be summoned.
As Hutter (1997 p175) also found, exerting pressure on managers by 
involving their superiors is also a common tactic used by inspectors. On 
one occasion, where the nursing home inspector had concerns about the 
home manager, the regional manager was informed of the visit and told 
to be present with the instruction that the “ person in charge” was not to 
be told. The “ person in charge” was then interviewed by the inspector 
in the presence of the regional manager. Thus the performance of the 
“ person in charge” and their inadequacies were demonstrated to the 
regional manager.
The sheer number of standards meant it  was difficult to check all of 
them on one visit but, in general, compliance with standards seemed 
poor. Of the homes visited, none appeared to meet all the standards, 
although a few were close. A significant number of homes were out of 
compliance in many areas. In particular, some eight years after the 
standards for unit A were published, five homes visited seemed not to 
have the required number of toilets, bathrooms, lifts and laundries. Unit 
B also had a large number of homes out of compliance with the building 
requirements, although their standards had been recently updated. Non- 
compliance with standards in nursing homes was not unusual. In my 
sample, compliance in individual homes varied from one home where an 
enforcement notice was subsequently issued, to one which had facilities 
and services far above the minimum and not seen in the twenty-three 
other homes visited. The only national data published on compliance 
states that less than half of the homes comply with the minimum 
standards for the storage and administration of medicines (National Care 
Standards Commission 2004).
The home considered unacceptable, well below the minimum standard, 
or not “ f i t ”  was very dirty, with one cleaner employed for thirty-eight 
residents. There was a smell of urine throughout which the home
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attempted to disguise by a device that periodically emitted a chemical 
perfume. Equipment was rusty and the bed linen was in tatters. The 
nursing staff were of poor quality and had worked eighteen hours a day 
for nine consecutive days over the Christmas period. At the time of the 
visit, staff were not in uniform and it was very difficult to distinguish 
staff from relatives. One woman, who was vacuuming the carpet in a 
communal room, was presumed to be a member of staff but she was 
actually a relative who had found the home so dirty she had decided to 
take matters into her own hands. Call bells went unanswered during the 
inspection visit. At one point, the inspector went off to a lady who had 
been shouting help for some time, and came back to say that the reason 
she was shouting was that she could not reach the call bell. The 
inspector had given her the bell. The staff then commented: “ Now she 
will have great fun with that.” The inspectors had put pressure on the 
regional office to provide a considerable injection of management 
support but this appeared to be having little  effect. The “ person in 
charge” was told that the Authority was close to taking legal action in 
the form of an enforcement notice. The staffing arrangements in 
particular were unacceptable.
At the other end of the spectrum was a home owned and managed by a 
not-for-profit organisation. The home charged about twice the Local 
Authority rate and had many residents who paid their own fees, but it  
nevertheless had a waiting list. Nursing staff were paid above the NHS 
rates and the home employed a multidisciplinary health-care team. It 
was the only home visited which had access to services of a psychologist 
who made assessments as to whether a resident was depressed or 
showing the first signs of dementia. Unlike the many homes where call 
bell systems were either not working or placed out of the reach of 
residents, this home had a call bell system which recorded the length of 
time taken to answer the call and defaulted to general alarm after ten
minutes. It was the only home visited where there was evidence of 
major structural changes to the building as a result of the inspection 
process. The laundry had also undergone major renovation as a result of 
the inspector’s requirements. Economics is not the only factor here, as 
other homes visited also charged similar rates for fee-paying residents 
but with far fewer facilities and a much lower standard of care.
STYLES OF PERSUASION
The Unit A style — focusing on residents and their needs
Hawkins (1984 p187) found in a study of environmental protection that:
...field officers only present themselves as authoritative 
legal actors when it  is tactically appropriate to do so in 
negotiations... the law... is distant, dimly perceived and 
little  understood. The officer, with few exceptions, has 
scant knowledge of the precise law he is administering and 
enforcing.
This was also the case for Unit A and reference to the law or the use of 
law as a threat or a risk was not a common part of conversation with 
home managers. Law was only brought into the picture when care in the 
home fell well below a minimum level.
Thus the Health Authority’s philosophy carried through into the 
inspection process with expertise and authority derived from nursing.
The emphasis was on both advocacy for individual residents and a very 
old philosophy, firmly embedded in the NHS, that residents must be 
treated or receive care according to their needs. Needs, in this case, are 
constructed from a nursing perspective which is described in more detail 
in Chapter 4. In making judgements about the home, Unit A was keen to 
obtain information from both relatives and residents. Inspectors went to 
some lengths to make themselves available to both on the inspection
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visit. Thus Unit A’s view of the resident shared much in common with 
the vogue for “ user empowerment”  in health policy and the industry’s 
advertisements of the service they provided, described in Chapter 7. But 
as I shall explain, the general approach of Unit A based on these values 
was frustrated by legal and resource constraints.
Establishing needs and authority — the in itia l interview 
with the "person in charge”
The inspector’s initial interview provided an opportunity to ensure that 
the home had kept many of the required records. However, a major part 
of the interview would be taken up with a discussion of residents and 
their needs -  a discussion which had a number of different purposes. 
First, it  provided an opportunity for the inspector to make an informal 
but professional assessment of the competence, skills, training and 
trustworthiness of the manager. As Hutter (1997 p174) notes, managers 
would be tested and this might include setting traps to see if  they could 
be trusted. What did they know about their residents? How much did 
they know about the requirements for managing this type of resident? 
This was particularly important where inspectors had no previous 
knowledge of the manager. Secondly, such a conversation would also be 
used to establish the inspector’s own competence and authority as a 
clinician and a manager — for example, what type of dementia did a 
resident have and what medication were they on?
A further important part of this conversation was obtaining the necessary
information to make an interpretation of rules governing care and
services. These were framed in terms of a requirement to be “ suitable”
and “ adequate” to the number, type and condition of residents. For
example, the staffing notice, a rule about the ratio of staff to residents
agreed with the Health Authority, needed to be based on the number and
type of residents at the time of the visit. Even establishing the number
of residents was seldom straightforward, as most homes did not have any
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electronic database of residents but relied on paper-based records.
Trying to reconcile the number of admissions and deaths and discharges 
in a log book with crossings out and omissions proved a frustrating 
experience. In a large home of some eighty or ninety beds, several of 
which were visited, a considerable time might be spent with the "person 
in charge” in this activity, causing one inspector to remark that he was 
"losing the w ill to live” because the home had such poor records. Having 
established the number of residents, inspectors needed to make an 
assessment of “ type” or needs of residents in order to match the staffing 
levels and the equipment such as hoists to these needs. As there had 
been no investment in the technology required to make a standardised 
assessment of need3, the inspector's assessment of this, and of the 
required staffing levels, was based on a professional conversation 
between the inspector and the manager. How many residents needed 
feeding? How many had pressure sores? How many were confused? What 
was the dependency level? For a large home, this was often done at the 
level of the floor or unit.
Such questions also provided an opportunity for the home to admit that it 
was attempting to care for residents with problems outside their 
registration category. Homes can be registered as a general nursing 
home, one for the mentally ill or people with learning disabilities, or for 
those needing palliative care. For each category, there were legal 
requirements in relation to the skills required of the staff. A person who 
had a past history of schizophrenia, for example, should not be 
accommodated within a home registered as a general nursing home. 
While homes could have their licence withdrawn for accommodating 
residents outside their registration category, this was unlikely. Homes 
keen to f ill their beds often admitted people without enquiring too
3 The US Federal Government had funded the development of such a tool, a 
standardised “Resident Assessment Instrument”. A UK version of this was being piloted 
in some homes (Challis D, Carpenter I and Traske K 1996).
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closely about their past problems. Once accommodated, such people 
would be difficult to move because of the shortages of beds in more 
specialised homes. The higher fees charged might not suit the payer -  
the local authority -  and geographical location may not suit the 
relatives. Some inspectors did not enquire too closely into this problem, 
but a sharp-eyed inspector would see that a particular resident did not f it  
the category “ frail elderly” .
Having formed a picture of the type of residents, the inspector would 
begin the difficult task of working out whether services were “ suitable” 
and “adequate” . Part of this was an inquiry into the very vexed subject 
of whether residents had access to local health services. While in law 
the NHS has a duty to provide such services for nursing home residents, in 
practice many NHS community services took the view that it was the 
nursing homes’ responsibility to provide services such as physiotherapy or 
speech therapy (Jacobs and Rummery 2002; O’Dea G, Kerrison SH,
Pollock AM 2000). The effects of the disagreement about responsibility is 
that residents of nursing homes had considerably less access to health 
services (Glendinning et al 2002) than elderly people living 
independently. As homes could not necessarily ensure access to NHS 
community services, compliance with this requirement could not amount 
to anything more than ensuring that the manager had attempted to 
obtain local health services. It was difficult for an inspector to insist on 
any more when it was not the home’s duty but the duty of the 
inspector’s own employer -  the Health Authority — to provide such 
services.
While nurses can manage residents without therapy services, they cannot 
manage without the prescribing powers of doctors. For instance, 
residents with behavioural disturbances associated with dementia can 
only be managed by the home with the help of drugs. The inspectors 
would attempt to ensure that there were arrangements for general
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practitioners to visit the home, and the “ person in charge”  would often 
attempt to seek the inspectors’ advice about how to manage a difficult 
GP, but inspectors did not enquire too closely about relationships 
between the homes and GPs. As described in Chapter 3, the legislation 
gave them no powers to intrude in this area.
A typical length of time for this initial interview was around two hours. 
Very occasionally, the initial interview was omitted and the inspector 
looked round the home and then reported back. Having a picture of the 
home and with the competence of the manager and the dependency of 
the residents in his or her mind, the inspector would then set about the 
difficult task of seeking out further information in support of an 
argument about whether or not the home provided “ adequate” and 
“ suitable”  services from observations around the home.
Gathering the evidence with Unit A
The buildings and the environment — sanctioned non-compliance
Both units made an attempt to ensure they looked in every room and at 
all residents. Bathrooms, sluices, kitchens and laundries were also 
inspected. Within the nursing home sector, building and skills cannot be 
easily changed to accommodate the needs of actual residents. Some 
eight years after the Unit A handbook was published, many premises 
appeared out of compliance with the Health Authority’s requirements, in 
terms of the shared accommodation and facilities for people with 
disabilities, including specialised bathrooms and laundries. The lack of 
specialised bathrooms meant that a home could not comply with Manual 
Handling Operations Regulations 1992 and 1998, which required 
employers to avoid the need for employees to undertake any manual 
handling operations which involve a risk of being injured. Thus, to avoid 
lifting a dependent person in and out of a bath, an “ island” bath is 
required -  that is, a bath in the middle of the room with enough space
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around to enable a dependent person to be hoisted into it  with an 
attendant standing at each side. A further requirement was for a bath 
that could be raised and lowered automatically to prevent back injuries 
to attendants.
Such facilities were only routinely availability in modern purpose-built 
premises, and several homes visited had no such facilities. For example, 
St Agnes was a nursing home with accommodation built at different 
times, each reflecting a different understanding of the nature of “ the 
resident” or a different positioning of nursing homes within the health­
care sector. One type of the accommodation consisted of hospital-style 
wards shared by six residents, dark and in a poor state of repair, with 
vinyl tiles coming off the floor, old hospital beds, and a day or sitting 
area at one end. In another part of the building, there were individual 
rooms without bathrooms. The shared bathrooms did not comply with 
modern requirements however, as the baths were against the wall, 
making it  impossible to assist a very dependent person.
There was inconclusive discussion between the inspector and the “ person 
in charge” about the number of usable bathrooms, which merged into a 
general discussion about the Health Authority’s requirements to update 
the building -  a discussion which had been in progress with the Health 
Authority for some three years. In the car park, work was in progress on 
a new building, an assisted living unit which the owners were developing. 
Rather than bringing the nursing home buildings into compliance, capital 
was raised for new and a different type of facilities. As there was no 
requirement for this to be registered, the inspector did not know about 
the new facility until the visit. Although the existing nursing building 
appeared out of compliance, the inspector concluded that there were no 
problems with the care but that discussions about the building would 
need to continue.
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A further small nursing home visited was a converted Victorian house 
which provided a service for a discrete rural community. The pictures 
around the walls of former residents who had celebrated their hundredth 
birthday gave testimony to a homely atmosphere. The manager and 
owner clearly knew all the residents, their habits and those of their 
families as well. Such personal care was much prized by the inspectors. 
However, the home used an unacceptable type of stair l if t  and the 
bathroom facilities were inadequate. The latter was not big enough to 
accommodate the hoist needed to enable one resident to get in and out 
of the bath. This resident had not had a bath since she took up residence 
some three years previously, and was articulate enough to complain. The 
problem of the bathroom could not be resolved because the home was on 
an economic knife-edge with an uncertain future. The inspectors, 
however, did not want the home to close as they thought it provided 
good care for the local community.
In the face of difficulties with buildings, it  would seem inspectors could 
only ensure that care did not fall below standards and continue 
negotiations with owners. “Twenty-five residents benefiting from two 
bathrooms... I would like to help get that sorted sooner rather than 
later” was the comment of one inspector. However, owners were 
reluctant to invest in improved facilities, as the financial returns on 
nursing homes were low and new regulatory law was pending. As 
described in Chapter 3, times in the nursing home sector were very 
uncertain.
Leaving aside these major problems with buildings, inspectors in Unit A 
encouraged and expected to see a homely atmosphere. The state of 
decor, the type of flooring, the bed linen and whether the home smelt of 
urine were all matters of concern. The inspectors considered any 
flooring other than carpets to be too institutionalised. However, many 
homes considered carpets unsuitable because they were continually
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soiled with the urine of incontinent residents. The resultant smell would 
indicate not only a hygiene problem but failure to manage incontinence.
Views of staff and residents
The walk around the home provided an opportunity to talk to staff, in 
particular the cleaning staff. How many were there of them? How many 
hours did they work? Had they received any training? The nursing staff 
views of the home were sought far less often, although they might be 
asked for information about the ways things worked and whether they 
had had any training. However, a particular feature of inspections with 
this unit was talking to residents.
In advance of their visit, this unit asked homes to put up notices and 
display leaflets saying that they would be available to talk to residents 
and relatives. Although no relatives or residents were observed waiting, 
inspectors said that relatives did occasionally phone up and comment 
after seeing the notice. Inspectors would ask residents questions, such 
as, what could be better here? Do they come when you call? As a large 
number of home residents are cognitively impaired, finding residents who 
could answer such questions could be quite a difficult task. But it  was 
part of the ethos of the team to listen to residents and bring their 
complaints to the attention of the “ person in charge” . Inspectors also 
had a “ case load”  of residents for whom they appeared to be acting as 
advocates, pursuing the residents’ complaints and dissatisfactions with 
the home. Such residents, including the one mentioned above who could 
not get in the bath, would be visited and progress with their case would 
be discussed.
Some residents had complimentary things to say about the home. Staff 
in one home were described by a resident whom the inspector always 
visited as “ friendly, thoughtful and kind... they don’t pull you about and 
holler at yer... you know what I mean... they keep you clean and tidy” ,
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“ lovely little  workers” . The relatives at St Agnes said “Mum is always 
nice and clean and the staff do her nails with nail varnish... i t ’s nice” . A 
married couple fe lt very comfortable, well looked after and pleased they 
got out to various treats. Residents could have different views of the 
same home. While one severely disabled man complained about the lack 
of a social life and his need to go out, another resident described the 
same home as “very relaxing... they really care... the food is very good... 
beautiful surroundings... couldn’t fault anything” . Another resident 
commented that she was fine as she had two young men with her, “w ill 
power” and “ perseverance” ! Some residents were passive, they did not 
like to worry the staff because they are very busy and they “ aren’t  
always on duty for me” . Another, when asked whether staff came 
promptly when called, remarked “ people don’ t  have call bells “ cause 
they use them too often” !
Few had complaints they were prepared to voice. A resident who had 
been in one home for nine years, commented that the place was going 
down hill. The food was no good... cold with poor ingredients. She said 
the top brass had been cutting back and the staff had been pared to a 
minimum and were working at top speed. The toilet paper was far too 
flimsy! In a different home, Ben complained that the food lacked 
variety. He would like curry or Chinese. He was fed up to the teeth with 
peas and there were no condiments like pickles and no roast potatoes, 
only mash. He also complained about the way he was lifted. Some of 
the staff were “ heavy handed” . He knew that they have to wear rubber 
gloves but his skin got twisted and torn (he has bandages around both 
upper arms). It hurt. At this point he burst into tears. He also 
complained that he could not get out of the building because he could 
not get his wheelchair over the high door sills unaided. As noted below, 
this was discussed with the manager but with little  effect.
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In a home where the inspectors were on the point of taking enforcement 
action, one resident summed up the problems -  problems of which the 
inspectors were only too well aware. He said that he had not seen a 
doctor in a year. He had only seen the last matron once in the last year 
and only one person came in all day. He thought he would be better off 
in a hotel, all the money he is paying. He also commented that he 
always ordered the cooked breakfast as “ there was a chance that they 
might get you up... otherwise you are stuck in bed all morning” .
But the numbers of residents from whom it was possible to obtain a view 
of the homes were few. The complaints above were all that could be 
documented from full day visits to ten homes with a total of 368 
residents. In five homes, there were no residents sufficiently aware to 
be able to articulate complaints. This is not surprising given that a level 
of cognitive impairment between 60% and 90% has been found in nursing 
homes (MacDonald A 2002; Netten et al 1998). Moreover, these few 
articulate residents tended to divorce themselves from the majority who 
were cognitively impaired. They said they ate separately, having meals 
in their rooms because, as one such informant put it, other residents had 
“ irritating habits” . They were also able to co-operate with the staff and 
engage in social conversation and thus could be more rewarding to care 
for. It was therefore quite likely they would be treated differently, so 
their view of the home might not be that representative.
Inspecting care planning
Whilst talking to residents, inspectors would also note their cleanliness, 
their teeth and their hair. They would also notice whether they 
appeared to have wounds or bruises or significant weight loss. The case 
notes of such residents might then be examined and the findings taken up 
with the “ person in charge” . Inspectors would also look at a random
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sample of care plans as well as the care plans of people about whom they 
had concerns.
Inspectors would often criticise the adequacy of such plans. For 
example, the daily record or statement - a legal requirement — often did 
not reflect the care plan. A resident may receive a high score in a risk 
assessment for pressure sores but no plan for action would follow from 
this. Nurses would write that a wound was infected, but there was no 
record of any subsequent action. In four homes visited, there were some 
very visible indications that all was not well with care planning. In these 
homes, relatives, frustrated that important issues were overlooked, 
would write out sets of instruction for staff, or "care plans” , which they 
affixed to the wall in the resident’s room -  for example: "Please do not 
give Bill confectionery of any sort” ; "Una needs her glasses to see... 
please put them on for her” ; "Please do not pull on Harry’s le ft arm, it  is 
very painful and we spent six hours at hospital with suspected shoulder 
dislocation. Harry can assist you as far as he is able... if  you ask him” .
Inspectors also encouraged the staff to place more emphasis on 
emotional and social issues in care planning - an approach which would 
suggest an holistic model of the individual. A number of nursing home 
managers seemed to have little  understanding of what this might involve. 
However, where nurses were competent to make such assessments then 
this led to other problems. Considering the level of cognitive impairment 
in nursing homes is known to be between 60% and 90% (Chapter 1), the 
conclusion of such assessments in many cases would be that the resident 
needed skilled help. But it was unlikely that this could be delivered. No 
home visited with this unit employed a psychologist. NHS community 
psychiatric nurses were usually thin on the ground for NHS patients, with 
nursing homes facing the additional problem, common to all NHS 
community services, that the local NHS was likely to see this as the 
home’s responsibility. Inspectors would criticise homes with large
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numbers of cognitively impaired residents for lacking any therapeutic 
programme. But as dementia was not a legal category under the Act, 
they could not require such programmes. Instead, skilled care was 
replaced by a poorly paid activities co-ordinator. Thus, in homes with 
large numbers of demented residents, the activities co-ordinator 
supplying sing-songs and craft took the place of any therapeutic 
intervention. The Health Authority had set a standard for such activities 
co-ordinators of one hour per week per twenty residents, and the 
inspectors also liked to see a varied programme of activities in the 
homes. But this was clearly not an issue which inspectors had many 
powers to persuade or enforce. That is to say, it  was likely that this 
professionally defined need remained unmet and there was little  
inspectors could do.
Assessing staffing, training and equipment
The rule that a Health Authority made about staffing was a condition of 
registration, but there were many ways in which the intent of these rules 
could be thwarted. The first problem was that the home might have far 
more heavily dependent people than when the notice was agreed. 
Therefore the notice would be inappropriate to the needs of the 
residents. The second problem was that inspection of duty rotas 
suggested that staff work very long hours -  fifty  hours a week was not 
unusual. The third problem encountered was that, in homes with 
separate units, the legal requirement was for the staffing notice to be 
set for the home as a whole. So while the home as a whole would 
comply, the staffing in individual units may be well below the level the 
inspector thought was adequate. Associated with staffing are the 
training needs. As well as the legal requirements for training in areas 
such as fire safety, inspectors would argue for training in care for 
dementia. Homes also should have sufficient hoists, pressure-relieving
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equipment and weighing scales, and appropriate beds. It was not usual 
to find homes lacking such basic equipment.
Holding the "person in charge” to account
Within Unit A, inspectors varied considerably in the extent they were 
prepared to engage with the "person in charge” in the final interview. 
Some merely announced the problems they found unsatisfactory while 
others engaged in considerable persuasive argument. Inspectors in this 
unit described their job as little  different from NHS management - 
monitoring performance and using their management skills to provide 
advice. Therefore, where the home had reached the minimum standard, 
the interview provided an opportunity for inspectors to point out issues 
which they fe lt to be problems, to persuade the home to improve, and to 
compliment the home on improvements.
Professional values tended to provide the persuasive force in these 
conversations, with strong disapproval being expressed as nurse to nurse 
rather than in terms of a requirement to be compliant with the 
regulations. For example, in one home the inspectors became aware 
that there were insufficient hoists. On one floor in particular there was 
one hoist for seventeen highly dependent residents. Rather than being 
reminded of the requirement to comply with the moving and handling 
regulations and the subsequent legal liabilities of failing to do so, the 
inspectors noted there was some rough handling going on, the staff 
needed more training in manual handling and they needed more hoists. 
When the inspector considered the staffing levels inadequate he 
remarked, "I don't consider this to be professional, do you... it's  not 
adequate to cover the risk” . Where the staff worked unacceptably long 
hours the "person in charge” was asked: "Are you happy they are 
producing quality care?” Although control of infection regulations are 
enforced by environmental health officers, the inspectors' choice was to
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draw on the manager’s professional conscience: “ How can you say as a 
nurse... you can’ t have handwashing facilities?” Intractable problems 
with the buildings and environmental hazards were simply stated with 
little  expectation that progress would be made.
Residents’ views were nearly always taken up with the “ person in 
charge” but criticisms from this source seemed to cut little  ice. When 
inspectors challenged the “ person in charge” with Ben’s comments 
about being roughly handled and that he was unable to get out of the 
building, the “ person in charge”  replied that he was rude and 
demanding, and wanted everything his own way. He had great difficulty 
in coming to terms with his situation. In another home, when a 
resident’s complaint about the food was reported to the “ person in 
charge” , she said that the resident was difficult to please and the food 
was cold because she insisted that she ate in her own room. The 
inspectors had also spent considerable time negotiating on behalf of the 
quadriplegic resident who wanted to go out more often and wanted more 
entertainment. Little had been provided and the inspectors fe lt that, for 
£400 a day, the home could do better. The compromise situation for the 
resident who could not have a bath because it was not possible to get a 
hoist into the bathroom was that the home had been persuaded that the 
resident’s feet be should washed more frequently.
As well as the denial of residents’ expressed needs, the “ person in
charge” would deny the inspector’s judgement of need. For example, a
home lacked hoists because, in the manager’s view, it was unsafe to use
them. In another home, where we had had great difficulty in finding
anyone to interview because all the residents appeared confused, the
inspector told the manager that she had noted a number of confused
residents and there seemed little  in the way of care planning around
mental health. The manager refused to acknowledge this, stating that
she did not admit people who were confused. There was no one in the
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home posing a problem to the home or themselves. In the face of such 
disagreements, some inspectors would continue to press their point, 
others would not argue but nevertheless write it  as a finding in the 
report.
While there could be much disagreement between inspectors and 
managers about compliance and the evidence on which it  was based, 
inspectors did have one strategy, also common to Unit B, for getting 
alongside managers. The final interview provided an opportunity for the 
inspector to collude with the “ person in charge” to obtain more 
equipment and other resources for the home - a tactic which Hutter 
(1997) reported as also being used by factory inspectors. Inspectors 
would ask: “What do you think of your beds? Honestly? Is this something 
I can help you with?” , “What else do you need? I w ill put it  in the 
report.” However, on occasions this tactic might be foiled by area 
managers from large corporates who attended to make sure this did not 
happen.
Going public — the Unit A report
For Unit A, “ putting it in the report”  carried a considerable threat. Unit 
A’s reports4 give the reader a clear picture of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the home, where standards have been meet, where the 
home is failing and where regulations are being contravened. The 
reports use the term “ resident” , or sometimes “client” , rather than 
patient. As such reports are public documents, the adverse publicity 
must have been unwelcome. For example, in a home close to legal 
action the report noted that:
Piles of clean and dirty washing filled the laundry and
containers of dirty washing were parked in the corridor.
4 To preserve the anonymity of homes and the inspection units, these reports have not 
been referenced.
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Most visitors expressed concern regarding the quality of 
care provided... four said that they would like to move their 
relatives out of the home. Staff continue to work excessive 
twelve hours shifts with two short breaks. This is 
unacceptable to the registration authorities and has been 
raised in previous reports.
Reports might also be used to support and pursue the complaints of 
individual residents:
There is one outstanding matter identified in a recent 
complaint investigation. It was agreed by the “ person in 
charge” that carpet would be replaced in one of the 
resident's bedroom after the bedroom had been 
inadvertently flooded. This has yet to occur.
Or to send warning signals:
Staff training records were not available at this inspection 
but w ill be monitored at the next inspection.
Anyone who had a choice in the matter might think about placing their 
relative in a home with the following report -  however, those with no 
choice might be waiting a long while for an improvement:
The home has 32 single rooms and 4 double rooms. All 
rooms have en suite bathrooms, however, none of the 
residents’ bathrooms can accommodate a hoist. The 
majority of current residents need to use the two assisted 
bathrooms. There is therefore insufficient provision of 
assisted bathrooms for the current client group. This issue 
has been raised in the last two inspection reports and has 
still not been addressed. The manager stated that she was 
still awaiting a review of the premises. A meeting w ill be 
set up to discuss progress.
The professionally defined resident
The inspectors avoided using the law except where standards were well
below an acceptable level. Instead, they relied on professional values,
the resident’s voice and the limited publicity of the report as a
persuasive force. The resident is therefore constructed as a person with
agency whose needs are professionally defined. In reality, not only do
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few residents f it  that definition but even when supported by regulatory 
officials their views seem to carry little  persuasive force. As Stannard 
(1978) notes, in a situation where patients are unreliable by definition, it 
is all too easy for staff to deny the legitimacy and validity of their views 
and to account for them by referring to the discredited attributes of the 
person making them. Two out of three of all residents had their fees 
paid at least in part by the local authority, therefore they had little  
power in the market place. Similarly, professional definitions of needs 
for this client group are not supported or underpinned by the Registered 
Homes Act or any other institution associated with it, such as the 
Registered Homes Tribunal - an issue discussed in more detail in Chapter 
6. The concept of “ needs” , professionally defined and measured, has 
always been contested in health care, with people treated or assessed 
according to the resources available rather than according to their 
“ needs” . Nevertheless, the concept of “ need” does hold some rhetorical 
force in a publicly funded service where equity is a political goal. 
However, in the nursing home context, the law prescribes nursing care 
only, and through other decisions which define and place boundaries 
around Health Authorities’ powers, denies other definitions of needs.
The vague definitions of the Registered Homes Act allow standards to be 
driven down. For example, the decisions of the Registered Homes 
Tribunal described in Chapter 6 indicate that residents must be fitted to 
homes rather than the other way round. Professional nursing values hold 
little  sway when it  comes to structural problems such as inadequacy of 
buildings, equipment or the employment practices of nursing home 
owners. Similarly, because there is a legal category of homes for people 
with mental illness, an inspector could assert that placing an individual 
with manic depression in a home for the elderly was a very serious 
matter as “ it  denied the man his rights to be treated according to his 
needs” . But no similar assertion was ever heard to be made or could be 
made in the case of the large number of confused elderly, as there is no
legal category for people with dementia. The rhetoric of inspectors in 
this unit seemed to have less potential to persuade nursing homes to 
develop their everyday practice in the desired directions. In this 
context, promoting professional values and a view of the resident which 
is counter-factual does not seem to be a greatly productive force. 
However, their emphasis on public shame may have proved just as 
powerful. The literature on firms' motivation for compliance suggests 
that large chains in particular are very sensitive about their reputation 
(Gray and Shadbegian 2005; Mendellof and Gray 2005). But, as noted in 
Chapter 7, until recently political activism on behalf of nursing home 
residents is weak compared with other sectors.
THE UNIT B STYLE -  “ TO PROTECT YOU FROM THE LAW”
Unit B's approach was described to me by one of the inspectors as 
“ bringing to bear any law they could lay their hands on” . In practice, 
this meant not only working closely with the other regulatory agencies 
and the police, but also intimating that private prosecutions against 
nursing homes were an increasing risk. As described above, the unit 
worked with many other regulatory agencies to obtain an understanding 
of their requirements. The strategy was to portray these other types of 
law as a threat which could be lessened by practices recommended by 
the inspector:
... this is to cover you for the UKCC5... it  is far worse than 
any court... don't know whether you have been there... it's  
terrifying.
The Coroner could also be brought into play. One manager was informed 
that the Coroner was now taking an interest in deaths in nursing homes, 
particularly if  the deceased appeared emaciated or otherwise in poor
5 United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing and Midwifery - a body which at that time 
controlled the registration of nurses.
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condition. The inspector had been asked to give evidence at a Coroner’s 
inquest, reported in the local paper, into two deaths in one particular 
nursing home. Because the nursing homes had good records she was able 
to testify that they had done all they could, but “with your records, 
Mavis... ?”  Homes were also portrayed as being at increasing risk of 
private prosecution. Families were reported as being increasingly aware 
that pressure sores meant inadequate care and would sue. Tales were 
related where scratches from furniture in need of repair, had been left 
unattended and became infected, resulting in lower limb amputation, 
with the relatives suing. Given the difficulties of proving cause and 
effect in such situations as described in Chapter 6, it  would seem that 
the inspector was bluffing. In their empirical studies of the inspectorate, 
Hutter (1997) and Hawkins (1984) both found that bluffing is a very well 
used technique in the regulatory context.
The strategy was to exaggerate the risk from all inspectorates and the 
law in general. But while the powers of other regulators were talked up, 
when called upon to provide support for the nursing home inspector, 
their response could be disappointing. One of the inspectors from Unit B 
described the local Health and Safety Executive inspectorate as “ very 
caught up with the airport... not too interested in the little  old man 
falling out of a nursing home window onto the rose beds” . Similarly, the 
same inspector described the UKCC (the professional body responsible for 
registration of nurses) as “ disappointing... had several cases we have 
referred where they have said they could not act” . But these legal risks 
were not entirely without foundation. In 1994, the regulatory body for 
nurses — the UKCC (1994) reported that complaints against nurses 
working in nursing homes formed the largest category of complaints. 
Similarly, as described in Chapter 3, the Health and Safety Executive 
database records many successful prosecutions against nursing homes 
since 1998, with fines in excess of £20,000. This is by far the maximum
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allowed under the Registered Homes Act. Having built up the powers of 
these other regulators, inspectors attempted to form an alliance with the 
“ person in charge”  to reduce the legal risks they had exaggerated. The 
purpose of the inspector’ s job as described to the “ person in charge” 
was “ to protect you from the law” !
Fixing the uncertainties in the Registered Homes Act by invoking “ other 
law” had advantages. The inspector’s recommendation could be 
portrayed as protective not only against the risk of legal action against 
the nursing home but also against professional disciplinary action by the 
UKCC. On occasions, nurses in charge of a floor seemed to appreciate 
the “ training” they had received and would remark they had learnt an 
awful lot. The approach also gave inspectors a persuasive lever for 
improving the environmental standards in nursing homes, instead of being 
impeded by the constraints arising from the decisions of the Registered 
Homes Tribunal. Unlike guidance under the Act, which was considerably 
weakened by the Tribunal decisions discussed in Chapter 6, Health and 
Safety Executive guidance carried more force. The inspectors were well 
aware of this. As described below, this Unit required much higher 
standards of laundries and kitchens. A further benefit was that the 
inspector’s argument that such risks would be lessened with increased 
documentation had the effect of making the care provided in the home 
more transparent to inspectors (Power 1997).
Like Unit A, focusing on and assessing the calibre of the “ person in 
charge” was central to the task. Inspection visits would be tailored to 
the inspector’s perception of the “ person in charge” . For example, 
where the inspector felt that the “ person in charge” was competent and 
there were no problems with the home, the focus would be on 
developing nursing practice: “ where we see willing we w ill put 
knowledge in then we can see things moving forward” . Where the 
situation with the home was delicate but improving then the inspectors
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would temper their criticisms with praise for improvements. Being overly 
critical could result in the “ person in charge” resigning and the home 
being le ft in a worse situation. In situations where there was uncertainty 
about the integrity or competence of the “ person in charge” , the 
announced inspection visit might be arranged so that the “ person in 
charge” could be put to the test by the inspector in front of the owner, 
who had been summoned for that purpose.
Unit B also had a more structured approach to inspection. They expected 
nursing homes to not only have a comprehensive suite of policies but 
systems in place to check whether such policies were “ alive” . They 
expected audits to be undertaken to ensure that policies had been put 
into practice by staff. They had also devised their own series of audit 
tools around issues such as wound management and nutrition for checking 
the integrity of a nursing home's systems. The use of one such tool is 
described below.
Getting alongside the “ person in charge”
For Unit B, the interview with the “ person in charge” provided an 
opportunity to check the various licences, the requirements of other 
inspectorates, other documents and employment records that are a 
requirement of all homes. On inspection visits, it  was the practice to ask 
for the most recent reports of other inspectorates, make a note of the 
requirements and establish whether action had been taken. Where these 
other inspectorates had not visited the home recently, or the inspector 
thought such an inspection necessary, then they would be called in. The 
home was also required to produce a large number of policies which 
inspectors would read and comment on practical or other flaws — for 
example, complaints policies that made no mention of the right to 
complain directly to the Health Authority. Inspectors would also make a 
note of aspects of policies to pick up later with staff.
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As noted above, inspectors from this unit were focused on environmental 
issues and the management of risk. For example, they would expect 
special arrangements to reduce risks of accidents to be made for 
residents who smoked. They would also focus on arrangements for 
maintenance, including the records. It was not unusual to find that the 
maintenance was undertaken by migrant workers with poor English, and 
the records, where they existed, would be very difficult to understand. 
Where such records were of poor quality it  provided an opportunity to 
remind the “ person in charge” of the risks they were running by not 
clearly documenting the proper maintenance of equipment:
Forget the Registered Homes A c t .. this would apply if  you 
were running a factory. Wheelchairs require maintenance... 
not in the Registered Homes Act but people do get nasty 
accidents and when they do you need a clear paper trail to 
show that the wheelchairs have been checked... if  something 
happens the HSE w ill be all over you like a rash... they say 
its only guidance... but they will on to you as though i t ’s a 
legal requirement.
As with Unit A, the initial interview also provided a chance for the 
inspectors to establish their credentials with the “ person in charge” , 
with inspectors often mentioning that they had managed nursing homes. 
Nurse inspectors from this Unit would also take the time to describe to 
the “ person in charge” the focus for the day and what they would 
require of them. For example, whether they intended to inspect the 
kitchens and whether they wanted to talk to staff.
As with Unit A, inspectors would want to know the number of residents 
and whether there were any who should not be accommodated in such a 
home either because of the home’s legal category or because the home 
did not have the staff or equipment to meet their needs. Again, part of 
the job was to make sure that homes did not admit people whose needs 
they could not reasonably meet. In the case of poorly equipped homes,
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the inspectors would seek to put the owner in a position were they would 
lose revenue unless they provided better equipment:
There are no hospital beds... only divans? How does the 
equipment go under the bed? You are the gatekeeper here,
Mary... the owner must provide the building and equipment 
or you must severely restrict the clients you take... you must 
make the owner aware of who you are turning away.
Looking at systems and practices with Unit B
The environment as risk
Because the Health and Safety at Work Act provided a powerful lever, 
many of the problems found in nursing homes were reconstructed in 
terms of health and safety standards. For example, furniture in poor 
condition was noted as an infection risk rather than a problem of 
aesthetics or not providing a “ homely” environment. An elderly resident 
may have a wound which would get infected from the furniture in poor 
condition and the relatives would sue. For the control of infection, 
laundries were required to have clean and dirty areas with soiled linen 
placed in red bags which were then placed unopened in the washing 
machine. Gloves and aprons needed to be available to staff as nursing 
homes provide a pool of infection for MRSA and outbreaks of scabies are 
also not uncommon. Cleaning agents must be locked away, the laundry 
and cleaning cupboards must be locked. Similar attention was paid to 
the kitchen, including the recording of fridge temperature, fly screens 
and so on. Systems, schedules and records for cleaning were also 
required. The inspectors would often get the laundry and kitchen staff 
to describe these practices. This could be difficult, as such staff often 
had poor understanding of English, but they seemed pleased that 
someone was showing an interest in their work. On an announced 
inspection it was clear that many backroom staff were making a 
considerable effort not to let the manager down! As with Unit A,
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inspectors would also collude with the managers and encourage other 
staff to try and obtain improved resources for the nursing home, saying 
directly to kitchen staff... any thing you need... now is the time to ask ?
Bodies and the adequacy of systems
With Unit B, inspection of the care followed a purposeful routine. 
Although the inspectors did talk to residents, rather than attempting to 
obtain their views, the aim of the conversation was to make an 
assessment of individual care. The inspectors’ efforts to communicate 
with patients or relatives during visits were largely symbolic: “That’s a 
really pretty blouse you are wearing.”  Such casual interest in residents 
provided an opportunity to notice the state of the residents’ teeth, nails 
and hair. Did they smell? Relatives, where present, were asked about 
the care, although no attempt was made to inform them in advance of 
the inspectors’ visit.
While walking around the home, inspectors made a note of anyone in 
bed, anyone who had bruises, bandages, evident weight loss or anything 
else they considered to be of concern. The case-notes of these residents 
were then inspected. Where it was suspected that the cause of an injury 
was an accident, the inspector expected to see a relevant report in the 
accident book and an appropriate treatment plan in the nursing notes. 
Documentation of the accident which would stand up in court was 
expected: Who was there? Witnesses? Any equipment involved? Where 
was the resident’s head? What did you do? While inspecting the accident 
records, one inspector told the “ person in charge” that she took the 
view that the criteria for all documentation in a home should be “ the day 
we are going to court - we never are, of course” .
If the explanation for the accident appeared to involve moving or 
handling the resident then the inspector reviewed and commented on the 
appropriate part of the care plan. Further questions would be raised
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about the adequacy of staffing levels, training in moving and handling 
and the adequacy of the equipment. Where these proved to be 
inadequate, the manager might be reminded of the financial risks from 
litigation: “ Did you see the latest award for back injury — £200,000.” 
Clearly, the home would be covered by employer’s liability insurance but 
such a claim would be very damaging for the home’s reputation. The 
inspector spotted a resident with bandages on both legs. She asked the 
resident how she got the injury. The resident, who was cognitively 
impaired, said that children tripped her up with string. The inspector 
then asked the nurse who replied that she did not know the cause, the 
resident had very frail skin. The inspector then examined the accident 
book and the notes. The fact that there was no record of the injury in 
either of these places was taken up with the ’’person in charge” . In 
another case, a resident had a bruise on his wrist, and there was no 
accident report and nothing recorded in the care plan. The inspector 
explained that, because of the lack of documentation, she did not know 
what was happening and it  was not acceptable. Although the residents 
looked well cared for and the staff were well motivated, she was 
concerned that there was no account of Lesley’s bruise. She did not 
want to be getting the police in. The sister, alarmed by these threats 
and the demands on her, bursts into tears. Inspectors often remarked on 
the under-reporting of accidents and wanted to see more reporting. Like 
the factory inspectors studies by Hutter (1997), they had no hesitation in 
using bluff, drama or hyperbole to press their point.
Similarly, where inspectors had previously noted problems with residents 
such as significant weight loss or pressure sores, care plans were 
examined to assess whether these problems had been dealt with. With 
some inspectors this examination of nursing records could turn into a 
lengthy teaching session on care planning with the nurses in charge of the 
floor. At other times, it  could be much more threatening, as inspectors
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attempted to find out the extent to which nurses on the floor understood 
the home’s policy. For example, a nurse was asked what procedure she 
would adopt if  she suspected a case of abuse. The recommendations 
were often for more detailed protective documentation:
Your records need to prove that you have done everything 
reasonably practical if you get hauled up around a duty of 
care.
With this group of inspectors, little  time was spent establishing the 
current staffing level or the dependency levels for the home as whole. 
Instead, inspectors would demonstrate the inadequacy of staffing levels 
by using difficult individual cases. On one floor of some thirty beds, the 
inspector asked the sister to produce the records for the most dependent 
patient they had. She remarked that, in the care plan, three people 
were required to toilet this resident. The inspector then asked for the 
duty rota and noted that there were only three people working on the 
floor on this shift. “What happens to the other 15 residents when they 
are toileting Fred?” , she asked. She considered this level of staffing was 
unsafe; however, for the announced inspection, the home would be 
unlikely to be non-compliant with the staffing notice. Instead the 
inspectors describing the problem as “ an issue of professional 
accountability” .
Inspection visits might also be uniquely tailored to engage the home in an 
audit of a particular topic. On one such visit, as well chasing up the 
outstanding requirements in relation to the kitchen and laundry, the 
inspector decided to audit nutrition. The process began with the “ person 
in charge” being informed that part of the day would involve a 
“ professional discussion”  about nutrition. In the presence of her 
manager, the “ person in charge” was asked to identify all the standards 
-  legal, Health Authority and professional -  which governed the home’s 
practice in relation to nutrition, and to tell the inspector how these had
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been operationalised into policies for the home. Prompted and helped 
by the inspector, the “ person in charge” was required to discuss the 
health and safety requirements and environmental health standards for 
kitchens, the requirements for staff training in food handling, the UKCC 
requirements in relation to nutrition and the home’s policies and records 
in these areas. The “ person in charge” was then required to identify the 
systems the home had in place to ensure that staff were competent in 
these areas, the records that were kept and the quality control processes 
that were in place to ensure that policies were adhered to. This was 
followed by observation of lunch in the home, which included the 
arrangements for feeding residents who could not feed themselves, and 
the recording of nutritional matters in a sample of case notes and an 
inspection of kitchens.
The inspection report
Unlike the reports for Unit A, reports for this inspection unit just 
recorded compliance or non-compliance with the Health Authority’s 
standards, to the extent that there was no mention of the “ patient” or 
“ resident” . The report did not give the reader any clear picture of the 
care in the home and appeared to be addressed to an internal audience 
with little  or no information that would give the public an idea of the 
home’s quality of care or the home’s problems.
Using law to protect bodies
The style of Unit B has a great deal of similarity with an approach to 
regulation of risk seen in the Health and Safety at Work Act (Hutter 
1999). In a practice that is simultaneously constitutive and constraining, 
inspectors attempted “ to constitute structures, routines, and 
procedures... which w ill be incorporated into organisational routines and 
also become part of everyday individual activity”  (Hutter 1999). Unit B
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were engaged in a kind of enforced self-regulation where the inspectors 
are making use of key elements in homes' own internal logic practices 
(Black 1999; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). This unit attempts to use all 
the formal resources of a regulatory network consisting not only of the 
Registered Homes Act but the burgeoning amount of other legislation, to 
constitute an environment of procedures and practices to protect 
residents. Thus, the environment appears to be conceived not only in 
terms of the state of the buildings and equipment but the systems of 
care, including staff employment and training. With this approach, 
elderly residents are constituted as though they were very delicate 
china. The home must therefore have systems in place to protect the 
bodies of very frail elderly people from harm. For this unit, there was no 
need to ask residents for their views or experiences of the home. The 
failure or absence of routines, procedures and systems was written on 
the residents' bodies. This model fits well with the nature of the 
residents, as their protection is not dependent on their ability to 
articulate and express views. However, the process appeared to be 
directed toward the internal management of the system, with expressed 
views of residents, their relatives' or wider public lying outside the 
system.
CONCLUSION
Health Authorities were very unlikely to prosecute nursing homes. They 
were more likely to take the administrative action of removing the 
licence of a home operating well outside the terms of its “ social 
licence” . The licence for nursing homes is best described in these terms 
because, as the decisions of the Registered Homes Tribunal analysed in 
Chapter 6 suggest, licences are removed for actions considered immoral 
and which cause residents actual harm - abuse, neglect and gross
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financial mismanagement — rather than transgression of legal rules.
Thus, the traditional view of regulation as compliance with formal legal 
rules under the threat of legal sanctions bears little  relationship to how 
nursing home regulation is actually conducted. Instead, this study has 
identified a number of persuasive strategies that are used to encourage 
nursing homes to adopt practices considered appropriate. With 
enforcement action unlikely, these strategies are not backed by any 
sanctions beyond improvement notices. As Gunningham and Johnstone 
(1999) have observed for occupational health and safety in Australia, the 
criminal law has lost a significant role in enforcing standards for either of 
these inspection units.
Unit A appeals to nursing homes as sites of professional nursing activity, 
with inspectors finding it  difficult to distinguish their current role from 
their former one of nurse managers. Therefore inspectors are concerned 
with what could be described as the “ professional licence” for nursing 
homes. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the hold that a professional 
licence has on a nursing home is likely to be weakened, as nursing homes 
employ few professional nurses and those that are employed are on the 
periphery of the profession. Motivated by the need to earn a living in the 
harsh financial circumstances of the nursing homes sector, rather than 
maintaining professional standards, they perhaps should be seen as 
tradeswomen. But Unit A’s stance as professional nurse managers also 
leads them to be interested in providing advocacy for individual 
residents, involving the public and shaming a home by publicising their 
findings, particularly where a home shows no inclination to improve 
matters for its residents. These are all strategies advocated by 
regulatory scholars such as Gunningham and Johnstone (1999) who have 
researched firms’ motivation for compliance. However, their 
effectiveness in situations where the protected are marginalised and 
have little  power is questionable. The approach of Unit B, with its
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insistence on the development of systems to militate against risks, is 
similar to the model of enforced self-regulation proposed by Ayres and 
Braithwaite (1992), or to the systems approach to occupation health and 
safety advocated by Gunningham and Johnstone (1999). It appeals to the 
“ person in charge”  as “ tradeswoman” or “ tradesman” , rather than as 
professional nurse.
As for the image of the resident, Unit A’s professional approach means 
they were concerned with empowerment and view the resident as 
subject whose autonomy should be promoted. As noted in Chapter 4, 
this approach is related to the professional ethos of nursing but is out of 
step with residents’ actual characteristics as highly dependent people 
who are cognitively and physically impaired. In contrast, Unit B’s 
emphasis on compliance with environmental standards means that the 
resident’s body becomes the object to be protected. This is more in tune 
with the working practices of homes but runs counter to advertising of 




UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE: RESIDENTS AND THE REGISTERED
HOMES TRIBUNAL
THE REGISTERED HOMES TRIBUNAL AS A LEGAL FORUM
From 1985 to 2004, the Registered Homes Tribunal operating under the 
Registered Homes Act 1984 heard appeals from nursing home owners 
against the decisions of Health Authorities. The types of decisions which 
could be the subject of an appeal were refusal to register a nursing 
home, withdrawal of registration or the imposition of conditions on 
registration. In this period of some 18 years, 86 appeals were heard -  
around four or five a year. The Tribunal fulfilled the very traditional 
legal purpose of adjudicating a rights claim (Ogus 1994 p116; Rubin 1991) 
— the claim of home owners to pursue their business without 
unreasonable interference of government officials charged with the task 
of protecting the welfare of residents.
The arrangements were for the Tribunal chair to be chosen from a legal 
panel appointed by the Lord Chancellor and for two other members to be 
selected from an expert panel of nurses and doctors. The Tribunal had 
the freedom to decide on the type of legal process used in the appeal -  
mediatory, inquisitorial or adversarial. But it  operated mainly as an 
adversarial legal forum (see Council on Tribunals 1998 para 2.129) with 
both parties represented by counsel. Although there was a potential for 
decision making from the perspective of health care professionals, the 
decisions remained primarily legal in character. But throughout the 
Tribunal's history, the people who live in nursing homes were sometimes 
referred as “ patients”  and sometimes “ residents” , with no consistency. 
Using the recorded Tribunal decisions, this chapter explores how
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representations of nursing homes residents were brought into play in 
these legal decisions.
As in other legal fora, the stakes in an appeal could be very high. For the 
reasons described in Chapter 2, prosecutions under the Registered Homes 
Act 1984 were rare. Therefore, the main sanctions available to Health 
Authorities were administrative. Such sanctions included those which 
could result in a particular home being immediately closed, with the dire 
consequences for the home owner of the loss of their business and their 
reputation, and exclusion from the industry. The main function of the 
Tribunal was to provide a constraint on such decisions. Much could be at 
stake for Health Authorities too, as their authority and competence could 
be called in question. Boyle (1994) notes that Tribunals, in general, are 
usually confined to ensuring the correct application of rules whose 
content and objectives are decided elsewhere, with complainants seldom 
being given the rights to challenge the merits of decisions. However, the 
Registered Homes Tribunal could take de novo decisions, overturning any 
regulatory rules or any sanctioning decision made by a Health Authority.
In the Registered Homes Tribunal, appellants and respondents were 
represented by a small group of barristers whose names appeared 
frequently. There were also a small number of appeal chairs, with 
around a quarter of all appeals being heard by the same person. Thus, 
through a small group of lawyers providing advice to Health Authorities 
and home owners and through the published decisions made freely 
available to all those with an interest, messages about the Tribunal's 
view of the law and the behavior of Health Authorities and home owners 
were transmitted within a relatively small community. In a system where 
operational guidance to the inspectorate was vague and prosecutions 
rare, the Tribunal was potentially one the few cohesive forces among the 
one hundred or so Health Authorities responsible for regulating the 
sector. It is difficult to directly demonstrate that the decisions of the
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Tribunal had any effect on the inspectors. There were no instances in 
the fieldwork observations where inspectors referred explicitly to 
Tribunal decisions. But it  would seem that some of the actions of the 
two groups of inspectors studied took into account Tribunal decisions.
For example, in questioning care assistants about their duties, inspectors 
were keen to ensure that not too much of their time was taken up in 
domestic tasks — clearly a reflection of decision 237, discussed in this 
chapter. Similarly, in discussion about the needs of residents, 
particularly in homes where many of the residents were cognitively 
impaired, there was no attempt to insist that the home employed staff 
with appropriate training or qualification in this area. Tribunal decision 
296, also discussed in this chapter, indicated that it  was unlawful for 
Health Authorities to insist on this.
LAW, THE TRIBUNAL AND RESIDENTS
Yeung (1999) suggests that two models are used to justify approaches to 
punishment for traditional criminal offences. One model is based on the 
philosophy of criminal responsibility. This involves the notion of 
individual wrongdoing, generally with a degree of awareness of the act or 
its consequences. In contrast, the second approach, which Yeung refers 
to as the deterrence approach, is based on the classic utilitarian 
principle that punishment is warranted by reference to its crime 
prevention consequences. Many regulatory offences are based on the 
second type of thinking. Regulatory law is primarily concerned with 
discouraging behaviour which is considered to be inimical to shared social 
goals. The punishment of regulatory offences is a practical means of 
controlling an activity, without necessarily implying the element of social 
condemnation which is a characteristic of traditional crimes. Criminal 
offences based on the first model, that of the philosophy of criminal
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responsibility, depend on proof of some form of mens rea, be it intent, 
knowledge or recklessness. But regulatory violations often discard mens 
rea so that a regulatory offence may be committed without the need to 
establish any mental element on the part of the offender. In other 
words, they are strict liability offences in which the offender may be 
liable without any need to prove their culpability or subjective 
wickedness.
The effectiveness of strict liability offences in regulatory law is 
controversial. For some, the presence of strict liability favours the 
regulated since it  serves to marginalise their non-compliance and to 
distinguish it from “ real” crime where moral questions of fault or intent 
come into play (Richardson 1987). It is also suggested that the inclusion 
of a strict liability principle may also result in a hesitancy to prosecute or 
sanction offenders (Richardson 1987). However, irrespective of the legal 
basis of strict liability, many empirical studies of regulation suggest that 
regulatory agencies w ill often consider the notion of fault when 
exercising their discretion to prosecute strict liability offences 
(Richardson 1987; Hutter 1997; Hawkins 2002). But the picture is not 
entirely clear-cut, as Hutter (1997) found that in certain circumstances 
utilitarian reasons for prosecution came into prominence, particularly 
where there was a widespread risk of serious accidents and persuasion 
had failed.
While there may be grounds for considering some of the offences under
the Registered Homes Act 1984 as strict liability offences, for example
offences which involve violation of the conditions of the licence, this is
not apparent from the Tribunal decisions. Instead, decisions are justified
with reference to two distinct types of moral argument. The first is
concerned with the character of the home owner. This is partly a
consequence of the framing of the Registered Homes Act 1984, where
registration of a nursing home is conditional on the continued “ fitness” of
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the applicant. At first sight, it might be expected that this type of 
argument would be most associated with appeals about registration, but 
such arguments are also brought into play in all types of appeal. In 
arguments of this type, residents are sometimes absent and the 
Tribunal's focus is on other matters, for example, the financial viability 
of the business or whether the inspectors had found the proposed 
registered person impossible to work with. A second type of legal 
argument is about the culpability or blameworthiness (Walker 1991; 
Hawkins 2002 p409) of the home in relation to harm caused to residents. 
Apart from the most obvious of cases, such as the appropriation of a 
resident's property, such arguments are beset with problems. For 
example, evidence of physical harm in extreme old age can be unreliable 
as it  is difficult to relate the actions of home to the state of the 
resident's health or body. More fundamentally, as will be explored in 
later chapters, the rights of residents and more generally of elderly 
people at the very end of their lives are contentious. Brooke and Gewirtz 
(1996 p10) suggest that one of the functions of legal opinions, such as 
Tribunal decisions, is to persuade the audience that the Tribunal or court 
did the “ right thing” . But in the case of nursing home appeals, the “ right 
thing”  is a very vexed concept as it is very difficult to know whether the 
point of reference for the “ right thing” should be the home owner or the 
resident. The appeal process by its very nature requires the rights of 
residents to be balanced against the “ right thing” for home owners in 
undertaking their business. Unfortunately this balance must be done 
without any guidance from the Registered Homes Act 1984 and its 
regulations, as they contain no explicit framework of rights for residents, 
nor even a statement of the Act's principal objectives (Brooke Ross 1989 
p263). Brooke Ross (1989 p276) also argues that clear objectives should 
be set out in the legislation, since in this area of welfare provision, 
providers, consumers and regulators may have different and sometimes 
seemingly irreconcilable objectives and strategies. As she also notes
(p265), guidance which accompanies the regulations for the residential 
sector also provides more principles for safeguarding the rights and 
welfare of residents than the parallel for the nursing home sector (see 
Chapter 3).
As well as the legal rationale for punishment, two other factors need to 
be considered as potentially important in shaping the outcome of 
Tribunal decisions. First, in offences which involve mens rea, the law 
provides appropriate procedural protections for the accused. In dealing 
with corporate regulatory crime, such protection often works against the 
pursuit of regulatory objectives (Simpson 2002 p50; Scott 2003 pxiv). 
Corporate entities are accorded all of the constitutional safeguards and 
protections that are granted to individual defendants. Such rights were 
conferred on individual defendants as a means of protection against 
potential abuses of state power. However, Simpson (2002) argues that 
corporations neither qualify as weaker adversaries vis a vis the state, nor 
do they suffer the same consequences as individuals upon conviction.
The second factor is that legal fora such as the Tribunal, where 
professional lawyers ply their trade, are thought to operate with 
particular patterns of argument. Those interested in law as narrative -  
for example, Brooks and Gewirtz (1996) or Porter Abbott (2002 ch11) -  
suggest that such forms of legal argument can place limits on the kinds of 
stories that can be told and on the ways stories can be told. The concern 
is that legal fora can become prisoners of stereotypical arguments. For 
example, the Critical Legal Studies movement has sought to articulate 
ways in which marginal groups such as women, ethnic minorities and 
others on the margins of power were excluded from legal processes by 
low representation from such groups on juries and in the legal profession. 
At the same time they are represented in such processes in stereotypical 
ways which cause grave injustice (Porter Abbot 2002 ch1) -  for instance,
as "loose” women, or black men who had "stepped out of their place” .
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Nursing home residents are a marginalised group. When this is coupled 
with a traditional legal culture which affords procedural rights to “ the 
defendant” or home owner, then it  is not surprising that residents or 
their relatives had no right of standing before the Tribunal. Residents 
never appeared in person as witnesses and their relatives were seldom 
called. In the twenty years of operation of the Tribunal, relatives were 
called on only three occasions. One of these cases (decision 264) 
involved theft of a resident’s property and the other two (decisions 452 
and 453) involved abuse. Brammer (1994 p433) notes that even if 
residents were called they would be unrepresented, subject to coercion 
and powerless. Residents (and their relatives) were limited to reporting 
actions to the registration authority and, if dissatisfied with its response, 
had recourse only to judicial review (Brammer 1994 p433). Given the 
absence of residents, what was the nature of these stock legal arguments 
used in the Registered Homes Tribunal and how were residents 
represented within them ?
THE TRIBUNAL’S OWN STORY
The first decade of the Tribunal’s operation from the late 1980s onwards 
was marked by both positive and negative reviews of its operation.
Brooke Ross (1989), reviewing the first two years of the Tribunal’s 
operation, considered that it  was regarded as an impartial and 
competent forum and on the whole gave great weight to the welfare and 
wellbeing of residents, present, past and future. However, Brooke Ross 
mainly reviewed cases from the residential homes sector where she notes 
that more principles promoting and safeguarding the rights and welfare 
of residents can be found. In contrast, Harman and Harman (1989) and 
Brammer (1994) were critical. Brammer (1994 p229) suggests that the 
role of the Tribunal must be focused on safeguarding the interests of
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residents rather than protecting home owners from what they may 
perceive as excessive bureaucratic interference. After reviewing a 
number of cases both Harman and Harman (1989) and Brammer (1994) 
concluded that the Tribunal favoured the private entrepreneur and had a 
tendency for inconsistent decision making.
Since 1994, nothing has been published on the Registered Homes Tribunal 
and little  on the operation of Tribunals in general. In 1999, a review of 
all tribunals was set up, chaired by Sir Andrew Leggatt - the first 
systematic review of tribunals since the Franks review was published in 
1957. However, Leggatt (2001) left regulatory tribunals on one side to 
concentrate on tribunals which concern individual citizens and the state 
(Bradley 2002).
A view of the operation of the Registered Homes Tribunal can be found in 
some of the appeal decisions1. Running through these decisions is a story 
of the Tribunal labouring under very difficult circumstances, for 
example:
...many of the appeals coming before the Tribunal these 
days are complicated, difficult and lengthy... 
documentation, of which there was in abundance, 
continued to arrive throughout the hearing... it  was a most 
difficult case.
Registered Homes Tribunal 272.
And:
“ ...extremely large bundles of evidence... with duplication... 
and confusion.”
Registered Homes Tribunal 457.
At the root of many of the Tribunal's difficulties were flawed procedural 
rules. Indeed, throughout the 1990s it  was argued that these resulted in 
severe delays which jeopardised the entire regulatory system as it
1 A record of these appeals in terms of the decision, and the reasons for the decision was published 
on the Tribunals website http://www.doh.gov.uk/RHT until 2002 and from that date at 
http://www.carestandardstribunal.gov.uk.
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prevented Health Authorities sanctioning homes (Day et al 1996; Council 
on Tribunals 1998). The responsibility for formulating the procedural 
rules lay with the Tribunal’s “ sponsoring”  Department, the Department 
of Health. For nearly a decade, concerns about this state of affairs were 
repeatedly expressed in the annual reports of the Council on Tribunals, 
the body with oversight of all tribunals, but changes were mired in the 
Department’s intent to conduct a major review of care home regulation2. 
Leggatt (2001 para 1.19), in his general review, commented on the 
“ uneasy relationship” between most tribunals and the departments on 
whose decisions they were adjudicating. He notes:
In those tribunals which are paid for by the sponsoring 
departments, the chairmen and members feel that they 
cannot be seen as independent, however impartial they are, 
and however scrupulous departments are. Indeed, plainly 
they are not independent. ... At the same time, 
paradoxically, many tribunals do not enter into the 
appropriate dialogue which would enable departments to 
learn from adverse tribunal decisions and thereby to 
improve their primary decision-making.
The majority of 86 appeals to the Registered Homes Tribunals relating to 
nursing homes were settled by adversarial contest — a minority by 
negotiation between the parties or the withdrawal of one or other or the 
parties. In appeals of the latter type, little  information apart from the 
statement of facts of the withdrawal is provided. Therefore the appeals 
analysed below are the appeals which were fully heard, some 60 in all. 
The final disposition of the appeals is shown in Table 1.
In the two decades of hearing appeals under the Registered Homes Act 
1984, the Tribunal had 21 different chairpersons. Two chairpersons, 
Margaret Rutherford (13) and JCR Fieldsend (9), heard twenty-two cases 
in all, more than one third of those which went to a fu ll hearing. In an
2 See Annual Reports of the Council on Tribunals from 1993-94 to 1998-1999.
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early Tribunal (decision 27) which Fieldsend chaired, Home Life was 
deemed not applicable to the nursing home sector. This guidance for 
residential homes emphasised the rights of residents. Margaret 
Rutherford was a past Chair of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
Her interest in this method of dispute resolution seemed to be reflected 
in the Tribunal’s decisions.
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21 6 1 0 14 6 8
Total 86 7 9 10 60 19 41
For example, in appeals about conditions of licence around staffing 
(decisions 237, 296 and 305) she was at pains not to adjudicate but to 
force the parties to negotiate a settlement between them:
It seemed at times incredible that both parties should go to 
such lengths, and incur such heavy expenditure, to have the 
matter decided before a Tribunal. During the hearing the 
concern fe lt by the Tribunal was expressed to the parties 
(Registered Homes Tribunal 305).
Co-operation is the key word with each of the parties being 
ready and willing to acknowledge the other’s reasoned point 
of view, always bearing in mind the welfare of the patients 
which is the raison d 'e tre  of the process.
Registered Homes Tribunal 296.
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In forcing the parties to negotiate about staffing levels, the Tribunal 
avoided setting clear standards. Yet the agreed settlement between the 
parties is often set down in the documentation of the Tribunal decision 
and thus came to be seen as the definitive interpretation of staffing rules 
for a particular type of home. Both Fieldsend and Rutherford were 
instrumental in ensuring that a high standard of proof was a requirement 
for the emergency closure of homes under Section 30 -  for example, 
decisions 123 and 187 -  and in operationalising the concept of fitness -  
for example, decisions 136, 187, 220, and 243. The operation of the 
Registered Homes Tribunal was clearly a very specialised area for 
lawyers, with two firms of solicitors providing the representation for the 
majority of hearings. Undoubtedly, they would also have provided advice 
for Health Authorities about the Tribunals* stance in particular issues. In 
this way, lawyers may have provided Health Authorities with an 
interpretation of the regulatory norms which was backed by the authority 
of the Tribunal (McCahery and Piciotto 1995). That is to say, lawyers 
may have provided one means through which Tribunal decisions became 
influential in Health Authorities’ actions.
TYPES OF APPEAL
Appeals can be divided into two broad types. The majority of fully heard 
appeals (46) were about cancellation or refusal of registration where the 
home owner cannot operate or must cease operating unless the decision 
of the authority is overturned by the Tribunal. The Registered Homes Act 
is framed in terms of the concept of "fitness” , either of the “ registered” 
person, usually the home owner, or occasionally the "fitness”  of the 
building. Fitness is a legal concept vested in the characteristics or 
personal qualities of the registered person. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 
of Words and Phrases (Greenberg 2000) defines “ fitness” as:
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... honesty, knowledge and ability; honesty to execute (his 
office) truly, without malice, affection or partiality; 
knowledge to know what he ought duly to do; and ability, as 
well in estate as in body, that he may intend and execute 
his office, when need is, diligently and not for impotency or 
poverty neglect it.
Framing the legislation in this way would suggest that "fitness” should be 
an important concern in these Tribunals, with such appeals setting the 
“ minimum” standards for participation in the sector. The minority of 
fully heard appeals (14) were against the conditions of registration set by 
the Health Authority. This second type of appeal usually concerned the 
number and type of staff or the number of residents. Appeals of the 
second type bring into play economic factors, such as the power of the 
Health Authority to constrain the profitability of the business.
Challenges to the conditions of registration seemed particularly 
successful, with nearly half of these allowed. Overall, nearly half of 
cases of this type that went to full appeal were successful. I shall return 
to this later.
Ostensibly, appeals of the first type are concerned with the character or 
moral standing of the owner, for that is the way the law is framed. But 
in many Tribunals, the argument turned on harm or potential harm to 
residents where this could be clearly demonstrated. The character of 
the owner also comes into the argument in circumstances where its 
relevance is less obvious. At first sight, it  might be thought that appeals 
about numbers of residents and staffing would be matters where the 
debate would turn around the residents, their rights and characteristics 
— for example, how many residents with particular sorts of disabilities 
should be accommodated in a home of a particular design? While 
arguments about residents and their needs were presented in these 
appeals, often this was not the deciding factor, for there was little  firm 
basis for such arguments. Instead, decisions rested again on a traditional 
theme in criminal law, the moral character of the home owner. As
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Simpson (2002 p49) points out, there are difficulties in pursuing legal 
claims where the “ crimes” lack moral offensiveness or blameworthiness. 
The success of regulatory sanctions in this and other areas (eg Hawkins 
1984) depends on the extent to which society believes that particular 
acts should be prohibited.
CHARACTER OF HOME OWNERS AND HARMS TO RESIDENTS:
APPEALS ABOUT CANCELLATION OR REFUSAL OF REGISTRATION
Refusal to register
In the fourteen appeals about refusal to register which were fully heard, 
ten failed and four were allowed. In these appeals, the Tribunal was 
being asked to make a judgement about the potential risk to residents 
and often did this with reference to the character of the owner. The 
reasons for failure of the ten appeals are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Failed appeals against refusal to register (n=10)
Reason Number Appeal reference
Failing to meet the 1984 
building standards
2 8, 29
Financial 3 238, 366, 389
Poor practices in other 
industries
2 159, 223
Unmanageable 3 31, 91, 154
Two early appeals (decisions 8 and 29) were refused because the Tribunal 
considered that the homes did not come up to the standards required for 
the 1984 legislation. As noted below, owners who got into severe 
financial difficulties were declared unfit and excluded from the industry. 
Thus appeals against refusal to register from three potential owners 
(decisions 238, 366 and 389) who had been declared bankrupt, had
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convictions for debt, provided no bank references and had property 
which was repossessed, failed. Entrepreunerial failure was deemed a risk 
to residents.
Appellants with a history of bad management in other industries where 
they had contact with vulnerable people also failed — for example, an 
appellant who had a previous registration for a residential home 
withdrawn (decision 223). Another appellant, with a history of being a 
bad landlord with allegations against him of assault and harassment 
(decision 159), also had his appeal dismissed. The character of this 
applicant (one or more?) was called into question. The appellants (one 
or more) in 159 had neither “ a caring attitude towards those they have 
obligations, nor the balance and composure necessary for dealing with 
elderly people” . A further three appeals (31, 91 and 154) were from the 
same person, who was considered unmanageable as she refused to 
change, learn or listen to advice: “ (she) is still the same uncompromising 
person she was in 1985. Until she changes her attitude there can be no 
question of registration”  (decision 91). As noted below where the 
regulators found it  impossible to work with the regulatee, then this 
formed part of the evidence that the regulatee was unfit and the appeal 
would be refused.
In three of the appeals which succeeded, the Tribunal took the view that 
convictions for assault, obstructing a police officer, gross indecency and 
personification (decisions 234, 168, 6) were no bar to being approved as 
long as the offence was unconnected with the care of vulnerable people. 
The fourth appeal to succeed (decision 136) concerned an entrepreneur. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, during the 1980s the expansion of the nursing 
home industry meant entry into the sector not only of corporate 
businesses, but also of individual entrepreneurs who had no qualifications
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in health care3. When a Health Authority refused to register such a home 
owner (decision 136) who had a poor knowledge of care of the elderly 
and an unsatisfactory financial plan, the Tribunal disagreed. It argued 
that owners had no need for knowledge about care of the elderly as long 
as they employed someone who did. Owners should also be allowed to 
take the financial risks. However, as noted above, the Tribunal was less 
sympathetic to “ failed” entrepreneurs. This group posed a risk for 
further management and financial failure which might adversely effect 
residents.
Cancellation of registration
Registration could be cancelled in two ways. The Health Authority could 
obtain an emergency order for immediate closure from a magistrate 
under Section 30 of the Registered Homes Act. In this case the Health 
Authority was required to prove that there was a “ serious risk to the life, 
health and well-being of the patients in the home” (Section 30.1.a.ii). 
The other route was for the Health Authority to cancel the registration 
without a magistrate’s order under Section 28. The latter could not take 
effect until any appeal by the owner had been heard. This could be a 
very slow process as the lack of procedural rules meant it  was possible 
for the appellant to delay by asking for postponements and 
adjournments. By the early 1990s, these tactics had caused a backlog of 
cases in the Tribunal (Day et el 1996).
Magistrate’s orders were very controversial as they could be heard ex 
parte with the owner finding that his or her business had been shut down 
without any warning. Clearly, this could have devastating consequences
3 In 1989, major providers with three or more homes accounted for 12% of homes and 32% of 
beds. In 1999 this had risen to 19% of homes and 43% of beds (Laing and Buisson 2001). 
However, Laing and Bussion’s most recent review (2005) suggests that the majority of nursing 
homes providers are still small businesses. Only six out of the 91 major providers are listed 
companies -  five are listed in London and one overseas.
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for the residents, who would have to be uprooted to other homes at short 
notice. Therefore such orders were disapproved of except in extreme 
circumstances. Full hearings occurred for seven appeals against 
emergency closure, with four being upheld and three dismissed. In all 
four appeals which were dismissed, the evidence was suggesting extreme 
neglect or physical assaults on residents. The harm to residents was 
documented in some detail in the record of the Tribunal decision. Thus 
there is a sense in which evidence about the condition of individual 
residents is used to shame the home owner and to justify the Tribunal’s 
decision. The nature of the home owner’s character is left in no doubt.
In decision 272 the Tribunal concluded:
... the (appellant’s) demeanour clearly demonstrated how 
difficult it  must have been for the Respondents to deal with 
him and to engage in any kind of meaningful constructive 
dialogue. It must have been difficult for them to repose 
any kind of confidence in him sufficient to develop a good 
working relationship... His letters to respondents... show that 
he was at times aggressive, unco-operative, hostile and 
confrontational. He appears to have no recognition of past 
failures and does not concede there have been problems.
He seemed unable or unwilling to change... He showed a 
lack of effective leadership, competence and control, and 
inconsistency and irresponsibility in his dealings with the 
Respondents.
In appeal 255 the inspectors made an unannounced visit as a result of a 
complaint from a former member of staff. The front gates were 
padlocked; there were no staff in the home, apart from the owner, as 
the staff had walked out, and the owner’s sons were sleeping on camp 
beds in the lounge. The patients were lying on plastic sheeting, with 
evidence of pressure sores and, instead of incontinence pads, net 
knickers filled with gamgee and cut-up sheets were being used. 
Medication for administration the next day had been decanted the night 
before and sheets hung over the banisters, posing a fire risk. The
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Tribunal took the unanimous view that conditions in the home on this 
night did pose a serious risk to the health and wellbeing of residents.
In appeal 272, the Health Authority produced an impressive array of 21 
witnesses to testify to the blameworthiness of the registered person. 
Evidence was heard from consultants, nurses, hospital representatives 
and other professionals. Part of the health authority argument was that 
the home continually operated with one qualified nurse for 22 patients. 
Not only was this in breach of the staffing notice, but the lack of staff 
had caused harm to residents. In particular, there had been a failure to 
recognise when residents should be admitted to hospital. One resident 
had been crying in pain for a number of days before she was admitted to 
hospital where she was found to have a fractured femur. Another had 
been admitted in an appalling condition -  “ dehydrated, with a urinary 
tract infection, blistered lips, scalp and hair infestations, a bleeding 
crusted mouth and legs blistered from the knees down” . Yet another was 
admitted with multiple infected pressure sores, malnourishment and 
septicaemia, with no evidence in the nursing home records of any 
interventions to alleviate matters. A stroke patient who was immobile 
was placed too close to a radiator and suffered severe burns. The care 
plan indicated that she should have been turned every two hours, so the 
Tribunal asked, did the staff not see the burns or smell the burning flesh?
Appeal 240, which failed by a majority decision, illustrates the 
difficulties of establishing harm and culpability when the only witnesses 
may be disaffected staff. Staff at the home had alleged that the owner 
used physical abuse, was violent and force-fed the residents. The owner 
was also fe lt to be challenging and provocative. The home was in 
financial difficulties and this was thought to have been the reason why 
staffing levels were at the bare minimum. However, the staff withdrew 
their allegations, the residents showing no physical signs of abuse or
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injury when several of them were removed to hospital. The Tribunal was 
split, with the chair arguing that the case had not been proved on the 
high standard of probability. The expert members fe lt that the staff had 
been intimidated by the owner into withdrawing their statements. They 
argued that on the night when the magistrate's order was obtained 
staffing had been inadequate and the owner's attitude gave grave 
grounds for concern.
Turning to the four appeals under Section 30 which succeeded, in 
decision 187 there were many allegations from the staff of the owner 
hitting residents and using abusive language. The home was also 
unacceptably cold as the boiler frequently broke down. The owner was 
found to have lied to the Health Authority about the staffing levels and 
his integrity was seriously in doubt. However, the allegations were made 
by three extremely young inexperienced care staff. The Tribunal 
considered that there was no serious risk to the life, health and well­
being of the patients in the home at the time when the magistrate's 
order had been sought and the appeal succeeded. Had the Health 
Authority just withdrawn the registration under Section 28, the Tribunal 
stated that it  would have had no difficulty in finding the owner unfit.
In decision 174 the Tribunal agreed that care in the home was poor, but 
lack of attention to patients at night and lack of a qualified nurse on duty 
did not constitute a serious risk to life, health or well-being. There was 
no strong case for immediate closure. In the third case where the appeal 
was upheld, there were many problems in the home because of building 
work. The Tribunal was highly critical of the Health Authority for seeking 
such an order instead of applying "properly focused pressure'' -  for 
example, issuing improvement notices and if the regulatee then failed to 
comply, prosecuting (decision 369). The fourth case (decision 457) is 
considered below as it  was heard in conjunction with an appeal under 
Section 28.
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The second way a Health Authority could cancel the registration was 
under Section 28. This states that the Health Authority could cancel 
registration on the following grounds:
(i) any grounds which would entitle them to refuse an 
application for registration
(ii) that the person had been convicted of an offence against 
Part 2 of the Act
(iii) that the person had been convicted of an offence against the 
regulations
(iv) the person had not complied with any condition of 
registration
(v) the annual registration fee has not been paid
Twenty appeals against cancellation under Section 28 were dismissed and 
five were allowed. The main reasons for dismissal are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Dismissed appeals for cancellation of registration 
(Section 28) n=20
Reasons Number Appeal reference
Residents robbed or property 
misappropriated
4 67, 180, 264, un-numbered
Business failure 8 85, 138, 204, 220, 258, 
289, 397, 408,





5 121,204, 210, 359, 393
Other 1 244
In these twenty appeals there was a group of some twelve cases where 
the harm or potential harm to the residents was clear-cut. In four cases 
(67, 180, 264 and un-numbered), evidence was presented that residents 
or their estates had been robbed or their property misappropriated. 
Owners in these cases were declared unfit. In a further eight cases the
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business had failed, with homes in receivership, and creditors such as 
utility suppliers about to cut off the gas or electricity supply and the 
staff unpaid (cases 85, 138, 204, 220, 258, 289, 397 and 408). In appeal 
138 the Tribunal was unsure whether the owner did not have the 
financial resources to maintain proper standards or had the resources but 
was not prepared to use them. These owners were also declared unfit.
In a further two cases where the appeal was dismissed (87 and 453) there 
was evidence of extreme neglect and treatment which bordered on 
assault. In appeal 87 it  was alleged that a regime which relied on threats 
and punishment had been instituted. Residents were intimidated, 
taunted and punished by limiting relatives* visits and denying telephone 
calls, TV or radio. A resident who was incapable of walking was dragged 
on the ground with the owner kicking and swearing at him. There were 
allegations of slapping, punching, force feeding and inappropriate use of 
restraint. Residents were bound to beds and chairs with rope and le ft all 
night unsupervised and unable to summon help. One resident who 
wandered was restrained in this way for nine consecutive nights. Forty 
witnesses gave evidence for the respondents but one of the unusual 
features of the case was that the owner documented her practices in the 
nursing notes — that is to say, she fe lt that tying a resident to a chair 
with rope was an appropriate professional response to the behavioural 
problem of the resident wandering. Similarly, taking away a resident’s 
privileges was an appropriate method of sanctioning or behavioural 
control for the demented people. The owner was declared unfit and also 
faced criminal charges.
In appeal 453 there were complaints from agency staff, relatives and 
social services about the care and the state of premises. The relatives of 
one resident gave evidence that their father was in pain with a horrible 
smell about him but the strong painkillers prescribed by the doctor were 
unavailable in the home and when they complained nothing was done.
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Their father was removed to another home, where he arrived with no 
antibiotics and just paracetamol despite a massive infected pressure sore 
and a high level of pain. He was subsequently given morphine, and died 
the next day. A resident who suffered from dementia was attacked by 
another resident with mental illness, known to be violent, who was 
inadequately supervised. Another had been complaining of pain for some 
days but medical advice was only sought at the inspector’s insistence.
The resident was subsequently found to have a fractured head of femur. 
Other relatives witnessed semi-conscious residents being “ dragged off 
commodes” . The Tribunal concluded that the owner was not a f it  
person. Notwithstanding the harm to residents, the Tribunal notes that 
the owner was also unco-operative and had an aggressive attitude to 
other professionals.
A further group of appeals which failed turned on the owners’ ability to 
run a home in a proper manner (cases 121, 204, 210 and 359). In appeal 
121, the general practitioner who had visited the nursing home at 
fortnightly intervals over a period of years gave evidence that he had 
serious misgivings about the professional knowledge, expertise and 
clinical judgement of the new owner. There was no management 
structure, a lack of staff, lack of a planned regime and the owner had 
been unable to establish a satisfactory medicines policy, despite help 
from the inspectorate. The consequence of the poor management 
practices were seen in the condition of residents admitted to hospital. In 
appeal 210, the owner refused to employ staff and was rostered to be on 
duty herself for 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In appeal 359, the 
owner condoned the absence of staff, with the result that the home was 
le ft unattended with no staff on duty. At the tribunal she lied about this 
and therefore lacked integrity. In another case, 204, drug addicts and 
alcoholics were admitted to a home for the elderly. In appeal 243, the 
owner employed people who he knew had bought their identity as nurses.
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In appeal 393, the home operated below the agreed staffing levels and 
there was a management vacuum with no manager appointed for nine 
months. Finally, there was one case, 244, where the Health Authority 
had secured a conviction in the magistrates' court for breach of 
regulations.
Five appeals succeeded. In appeal 65, the Health Authority had 
withdrawn the registration because the home had failed to provide a 
qualified nurse at all times. The Tribunal visited the home and thought it  
a small pleasant well-run home, which for the most part gave a good 
service. They accepted there had been staffing difficulties but they 
allowed the appeal with the condition that a qualified nurse be employed 
as matron. Part of their reasoning was that the owner had listened to 
and implemented advice -  that is to say, as discussed below, she had the 
right time type of character for a regulatee. In another appeal (92), new 
owners had taken over a badly run home with a poor structural fabric. 
Consistent with the view that entrepreneurs should be given a chance, 
the Tribunal decided that the owners should have been given more time 
to rectify defects in the property but that this should be a condition of 
the registration. In appeal 149, the Health Authority argued that there 
were problems with staffing and lack of a lift. The Tribunal decided that 
the failure to provide professional staff on the odd occasion was not of 
great significance. Instead, the Tribunal's decision seemed to turn on 
their favourable impression of the matron. She was described as a 
responsible, capable and caring person, devoted to the welfare of the 
home and of the patients, and a person whose judgement could be relied 
upon. The appeal was allowed with the proviso that the owners installed 
a lift  as a condition of registration. In appeal 452, there had been 
allegations from employees and ex-employees of assaults on patients 
which was contradicted by the appellant's witnesses. The Health 
Authority did not seek to corroborate the employees' accounts with
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evidence from residents, relatives, medical practitioners or others whose 
opinions carried weight with the Tribunal. Given the conflicting evidence 
of abuse and a lack of other defects severe enough to warrant 
cancellation, the appeal succeeded.
Finally, appeal 457 was a long and complex case. The Health Authority 
withdrew the registration because of concerns around administration of 
medicines, cleanliness and alleged abuse of residents. The home owner 
appealed. While waiting for the appeal to be heard, a resident, Mr C, 
was admitted to hospital in an extremely poor condition. Mr C 
subsequently died and the findings of the post mortem indicated neglect. 
The death precipitated action by the Health Authority who applied for a 
magistrates* order for immediate closure. The Authority also arranged 
for a nurse to assess residents in order to collect evidence about possible 
neglect. In evidence, the nurse charged with providing the assessments 
stated that she obtained verbal consent from the residents but she did 
not know what the assessments would be used for and therefore could 
not provide an explanation of their purpose to the residents. Her 
approach to obtaining consent from residents who lacked capacity was 
also unclear. The Tribunal took the view that consent was not properly 
obtained and warned the nurse that she was in breach of Articles 6 and 8 
of the Convention on Human Rights and by giving further evidence she 
would incriminate herself. At this point, she withdrew her evidence and 
the Health Authority’s case collapsed. After the post mortem on Mr C, 
the police became involved and commissioned a further expert review 
from a geriatrician. The reviewer concluded that Mr C had had a long 
history of self-neglect and therefore the culpability of the home was in 
doubt. The Tribunal concluded that while there were inspections which 
brought to light a number of relatively minor issues, these did not point 
to a failing home. There was no evidence of unfitness, although 
standards were not high.
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What do these cases illustrate?
These cases illustrate the difficulties in obtaining evidence based on 
actual harms to residents to justify the Tribunal’s decisions. The 
Tribunal has no investigatory resources and therefore, apart from an 
occasional excursion to view a home, it  is reliant on the evidence placed 
before it. But the nature of nursing homes as total institutions in the 
Goffman sense, combined with the characteristics of residents, means 
that evidence can easily be contested. For the respondent — the Health 
Authority— reliable evidence is difficult to come by. The most likely 
witnesses are staff but, typically, nursing home staff — described more 
fully in Chapter 4 -  are young, unqualified and inexperienced. They may 
be also disaffected if they have left the home. This means that their 
evidence is contested and seen as unreliable as in decision 452.
Little reliable evidence can be gained from residents. Cognitive 
impairment and the ravages of the aging process, particularly in people 
close to death, mean it is very difficult to disentangle the effects of 
aging on the body from the effects of poor care or abuse. Thus it is very 
difficult to relate harm to residents and blameworthiness of the home. 
For example, residents may have frail skin and be easily bruised. This 
makes it  difficult to distinguish accidents or poor care from intended or 
deliberative harm, particularly as residents may be too confused to 
provide an account themselves. Even causes of death are contended, 
with different views from medical experts. In appeal 457, where the 
admitting doctors and the post mortem suggested neglect by the home, 
the subsequent expert opinion argued that this must be seen against a 
history of alcohol abuse and self neglect. In the Takare case discussed 
below, the GP who examined a resident at the home noted that he had a 
pattern of sores on his toes and knees which the doctor described as 
“ carpet burns” (Select Committee Public Administration 1997-98 para 
723) -  that is, burns consistent with being dragged face down along a
carpet. The home subsequently became the subject of a large-scale 
investigation into poor care. This culminated with a review by the Select 
Committee on Public Administration, but the combined resources of a 
review by a Professor in Care of the Elderly, an enquiry by the Health 
Ombudsman and the Parliamentary Committee failed to establish the 
cause of these sores. The Health Ombudsman deemed the home to be 
“ guilty” of the lesser charge of “ inadequate” nursing care. The great 
difficulties in agreeing causes of damage to a body in extreme old age, 
mean that reasons other than non-accidental injury or poor care are 
always credible. Blameworthiness is difficult to establish.
Since decision 457, in 2003, it  has become even more difficult to provide 
evidence about care from the bodies of residents. As described above, a 
nurse examined patients at the request of the Health Authority to gather 
evidence about their care in order to make a decision about the home's 
registration. As she had not obtained appropriate consent from the 
residents, particularly those who were cognitively impaired, the Tribunal 
argued that she had breached the residents’ human rights. When asked 
how she should have proceeded, the Tribunal stated that where a 
resident’s capacity was in question, then there was a requirement to 
obtain an opinion of the resident’s capacity from a consultant 
psychiatrist before consent is obtained. In a large nursing home, this is 
potentially a difficult and expensive process. Thus the Tribunal 
attempted to protect the privacy of a person who cannot experience or 
enjoy that privacy in any meaningful sense.
While it  is also difficult in other health care settings, such as acute 
hospitals, to disentangle disease processes from harm caused by the 
institution or its staff, in other settings the authority structures are far 
more secure and this allows the problem to be framed in a more reliable 
way. In the nursing home world such structures are ambiguous, insecure 
or contested. For example, as explored in some detail below, it is
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unclear whether a nursing home is a home or a hospital. Do the norms 
for health care facilities apply? What types of actions are permissible to 
deal with violent, aggressive residents? Do the norms of professional 
nursing apply? After all, the qualifications of nurses in nursing homes are 
defined by the Secretary of State for Health, not by the profession, and 
the majority of staff in nursing homes are not professional nurses. When 
it is not possible for the Tribunal to provide reliable answers to these 
types of questions, the Tribunal often returns to the character of home 
owners as a more justifiable basis for decisions.
APPEALS AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE NURSING HOME INDUSTRY
In appeals about conditions of registration, home owners challenged the 
authority of regulators to interpret the rules in a way that placed 
economic constraints on their business. It might be expected that 
appeals about premises or staffing would turn on what could be allowed 
given the characteristics of residents and their rights to particular 
facilities and treatment. However, this was not always the case and 
decisions sometimes turned again on the character of home owners. In 
these cases, we meet ‘the exemplary owner’ for whom allowances must 
be made and for whom standards must not be applied rigidly. As Hawkins 
notes, it  is clear from a large number of studies that assessments of 
moral character made by legal decision makers are one of the most 
pervasive and persistent features of the exercise of discretion (Hawkins 
1992 p43; Hawkins 2002p 367).
Premises and the character of home owners
To improve the economics of the home, some owners would try to adapt 
their premises to accommodate more residents. As more rooms were 
pressed into use, the amount of communal space per resident
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diminished, thus breaching the Health Authority’s space standards.
When the Health Authority refused to register the new arrangement, the 
resulting appeal tended to bring to sharp focus the purpose of a nursing 
home. Is the purpose to cater for inhabitants deemed to be “ residents”  
or “ patients” ? Are nursing homes meant to be “ homes”  with facilities 
which encouraged independent living, which would suggest that 
communal space was important? Or alternatively, are they more like 
hospitals — places for the dependent sick? There are no easy answers to 
these questions, as nursing homes cannot be clearly positioned in the 
care sector (see Chapter 7). So the Tribunal had to look for other 
justifications and turned to the character of the home owners.
In cases concerning communal space that was less than recommended by 
the national guidelines, “ exemplary”  home owners had their appeals 
allowed. These people were seen as honest, caring and reliable. In an 
early decision (28), a home owner who was “a caring person who was 
concerned about the welfare of his patients” , who was “  a good witness” 
and whose evidence was regarded as “ entirely reliable”  had his appeal to 
increase the number of residents allowed. Similarly, in 1987, the 
appellant who had all the “ experience, personality and ability that could 
be wished for in running a small nursing home” (appeal 61) had her 
appeal to turn one of her single rooms into a double room allowed. On a 
visit to the home, the Tribunal detected a “ happy atmosphere deriving 
from harmonious relationships throughout, under the leadership of the 
appellant” .
Reliance on motive or character was also apparent in decisions about 
other aspects of buildings. For example, in decision (207) the appellant 
wanted to provide continuous and intensive care to people in the last 
weeks of their lives in a four-bedded room. The Health Authority 
inspector, however, argued that it  would be insensitive to remove
patients from their own room to a public facility when death approached.
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The difference of professional opinion was settled through recourse to 
the motives of the appellant. The Tribunal were satisfied that his reason 
was not connected with securing maximum occupancy in, and hence 
maximum income from, the home and therefore allowed the appeal. 
However, such cases only succeeded where the Tribunal considered that 
the home provided the basic facilities adequate for the increase in 
numbers of residents (175, 124 and 76). Thus the Tribunal encouraged 
Health Authorities to make exception for home owners with an exemplary 
character.
Although the Tribunal could rule that guidelines should not be strictly 
applied to home owners with such a character, in later appeals, it  was 
minded to articulate the rights of residents as a basis for decision 
making. Communal space was needed as the resident had a right to 
“ freedom of choice, personal privacy and proper opportunities to retain 
their individuality and self-respect” (124). In another decision a 
communal room needed to be available and attractive, for the reason 
that, “ residents must be offered a choice about where to sit and eat and 
the Tribunal is unconvinced that they have that choice at present”  (175). 
But the issue of communal space or the rights of residents to a particular 
sort of accommodation remained an area where the foundation of the 
Tribunal’ s decisions remained unclear.
In other cases, where the home owner was of good standing but there
were concerns about the structure of the building, residents could be
fitted into existing buildings not necessarily suited to their needs. The
Tribunal would impose restrictions on the type of resident that could be
accommodated in particular rooms or on particular floors (decisions 60
and 158). For example, ambulant residents had to be accommodated
only on the second floor. This sends a clear message to the industry that
you do not necessarily need purpose-built premises to participate, the
population of residents is heterogeneous and malleable. Consequently,
198
residents are fitted to nursing homes with a lower standard of facilities 
rather than more costly option of upgrading the home to meet the 
general needs of a highly dependent group.
Staffing
Staffing notices, set by a Health Authority for a particular nursing home, 
specify the number and type of "nurses” , qualified and otherwise, to be 
employed by the home as a condition of registration. Staffing levels 
should be set to reflect the level of dependency or the “ condition”  of 
residents in the home. As staffing levels are known to be the major 
determining factor in the quality of care (Harrington et al 2000), the 
staffing notice encapsulates a major trade-off between care and the 
economic viability of a nursing home. As the Tribunal notes, one of the 
givens, or the “ceiling” in this situation, is the level of government 
funding for nursing home places. They noted:
We do not accept the health authority’s argument that 
financial viability can never be a legitimate argument 
because... the health authority cannot expect standards that 
cannot be achieved by anyone at the level of publicly 
funded fees (Registered Homes Tribunal 434).
Ultimately, the Tribunal argues, it  is the constraints imposed by the level 
of fees decided centrally by the Department of Health which determines 
the standards for quality of care rather than the Registered Homes Act, 
regulations, guidance, the Tribunal or the condition of residents. Thus 
Health Authorities’ actions in pursuit of improved care for residents were 
only legitimate if they were framed within the limitations of government 
policy.
In the appeals on staffing that were heard prior to 1996, the Tribunal
seemed reluctant to become involved, in some cases taking the view that
it  had nothing authoritative to offer, and matters should be negotiated
between the parties. In 1991, the Tribunal took the view that a home
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must have a Registered Mental Nurse on at all times to care for thirty 
patients with severe dementia (207). A later Tribunal (296), considered 
this to be the wrong interpretation of the Registered Homes Act and 
criticised the inspector for letting his specialist experience as a mental 
health nurse cloud his judgement. The Health Authority has the power to 
specify, and set out in a notice serviced on the proprietor, the 
qualification of the person in charge of the home, but not of other staff. 
The registered person must then provide "adequate”  and "suitable” 
staff, but it  is left up to their discretion how that is interpreted. Thus 
Health Authorities had no powers to specify the qualifications of staff.
In 1994, a home owner challenged the legality of the staffing notice 
which specified the numbers of care assistants or non-registered nurses 
required to be on duty (RHT 237). The Tribunal somewhat reluctantly 
provided a ruling that care assistants were nurses within the terms of 
Section 25(3) because, under the terms of the National Health Service 
1977, the Secretary of State has discretion to decide what constitutes 
nursing qualifications and activities in a nursing home. The report of the 
Tribunal then went on to document the staffing notice agreed between 
the parties. Although the Tribunal was keen to point out that it  neither 
approved nor disapproved of this notice, Health Authorities nevertheless 
began to see this as the standard, and the equivalent of a "national 
staffing standard” was produced. Reluctantly, the Tribunal had been 
cast into the role of providing the mechanism through which cohesion of 
staffing levels was achieved.
In 1996, this unofficial "national standard” was challenged by a large 
corporate, Takare (appeal 306). Takare operated 62 homes in 37 
different health authority areas, all with the same staffing pattern of two 
care assistants in the afternoon in each 30-bedded unit. The respondent 
Health Authority had, however, set a standard for all of the other 37 
nursing homes in its area of four care assistants in the afternoon.
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Summoning an impressive array of sixteen witnesses, including a member 
of the Tribunal panel, a consultant geriatrician and a specialist 
psychologist, Takare argued that its staffing level was settled after 
extensive research. None of the other 37 Health Authorities had 
complained about the adequacy of this level of staffing, neither had any 
of the commissioning managers who had been monitoring Takare since 
1987. In evidence, the Health Authority stated that it  had based its 
requirement for staffing on its past practice and arguments about the 
general dependency of elderly people in their area. However, the 
Tribunal did not find the Health Authority's arguments convincing. It 
noted that the Authority's guidelines were not produced by identified 
experts and were produced for purposes other than use in nursing homes, 
and that their basis was subjective. The Health Authority had failed to 
justify its standard in relation to the dependency levels of potential 
residents. In allowing the appeal, the Tribunal declared it was most 
impressed by Takare's array of expert witness, the organisation's 
professionalism and the quality of many Takare matrons. That is to say, 
having dismissed the authority of the Health Authority to decide on 
staffing levels, the Tribunal was left with basing its judgement on the 
"the character”  of a large corporate organisation — a character which it  
judged as exemplary. Although the Tribunal might reliably form a view 
of the integrity and truthfulness of an individual owner standing before 
it, assessing such qualities in a corporate organisation which, by 1999, 
owned 43% of the beds in the sector (Laing and Buisson 2001) was much 
more difficult. No registered person from large corporates has appeared 
before the Tribunal with their fitness in question in twenty years of the 
Tribunal's operation. The regulatory literature (Kagan 1994; Reichman 
1998; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986 p214; Pearce and Toombs 1991: 
418) suggests that the imbalance of resources between large companies 
and regulators makes this unlikely. As Simpson (2002 p47) notes, “ the 
little  guys” are more likely to be prosecuted as they are too small to
fight the Justice Department effectively or to obfuscate a legal inquiry.
As I describe below, the Tribunars assessment of Takare as an exemplary 
owner was subsequently judged and found to be extremely ill founded.
What do these cases illustrate ?
A significant issue in many cases was that in coming to a decision the 
Tribunal was solely reliant on the evidence placed before them as they 
did not have their own investigatory or other support staff. As Leggatt 
(2001 para 12) remarked, all Tribunals need "... the support of expert, 
highly-trained, investigatory staff, with specialist knowledge” . 
Considerable technical expertise is required to understand the staffing 
levels and accommodation that might be required for residents with 
particular conditions. But as it  is unable to command such a resource of 
its own, the Tribunal is reliant on balancing the evidence presented by 
the parties. Whether or not such expertise is persuasive depends on its 
authority. This brought to the fore not only difficulties about what 
norms should be applied, but who had the authority to decide those 
norms.
Appeals about accommodation brought to the fore the difficulties in 
deciding which standards were applicable. Steeped in the idea that the 
purpose of closing long-stay hospitals in the 1970s/80s and the expansion 
of nursing homes was to encourage independent living in the community 
-  "community care” , some authorities took the view that the aim of a 
nursing home was to promote this. Therefore the relevant standards 
were those within Home Life , the guidance for the residential sector 
which was based on promoting independence. But Home Life was never 
endorsed for nursing homes and when home owners appealed, Health 
Authorities which tried to adopt Home Life standards were told by the 
Tribunal that they had been "carried too far by (their) enthusiasm”  to 
improve standards (decision 61).
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Registration and Inspection of Nursing Homes: A Handbook fo r Health 
Authorities (NAHA 1985) was the guidance that Health Authorities were 
required to use. Among other things this set standards for communal 
space. When owners appealed because their homes did not meet the 
requirements for communal space, they argued that their residents were 
not of a type that needed or would use communal space. In fact, i t  was 
claimed that residents preferred not to be moved about because of pain, 
inconvenience and embarrassment about their disabilities (cases 28, 62 
and 75). Patients preferred to remain in their own rooms and any home 
owner attempting to move them could be seen as unkind. The Tribunal 
refused to directly support Health Authorities in this matter. Instead, it  
took the view that it  was not bound by the NAHA guidance. Guidelines, 
it  noted :
... are regarded as of interest and in some cases, of 
persuasive authority, but are not regarded as laying down 
any rules of particular application which the Tribunal is 
bound to follow. (Registered Homes Tribunal 124).
In this later appeal, heard in 1990, the Tribunal did try to 
articulate the rights of residents in relation to accommodation.
These were stated as
a warm and homely atmosphere in which the patients 
should have freedom of choice, personal privacy and proper 
opportunities to retain their individuality and self respect....
Clean, comfortable and safe... (Registered Homes Tribunal 
124).
But without anchoring decisions to Department of Health guidelines, with 
the lack of clarity about the purpose of a nursing home and a vague 
statement about rights, the Tribunal then had difficulties in deciding the 
basis on which appeals about this matter should be decided. As noted 
above, in many cases the Tribunal fell back on the character of the home 
owner.
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Hawkins (1984) concluded, in relation to the regulation of pollution, that 
only those whose actions are clearly recognisable as amoral -  the 
malicious, the negligent, and the conspicuously “ bad” — are subject to 
severe sanctions, in this case exclusion. In the context of the 
enforcement of Health and Safety regulations, Hawkins (2002 p367) also 
argues that blame is frequently attributed or abandoned in response to 
the perceived personal character and attributes of those involved, rather 
than by virtue of what the regulatee has done or failed to do. Companies 
are socially constructed with a human character and personality. For 
inspectors much depends on the firm with a poor attitude equating to a 
negative evaluation. Similarly, the behaviour of the appellant to the 
Health Authority inspectors was also an important consideration for the 
Tribunal. Regulatees who showed willingness to respond to the 
requirements of regulators, such as, for example, an appellant who 
“ listens to advice” (case 65) or one who is “ learning what is required of 
him” (234) had a good chance of having their appeal allowed. One who 
was obdurate and had an “ uncompromising attitude to criticism” (31) 
would be deemed unfit (204, 272). Refusal to accept authority, and 
ignorance of the functions, duties and power of inspectors would also be 
cited as grounds for the failure of appeals (121). The regulatory system 
requires that inspectors must be able to put their trust in the regulated 
person, thus falsifying records (cases 174, 243 and 272) and not 
honouring promises (402) also provide grounds for the dismissal of an 
appeal. Integrity and willingness to negotiate are characteristics that 
make governance possible. Thus fitness for individual home owners 
appears to have as much to do with the capacity to submit and work 
productively with authority, with the requirements for such 
characteristics justified by the vulnerability of residents.
Health Authorities prosecuting appeals tended to presume that they had 
that authority to decide standards, both in law and by virtue of their role
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at that time within the NHS. Enforcing the Registered Homes Act was 
only a minor task for Health Authorities. Their main task, delegated to 
them by the Secretary of State for Health, was to plan all NHS services 
for large populations within a defined geographically area. Therefore 
setting the type of service, including the staffing levels, required for a 
small population of nursing home residents should have been a simple 
task. For example, before the expansion of the nursing home industry, 
Health Authorities planned services for a group they referred to as 
Elderly Mentally Infirm — people who now might be diagnosed as having 
dementia. Livesley and Ellington (1996) described this as a term which 
has entered common usage referring to patients as having “ specialist 
care needs because of an accompanying range of other physical and 
medical problems that may eventually include immobility” . For such a 
client group within the NHS there was an expectation of a particular level 
of staffing and staff with a particular type of experience.
However, in the context of the Tribunal, Health Authorities were forced 
to justify their decisions and frequently failed to do so. Health 
Authorities* decisions were overturned because they relied on the 
professional judgement of inspectors, as in 296, or on their own 
guidance, which it was argued was developed for other circumstances, as 
in 306, rather than countering the appellant's case with robust technical 
evidence from independent experts. Part of the problem lay in the 
design of the Tribunal. For other industries, Baldwin (1985) has observed 
that because the Tribunal had the power to take de novo decisions, the 
appeal body was turned, albeit reluctantly, into the regulator or norm 
setter and the Health Authority into the prosecutor. This is problematic 
for two reasons. First, as noted above, the Tribunal had no access to 
specialist technical expertise of its own -  it  was reliant on the evidence 
presented. Secondly, the Health Authority could be perceived as having 
a conflict of interest between its role as prosecutor and its role as expert
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witness in the appropriate care for elderly people. The Health Authority 
role was a conflation or conflict of interests — that of the NHS, the 
regulator and the resident. Therefore, unless the Authority produced 
independent witnesses, its expertise was likely to be discounted. In the 
Takare case this meant, that as Reichman (1998) has argued, the 
sophisticated challenger’s expert evidence was seen as persuasive. Thus 
a large company seemed to have the “ cultural authority”  to determine 
their own standards.
With all these uncertainties, making an assessment of the character of 
the owner standing before the Tribunal must have been attractive 
alternative. But as we shall see, the Tribunal proved to be a poor judge 
of character. In the Takare case, the Tribunal concluded by giving the 
Health Authority advice on how to safeguard the public, given the new 
staffing standard:
Takare is subject to scrutiny from thousands of relatives, 
outside professionals and forty three other health 
authorities. It w ill carefully assess needs and increase 
staffing upwards from the minimum when circumstances 
require. It would be foolhardy for them to do otherwise. If 
respondents fe lt there was a shortfall they should enforce 
regulation 12 (1)a with the consequent potentially damaging 
publicity.
Registered Homes Tribunal 306.
But in another part of the country, Takare had already been the subject 
of much adverse public opinion, which had had little  effect on their 
willingness to “ increase staffing upwards” .
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THE LARGE CORPORATE AS AN EXEMPLARY OWNER ?
Takare in Hertfordshire
The Tribunal case referred to above was heard in October 1996 in Stoke 
on Trent. Early that year there had been major problems with a Takare 
nursing home in Hertfordshire. The nursing home was built to take 
patients from the closure of local NHS facilities. The local Health 
Authority were very unhappy with the proposed arrangements for the 
new nursing home. In particular, they were concerned that the staffing 
levels proposed were well below those they fe lt appropriate for managing 
this group of patients. However, they were advised by the Regional 
Health Authority that they could not refuse to register the home as they 
would be unlikely to be successful in the resulting appeal because they 
would not be able to prove that quality of care would be compromised 
(Select Committee on Public Administration 1997-98 para 780). The 
home opened in October 1994 and throughout the spring of 1995 there 
were many complaints, culminating with a television documentary. In 
August 1995, Professor Livesley, a Professor in Care of the Elderly and a 
Justice of the Peace, was commissioned by the Health Authority to 
undertake an investigation with Sue Ellington, Chief Nursing Officer for 
Bedfordshire Health Authority.
Livesley and Ellington (1996) reviewed some 25 cases and interviewed 
both staff and relatives. They found that far from being an “exemplary” 
owner, by the standards of other appeals Takare could have been judged 
“ unfit” . They found that Takare had misled the Authority about the 
qualifications of its staff. It had claimed that the matron had 
qualifications in terminal illness and had supervisory care of people with 
mental illness. This was not the case: the matron’s qualifications in 
these areas consisted of voluntary work (para 1.49). The home had 
major staffing problems. The turnover of staff was high, with half
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leaving within six months. It continually operated with staffing at a level 
below the staffing notice, although this was set lower than the Health 
Authority thought manageable. Over Christmas 1994, there had been 
only one qualified nurse and one care assistant to care for 30 mentally ill 
infirm patients. The staff were inexperienced and unqualified, with only 
half of the qualified staff having experience in caring for elderly patients 
(para 1.70). Of the unqualified staff, more than half were either under 
21 or over 45 years of age and 50 per cent had no previous experience of 
care work. After recruitment they only had three days training with 
Takare, who insisted that this was all that was required. The review 
concluded that the staff did not have the skills necessary for the 
effective handling and care of elderly patients with the high levels of 
dependency they encountered. A large number of patients were 
admitted to the local hospital with falls. The reviewers concluded that 
one of the main reasons for this was the high temperature of the home, 
coupled with lack of staff. Many residents could not drink unaided and 
the low staffing levels meant that there were insufficient staff to help 
them drink. Residents were thus becoming dehydrated — prone to falls 
and other problems of dehydration. Thus Takare could have been 
considered as “ unfit” as it  had lied to the Health Authority and had 
caused harm to residents.
The independent review was published in January 1996. The Health 
Ombudsman then took up the complaints of many of the relatives and a 
report of the home and the Health Authority’s role finally appeared in 
the record of the Select Committee on Public Administration in 1998. 
Despite its experience in Hertfordshire that its staffing levels had been 
found to be a high risk and the adverse publicity it  had attracted, Takare 
nevertheless appealed against the decision of Stoke on Trent Health 
Authority to refuse to register a home with the same staffing pattern. As 
noted above, this appeal, heard in October 1996, was successful. What is
208
extraordinary is that neither the Health Authority and its legal advisors 
nor the Tribunal, appeared to be aware of the independent review 
published some nine months previously or of the adverse publicity 
surrounding Takare in Hertfordshire. The Tribunal's decision, which set 
the standard for all large nursing homes, appeared to be based solely on 
the evidence before it that Takare was an "exemplary” owner. But as 
Hawkins (2002 p409) reports, criminal proceedings tear selected facts 
about events from the complex social reality of the workplace, 
transforming them into individualistic criminal law conceptions of 
responsibility and sanctioning, thereby depoliticising the issues.
CONCLUSION
To return to the original question of how representations of residents 
are used in the Tribunal's decisions, the answer appears contrary to what 
might be expected. Although appeals about fitness turn on the character 
of the appellant, harms done to residents, such as robbery or assault, 
play an important part in the consideration of that character. At first 
sight, appeals about the conditions of registration -  staffing levels and 
the nature of the building -  might be seen as more directly related to 
the characteristics of the residents. However, because of the 
uncertainty in justifying a decision based on the condition of the 
residents, such appeals often turn on the character of the registered 
person rather than the quality of care offered.
The Registered Homes Tribunal has been criticised by lawyers who argue 
that it  favours the interests of home owners over the rights of residents 
(Harman and Harman 1989; Brammer 1994). But this chapter has sought 
to argue that behind this apparent bias lies a set of complex issues.
Many books on corporate crime carry chapters on nursing homes 
(Braithwaite 1993) which attempt to demonstrate that for nursing homes
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the legal definition of “ crime” does not encompass actions which are 
thought to be morally problematic or which produce grave social harms. 
Teubner (1984) suggests that one of the major criticisms of command and 
control regulation is that it  is cognitively inadequate to deal with the 
governance of complex organisations. Norms generated in other systems 
cannot be reliably translated into the legal system. The Takare case in 
particular provides another example of where, for complex reasons, the 
legal response has been inadequate to encompass activities in nursing 
homes which are considered to morally problematic.
The solution proposed by Teubner is “ proceduralisation” . One version of 
this includes an emphasis on the involvement of all those who have an 
interest in the regulatory processes (Black 2000; Justice 1996). In the 
case of nursing homes, it has been suggested that this would mean an 
appeals procedure which allows consumer groups the same standing as 
the regulatee to appeal the regulators’ decision (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992). As noted above, the Tribunal stands out by the absence of the 
subject of the legal protection. The resident is absent in person and 
appears only as an unclear representation -  referred to both as “ a 
patient”  and “a resident” with no consistency or apparent pattern. The 
rights of residents, occasionally articulated by the Tribunal as homely 
environments, individuality and choice, are constrained by governmental 
policies for the sector, ill-defined and even inappropriate to govern 
procedures required to care for residents with friable skin who are 
cognitively impaired, incontinent and immobile. With the authority of 
the Health Authority compromised by the fact that it  is perceived to have 
a conflict of interest between its expertise and its role in the Tribunal as 
prosecutor, there are no mechanisms, procedures, or institutions which 
add appropriate operational flesh to these skeletal concepts. Yet the 
contemporary legal framing of the resident as a rights bearing subject 
works against the ability of the inspectorate to collect evidence about
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the state of the resident’s body. Technical issues such as the one 
articulated by Livesley and Ellington (1996), about the effects of ambient 
temperature of a nursing home when coupled with lack of staff, have 
much valence for the problems of governance of nursing homes. But such 
issues do not appear within the records of the Tribunal. They are norms 
generated elsewhere requiring articulation by expert witnesses.
This chapter also suggests that development of such an “ interpretive 
community”  may be more complex than procedural rules which allow 
different groups the right to speak. The presence of health care 
professionals in the majority on the Tribunal does little  to address the 
complex issues identified here. But the more fundamental problem for 
elderly residents as a group is that while residents are, without a doubt, 
marginalised, they cannot be dealt with as just another under­
represented group. The solutions advocated for other groups, such as 
participatory inclusion or even notions of fairness or justice, are very 
vexed in their application to this group, as will be apparent in later 
chapters. It is difficult for residents to be present because of their 
frailty. Although the Tribunal was anxious to state that welfare of the 
residents was its primary concern, without any clear anchors either in the 
primary legislation or subsequent guidance, it  was difficult for the 
Tribunal to operationalise that concern in a robust way.
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Chapter 7
THE NURSING HOME RESIDENT AS "SICK PERSON”:
A CONTESTED IMAGE
INTRODUCTION
Theories of old age have changed in the last decade to accommodate 
new sociological ideas of the self, a concern with social divisions of 
race and gender and the changing nature of the welfare state. The 
literature on social policy and old age used to be dominated by the 
theory of “ structured dependency”  (Gilleard and Higgs 2000; Estes 
and Linkin 2000), where the relationship with the welfare state 
became the sole defining characteristic of a particular age group. The 
welfare system was seen as creating a situation where when people 
retired they became economically dependent on the state when there 
was no need for them to be so (Estes and Linkins 2000). This theory 
has now given way to a postmodern view of old age (Gilleard and 
Higgs 2000) which incorporates contemporary concerns with “ the self” 
and other social divisions. Thus, attention is now being paid to the 
lived experience of ageing and to acknowledging the heterogeneity of 
old people in terms of race, class and gender (Estes and Linkin 2000). 
However, for Gilleard and Higgs (2000), the significant divisions are 
not race, class and gender, but concern a person’s ability to function 
according to the standards required of a contemporary individual. 
People who can function in such a way are referred to as “ third agers”  
and those who have become too frail to do so as referred as “ fourth 
agers”  (Gilleard and Higgs 2000). The third age is portrayed by a 
picture of consumerism, self-improvement and self-development 
rather than being portrayed in the language of social rights 
(Featherstone and Hepworth 1998). People in this group, increasingly 
spatially separated into modern retirement communities (McHugh 
2003), are described as typifying the “ agentic construction of the life
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world which is the epitome of the modern self” (Gilleard and Higgs 
2000). When they can no longer successfully exercise the appropriate 
technologies of the self, and a progression to disability and 
dependency occurs, they are reclassified as “ fourth agers” . Thus 
there is no longer any common status in being old. Indeed, the 
characteristics of “ third agers” are accentuated to the detriment of 
“ fourth agers” . The institution most associated with the “ fourth age” 
is the nursing home. This chapter explores the status of “ fourth 
agers”  within social and health policy and considers how this status 
provides structural constraints on the regulation of nursing homes.
Many institutions occupy the “ regulatory space” (Hancher and Moran 
1989) of nursing home regulation -  government, legal institutions, 
residents and their families, nursing home providers and health care 
professions. This chapter analyses how the image of “ the resident” is 
contested in this particular regulatory space. The particular point at 
issue is whether the debility and disability that characterise residents 
means they should be classified as “ sick” . A number of key 
conceptual themes are linked to notions of the “ sick person” . First, 
the notion of “ expert”  knowledge about “ sickness” or “ illness” and 
secondly, ideas about the construction of the self. “ Expert” 
knowledge about “ sickness” has been developed and separated from 
“ lay”  or “ everyday” knowledge by the institutionalisation of the 
former into health care professions (Bury 2000 p5). Thus the rise of 
the medical profession is related to a parallel emergence of disease 
and disorders, and medical competence is legitimated as the proper 
means for dealing with them. Such knowledge is increasingly 
organised and mediated through institutions responsible for the 
delivery of care, for example hospitals and government health care 
systems (Hogle 2002; Friedson 1986). The second group of major 
conceptual themes is related to Foucauldian ideas about the 
construction of the self. Both the disciplines of medicine and the 
state “ objectify” their subjects by collection of information about 
them, for example statistics. Such information then becomes the
means through which individuals construct their identity or ideas 
about their self. That is to say, it  is used “ reflexively” to "subjectify” 
individuals (Rose 1996; Bury 2000).
The preceding chapters, in particular Chapter 3, have built up a 
picture of nursing homes and their residents as marginalised -  a 
neglected area for policy development. This chapter explores further 
the theme of deprivation and its consequences for the status of the 
resident. It is suggested that, as well as the withdrawal of economic 
resources, residents are also denied access to the professional and 
symbolic resources which, in the contemporary UK context, constitute 
the category of “ sick person” . Neither can residents be classified as 
“ dying people” , for many of the resources considered appropriate to 
the dying are also unavailable. This chapter describes how residents 
are excluded from the practical application of professional medical 
and nursing expertise. Little investment has been made to produce 
“ expert”  knowledge to describe, measure or control residents as “ sick 
people” , and what expertise there is, has been separated from the 
provision of care.
Twentieth century institutions for very old people: 
development, resources and conditions
The sequestration of old people at the end of their lives into special 
institutions is not a new phenomenon. Over the past hundred years 
institutions catering for such people have increased in size and in 
number. Thane (2000), in a social history of ageing, notes that prior 
to the interwar years few old people at the end of their lives survived 
infections. But advances in nursing and in treatment generally meant 
the proportion of the population which is over 65 has risen from 
around 2% in the early 1900s to 20% in 2001 (ONS population series). 
Over the last 40 years there has also been a substantial change in the 
age composition of older people. The proportion of people in the UK 
population aged 85 and over increased from 0.7 per cent in 1961 to
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1.9 per cent in 2002 -  over 700,000 people1. However, institutions 
catering for the increasing number of such people are not, nor ever 
have been, a high priority. For most of the century they were typified 
by few resources, poor conditions and restricted access to health 
care, in particular medicine. Indeed, part of the rationale for 
introducing nursing homes regulation in 1927 was to improve the 
conditions. A Select Committee inquiry which reported in 1926 
concluded that conditions for “ senile chronic cases” warranted an 
“ urgent need for registration”  (Select Committee 1926). Around the 
time nursing home regulation began, the Local Government Act of 
1929 transferred Poor Law institutions into the hands of local 
authorities, also in the hope of improving conditions (Thane 2000 
p436).
But conditions in these local authority institutions which catered for 
the chronically supposedly incurably ill, very many of them aged, 
remained poor. A rationing system that provided inferior medical 
care for most older patients was firmly in place (Thane 2000; Isaacs 
1981). Throughout the period to the inception of the National Health 
Service, there were very few doctors in these local authority 
hospitals, and the district, voluntary and teaching hospitals which 
specialised in acute medicine had an unwritten policy of excluding 
elderly people. One of the pioneer professors of geriatric medicine, 
Bernard Isaacs (1981 p224), writing in 1981, described how the 
rationing system worked in the 1940s:
House physicians of my day were instructed to repel all 
applicants for admission if  they were over the age of 65 
on the unarguable ground that “we don’t take that type 
of patient in here” . The GP could be unpleasant about 
this at times, but his invisible reproaches were much to 
be preferred to the wrath of the Chief next morning 
when he found one of his beds put to such inappropriate 
use. Thus these good and famous men, our teachers, 
transmitted to us, their students, their blind rejection of 
the elderly.
1http://www.statistics.gov.uk accessed Oct 4th 2005
215
Doctors in training had no contact with such patients and therefore 
whole careers could be spent without any experience of people at the 
end of their lives. At the inception of the National Health Service in 
1947, conditions in these former Poor Law hospitals were still inferior. 
Once qualified, Isaacs (1981 p225) was taken to a former Poor House 
-  the place where the elderly people he had excluded were likely to 
be sent. Notice how he describes how the conditions had rendered 
the residents other than human:
unbelievable sight... day rooms unheated save by a great 
iron stove discharging yellow smoke; unfurnished save by 
wooden kitchen chairs; and peopled with upwards of 
sixty old men, dressed in calico nightshirts of umbilical 
length and coarse cloth jackets and trousers, urinating 
on the floor beneath them, and countering the odour 
with that of indifferent tobacco. Pipe smoking was the 
only occupational therapy provided -  the pipes lighted 
by the attendant, for the ownership of matches was 
forbidden. The patients le ft in bed in the cheerless ward 
were so distorted by contractures that their only human 
resemblance was to the foetus in the womb. They were 
there because they were ill, old and poor. They were 
there because, when the GP telephoned the teaching 
hospital, he was told “ try elsewhere” . I did not like the 
sight of “ elsewhere” .
One of the nursing homes I visited, described in Chapter 5, might be 
also viewed in such terms, providing a modern equivalent. It smelt 
heavily of urine and had call bells which went unanswered as agitated 
demented patients cried out.
Conditions in the old Poor Law institutions taken over by the National 
Health Service as long-stay hospitals and in residential institutions 
remained grim with recurrent public scandals (Allsop 1984) until the 
early 1970s. Partly because, at the creation of the National Health 
Service, consultants did not wish to work in the former workhouses, a 
two-tier system of “ acute”  and poorly staffed, “ chronic”  hospitals was 
created (Grimley Evans 1997). At the same time, in 1948 geriatric 
medicine was created as a specialty -  an invention of the post-war 
NHS (Grimley Evans 2005). In the early 1970s, the height of the post­
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war welfare state, there was an intent to improve conditions for old 
people, and in the 1970s, the specialty enjoyed a special relationship 
with the Department of Health (Grimley Evans 2005). With the 
introduction of the District General Hospital in the NHS Reorganisation 
Act of 1973, the division between acute and chronic hospitals was 
abolished (Klein 1995a,b; Allsop 1984) Thus a fu ll range of services 
including geriatric services was required of the District General 
Hospital, and departments of geriatric medicine sprang up in all 
District General Hospitals (Grimley Evans 1997; Barton and Mulley 
2003). But despite the policy intent, it  proved difficult to transfer 
resources to geriatric medicine and as late as this was described as 
the treatment of under-privileged patients by under-privileged doctors 
in under-privileged buildings (Isaacs quoted by Thane p456).
No sooner had the brief period of accommodating old people in the 
mainstream of the NHS begun, than the state began to withdraw from 
the provision of long-term care and the expansion of the nursing home 
industry began. In 1970, the total number of long-term places in 
institutional care in the UK as a whole was 270,000, with !Unexpected 
End of Formula places in NHS geriatric hospitals and local authority 
residential care -  the state sector (Kerrison and Pollock 2001c) -  and 
very few, 20,300 places, in the independent nursing home sector 
(Laing and Buisson 1999). Between 1979 and 2000, the total number 
of beds in the NHS in England decreased from 480,000 to 189,000 
while the number of beds in the independent sector, mainly in nursing 
homes, increased from 23,000 in 1983 to 193,000, with around 
450,000 of beds in the nursing home and residential sector combined.
The 1970s also saw the development of the hospice movement (James 
1994). Hospices developed as charitable institutions, outside the NHS, 
specialising in the care of the dying. In contrast to nursing homes, 
hospices have easy access to specialist medical advice from doctors 
with expertise in care of the dying, a higher ratio of nurses to 
untrained staff and nurses with qualifications in care of the dying
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(Lawton 2000). Consequently, care is more sophisticated and 
expensive. However, hospices are not populated by dying old people. 
Instead, hospices are almost exclusively geared towards younger 
patients with incurable cancer. In one survey of UK hospices in 1997, 
97 per cent of the patients had cancer, two thirds were under 65 and 
only 7 per cent were in the 85 and over age group which has 14 per 
cent of the cancer deaths (Eve and Higginson 2000). Traditionally, 
one of the aims of the hospice movement is to enable patients to 
retain control of their lives until death. Thus hospice philosophy is 
congruent with the contemporary notion of the choosing self and 
consuming self (Lawton 2000). The cognitive problems of very many 
old people do not f it  easily with this image of the self. Instead, old 
people are more likely to die elsewhere. Of the deaths of people over 
75 in England in 1998 -  some 350,000 people -  about half occurred in 
NHS hospitals, 15 per cent in nursing homes, 15 per cent at home, 12 
per cent in other communal establishments (mainly residential homes) 
and less than 1 per cent in hospices (Registrar General DH1 series). In 
other words, there were approximately 51,000 deaths in one year in 
the nursing home population of around 190,000 (Registrar General DH1 
series). Yet, despite the fact that more than a quarter of the 
population of nursing homes w ill die in a year, older people in care 
homes have been described as being "systematically disadvantaged” 
in relation the provision of palliative care (Davies and Seymour 2002). 
The model of palliative care based on a multidisciplinary approach, 
where there is commitment to caring for bereaved relatives as well as 
the dying individual, does not f it  easily with a nursing home with one 
discipline, nursing, and where relatives may be seen as a disruption to 
the work of the home (Foner 1995). Recent attempts to develop 
palliative care schemes in private nursing homes have faced many 
barriers (Hockley and Clark 2002). For not only do care homes lack 
doctors, psychologists and social workers, they also lack “ experts” in 
spiritual care, and there are no chaplaincies associated with care 
homes to organise priests (Orchard 2002).
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In the 1990s, policies were implemented to further separate old 
people at the end of their lives from the health care system. As a 
consequence there is now empirical evidence which suggests that care 
is inadequate, with poor monitoring of chronic disease and overuse of 
inappropriate drugs in nursing homes (Fahey et al 2003). The 1990 
NHS and Community Care Act, which came into force in 1993, 
transferred the responsibility for purchasing long-term general nursing 
care from the NHS to local authorities. In practice, this meant that 
care which was previously free at the point of delivery was subject to 
co-payment between the recipient and the authority. That is to say, 
the rights of elderly people as citizens to free comprehensive health 
care had been removed. Or, to put it the other way round, care 
delivered in nursing homes was no longer classified as health care.
The process of reclassification of nursing homes as outside the health 
care system continued in the present decade when the term “ nursing 
home” was abolished in the Care Standards Act 2000.
Modern institutions for the care of very old people — nursing homes — 
are set apart for other reasons. Many of the processes which have 
been described as central characteristics of modern life — that is “ the 
desire to know, and to organise and control” (Bury 2000 p17) — are 
absent from nursing homes. As described below, compared to the rest 
of the health care system, little  effort has been put into the 
accumulation of knowledge about residents or nursing homes. 
Compared with other groups, representations of residents are 
impoverished.
EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND THE NURSING HOME
Separation of sophisticated knowledge from action
The development of a sophisticated health care system requires taking 
knowledge originally embedded within everyday life and subjecting it
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to specialist development (Bury 2000 p5). Despite the fact that old 
age is increasingly associated with specific diseases such as 
Alzheimer's disease rather than "natural”  decline, the state has 
managed to separate old people from expert knowledge. A growing 
amount of research evidence suggests that there is lack of health care 
provision in nursing homes, with inequity between the “ free living” 
and those in nursing homes (O'Dea et al 2000; Janzon et al 2000;
Jacobs and Glendinning 2001; Glendinning et al 2002; Jacobs 2003). 
Currently, geriatricians do not have an institutional base in nursing 
homes and specialist advice must be accessed through that general 
gatekeeper of specialist NHS services, the general practitioner. But 
the medical needs of care home residents have been deemed “ to 
exceed the original expectation for general practitioners' present 
general medical services (GMS) contract”  (Royal College of Physicians, 
Royal College of Nursing and British Geriatric Society 2000 para 7.1; 
Glendinning et al 2002). The result is that GPs may charge homes1 
retainers, with extra costs being passed on to fee-paying residents. 
Similarly, residents may lack the services of both specialist nurses and 
therapists (O'Dea et al 2000). As noted above, throughout the history 
of institutions for old people in transition between life and death, 
expertise becomes divorced from where care is being given.
Residents are admitted directly, without a medical assessment, and, 
as noted in Chapter 4, most of the care is provided by unqualified 
nursing staff who are supervised by fewer qualified nurses who are 
less well educated than their counterparts in the NHS. One 
independent enquiry (Livesley and Ellington 1996) found that the care 
assistants had been recruited from an advertisement in a local 
superstore and started work some three days before the home 
received residents. Sixty-six per cent had had no previous work 
experience in the provision of care in any form, and a third were 
younger than 21. In the first six months of the home's opening, 43 per 
cent of the care assistants had left. As noted in Chapter 3, the 
primary legislation places few requirements on nursing homes in terms
220
of employment of qualified staff and, in its adjudication, the 
Registered Homes Tribunal, discussed in Chapter 6, may have further 
weakened these requirements. Thus there is a return to the 
“everyday knowledge” through the employment of untrained staff, 
and the everyday point of reference for interpretation of rules is not 
specialist health care expertise in elderly people.
The impoverishment of symbolic resources
Similarly, nursing homes and their residents stand outside the 
mainstream of a management culture in health care of calculation, 
measurement, audit and other rituals of verification deemed 
important in contemporary society (Power 1997). Put simply, there is 
lack of interest in knowing about nursing homes or their residents, and 
older people are increasingly sequestered into those parts of the 
health and care systems that statistics do not reach (Grimley Evans 
2005 p80). Miller and Darton (2000) note that almost no information 
is available about the health status of nursing home residents. All 
nine official continuous surveys excluded this group, as they use 
households as their sampling frame, as do the majority of ad hoc 
official surveys. Although one in 20 people aged 65 and over is in 
institutionalised care (Bakejal 2002), the recent English Longitudinal 
Study of Aging, which began in 20012, does not include an institutional 
sample, although it w ill continue to follow people in institutional 
care. Apart from the decennial census, which includes people in 
institutions, the only official surveys undertaken since 1980 which 
include institutions are the 1984 OPCS surveys of disabilities, the 1997 
National Diet and Nutrition Survey and the 2000 Health Survey for 
England. The administrative data which might be used to indicate the 
performance of care homes also suffers from considerable neglect.
The only other source of routine data is prescriptions which are 
returned to Prescription Pricing Authority for analysis. This source of 
data accounts for literature being populated with papers about drug
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prescribing in nursing homes (eg McGrath and Jackson 1996). The 
sector received an estimated £9.1 billion of public funding in 2001, 
and this sum is likely to have increased since then. Despite this, the 
only official data collected were the capacity of the homes and the 
numbers of residents. There is no basic information about the 
utilisation of care homes, let alone information which could be used 
to assess residents* health needs or monitor the quality of services 
provided by homes. Although the Office of Fair Trading has recently 
completed a market review of care homes (OFT 2005), they did not 
produce any separate data for care homes with nursing. Therefore 
the shape of the provision for the most vulnerable group still remains 
hidden.
From the late 1990s, public debate over the funding of long-term care 
added impetus to the collection of information about residents. 
Following criticism from both a Royal Commission on Long Term Care 
(Department of Health 1999a) and from the Court of Appeal (R v North 
East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan), the government 
decided to fund nursing care in nursing homes provided by a 
registered nurse. Eligibility was to be assessed by an NHS nurse but 
the use of standardised residents assessments scales such as those 
developed by the Royal College of Nursing (2004) or the US Federal 
Government -  the MDS RAI (Challis, Carpenter and Traske 1996) was 
avoided. Each Health Authority and now each Primary Care Trust has 
been given the discretion to decide on its own assessment tool. The 
lack of a common scale meant that there was no possibility of 
generating comparative data which might fuel the public debate 
about the funding or draw attention to other issues such as levels of 
care or geographical and other inequities.
This lack of information stands in sharp contrast to the data available 
about the NHS. Basic information about a 10 per cent sample of 
individuals has been collected since the 1960s as the Hospital In-
2 http: /  / www.natcen.ac.uk/elsa/ docs/ facts tinks.htm accessed 12/12/05
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Patient Inquiry. Since the 1990s, a 38-item minimum data-set was 
collected for every person admitted to an NHS hospital (McFarlane et 
al 2000). As well as recording basic demographic details, this 
describes the diagnosis, treatment or type of operation, and the 
outcome, with extra data items required for pregnancy and birth, 
psychiatric and intensive care. The information is collated centrally 
and provides the Hospital Episode Statistics. In addition, a vast 
amount of information is returned to the Department of Health to 
enable the government to manage the performance of the service.
Old people, at the end of life, seem to be le ft out of the pursuit of 
knowledge. For example, Cox and Cook (2002) note that it  is only 
recently that needs of people with dementia who are dying or the 
needs of those dying in nursing homes in general have been explored. 
Research in this area is exploratory and tentative to such an extent 
that it  is "inappropriate” to identify "best practice” (Nicholson 2006). 
But those who have attempted to undertake pilot palliative schemes 
in nursing homes have raised questions about the transferability of 
that model. There are many differences between a death at the end 
of a long life and the death of a younger person with cancer. For 
example, nursing home patients are likely to be cognitively impaired. 
This means that it  is difficult to use assessment tools to describe and 
monitor pain and a different approach to pain management is 
required. In addition, as described in Chapter 3, a culture of 
normalisation exists in many nursing homes, therefore death and the 
need for appropriate care at this time is denied. Thus one manager is 
quoted as saying "We find it  better not to encourage residents to talk 
about God as this may lead to thoughts of death” (Orchard 2002 p69).
Without expert codification of their condition or "needs” little  
argument can be made for the provision of services. If people are 
constructed by discourse then nursing home residents are not people. 
The lack of management information or information which could be 
used to externally judge performance means that the sector lies
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outside the “ audit”  society. In many ways, nursing homes and their 
residents are an uncharted territory. As the symbolic resources with 
which to achieve this knowledge are absent or denied then elderly 
people might be seen as being on the periphery of life.
KNOWLEDGE AND RESOURCES FOR OLD PEOPLE IN GENERAL
Historically, and contemporarily, institutions providing care for people 
at the very end of life have existed against a general background of 
low priority being given to describing or meeting the needs of elderly 
people (Davies and Seymour 2002). Despite the fact that the NHS was 
meant to provide a comprehensive health care service from the cradle 
to the grave, from its inception it  was taken for granted that the 
needs of older people took lower priority than those of the young. 
Thane (2000 p440) observes that even the Beveridge Report of 1942, 
the blueprint for the post-war Welfare State, asserted:
It is dangerous to be in any way lavish to old age until 
adequate provision has been assured for all other vital 
needs, such as the prevention of disease and the 
adequate nutrition of the young.
Thus it is not surprising that post-war social reformers, such as Rob 
(1967) “ Sans Everything” and Townsend “The last refuge” (1962), in 
studies of the 1950s and 1960s, concluded that the elderly received a 
lower standard of care than the rest of the population.
At turn of the 21st century, inequity between old people and the rest 
of the population appears to be increasing. The withdrawal of the 
NHS from long-term care and the expansion of the nursing home 
sector has occurred at the same time as a comparative decline in the 
rise of expenditure on the health of elderly people. In a cross­
national comparison between England and Wales and Japan, Canada 
and Australia over the period 1985-87 to 1996-1999, Seshamini and 
Gray (2002) noted a decreasing proportion of general expenditure 
allocated to older people in England and Wales. The proportion of
total expenditure allocated to the population aged 65 and over 
decreased from 40 per cent to 35 per cent, despite the increased 
numbers in this age group. Per capita health expenditure increased 
by 8 per cent for ages 65 and over, compared to 31 per cent for ages 
5-64. The per capita expenditure on health for ages 65 and over in 
Japan, Canada and Australia over the same period was 12 per cent, 20 
per cent and 56 per cent respectively. The authors concluded that 
the cost of care for elderly people in England and Wales had declined 
and suggest that one possible reason lies in the expansion of cheaper 
forms of care, in particular nursing homes. They note that from 1988 
to 1998 the market value of the nursing and residential care sector for 
older populations increased by 43 per cent from £5.1 billion to £7.3 
billion, while the value of long-stay hospital care in the NHS 
decreased by 52 per cent from £3.3 billion to £1.1 billion. A further 
factor is that costs have been shifted to the individual by classifying 
nursing home care as social care which is subject to co-payment.
The lack of information which would allow sophisticated description of 
the nursing home industry and its residents, occurs against a 
background of a general lack of information about health in old age.
In the early 1990s, a wide-ranging report by the Medical Research 
Council (1994) argued that, despite a large demographic change 
whereby people over 65 formed an increasingly large proportion of the 
population, there was little  information about whether the health 
status of the older population has improved, deteriorated or remained 
static during the decades of mortality decline. At an individual level, 
disease in old age is known to present differently and old people 
respond differently to treatment (Grimley Evans 1997; Baron and 
Mulley 2003). But because the elderly are largely excluded from 
medical research, little  is known about the best methods of treatment 
for the majority of health problems that are typical of old age, such 
as instability and incontinence.
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Isaacs (1981 p231) notes:
The transport of sodium ions across cell membranes has 
attracted more medical interest than the transport of 
human beings across rooms... The balance between 
anion and cation absorbs many more shelf miles of 
medical literature than the balance between right and 
le ft foot... Doctors fascinated by the incompetence of 
(his) mitral valve are turned off by incompetence of (his) 
urethral valve, yet the mechanics are no less delicate 
and failure no less disabling.
Similarly, as a result of exclusion of elderly people from clinical trials, 
it  is not known whether much new treatment is harmful or beneficial 
for old people. For example, Grimley Evans (2002 p94) laments the 
lack of impact of the MRC 1994 review, commenting on one of the 
major advances in the treatment of heart attacks by noting that:
It is seven years since an overview concluded that 
thrombolytic therapy given to a thousand patients aged 
over 75 with acute myocardial infarction w ill save the 
lives of 35 but kill or shorten the lives of 26. A problem 
clearly exists as clinicians still do not have an evidence 
base for identifying which older people with heart 
attacks should not be given thrombolysis.
The impoverishment of geriatric medicine itself has meant that it  has 
few specific advances to offer old people. As Thane (2000 p254) 
notes, old people stand to benefit most from medicine where those 
benefits were shared with younger people. For example pacemakers, 
cardiac surgery and artificial joints have proved of benefit to the old 
and young alike. However, inequities or age discrimination mean that 
their access to such advances is restricted. For example, in 2005, the 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence decided that drugs to treat 
Alzheimer’s disease should be banned from the NHS as they were 
outside the range of cost effectiveness that might be considered 
appropriate where cost effectiveness is measured in terms of 
increased life expectancy. That is to say, if the same drug was used 
to treat disease in a young person then it  would be deemed “ cost 
effective”  (Harris 2005). Grimley Evans (2005 p79) noted the same
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ageist policy at work in formulation of the National Service Framework 
for Older People published in 2001. He pungently remarks:
..there can be little  doubt that the central policy 
preoccupation ..was to exclude older citizens from 
expensive medical care in acute hospitals not, as would 
be hoped by a geriatrician... to improve their well being.
WHAT INTERPRETATIONS CAN BE OFFERED FOR THIS 
MARGINALISATION ?
Identified above is a clear pattern of the removal of resources from 
the very old or fourth agers and their social exclusion to the margins 
of society. What explanations are offered such exclusion? From the 
perspective of a social historian, Thane (2000 p1), notes that the 
increasing numbers of old people in the population has been greeted 
with alarm and pessimism, with fears of the degeneration of society. 
Thane attributes this prevailing pessimism to an expression of an 
economic fear that increasing numbers of old people w ill be 
dependent on a decreasing population of working age. Vincent (2003 
ch4) suggests that this is largely a manufactured problem as the 
number of people over 64 tripled between 1911 and 1991 without a 
problem. Therefore a further rise of 50 per cent in the next 50 years 
should not be onerous. The purpose of generating this fear is to 
create a sense of inevitability that public pension provision will fail, 
driving policy towards individual market-based pension provision. The 
latter is advantageous to capitalism as it  provides finance for markets 
on a global scale. Vincent (2003 p107) concludes that such arguments 
“ define an aging population as a potential disaster rather than the 
human success it  actually represents” .
Turner’s (1998) sociological contribution to this debate is to point to a 
significant and growing conflict between generations. For Turner, a 
generation shares a culture grown out of a particular historical social 
movement and has a strategic temporal location to a set of resources
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as a consequence of historical accident. Generation is a collective 
strategy to secure and maintain resources with social struggles 
between generations over limited resources. With life expectancy 
increasing, there is a generational difference between third agers and 
fourth agers. However, an analysis based on struggle or conflict 
seems inappropriate for explaining the situation of fourth agers.
While, clearly, third agers could be very active in a generational 
struggle, by definition fourth agers could never have the capacities to 
engage in such a combat. Resources are removed by successor 
generations because those closest to death are in no position to 
struggle or resist.
For a more befitting explanation, I turn to an anthropological 
perspective. In a major review of the anthropological literature on 
old age, Cohen (1994) describes the situation of old people in terms of 
intergeneration violence. A central dynamic of generational politics is 
the challenge posed to the continuity of the social body by the 
potential degeneration of each successive generation. Symbolically, 
continuity is maintained by preventing such degeneration by an act of 
intergenerational violence. Those who show the ominous symptoms of 
decay are symbolically put to death. For Cohen, there are then 
interesting questions relating to the politics of debility. When do 
societies mark the powerful body as senescent? How do societies 
dissociate the individual from the social body? What is the means of 
destruction ? What are the semiotics of exchange ? How is a new 
body seamlessly enabled to become the social body? Some of these 
questions have significance for this thesis. In the description of 
nursing homes as bereft of resources, the means of destruction is 
identified. An individual is separated from the social body by being 
denied access to the resources -  economic and symbolic — that are 
attributed to full people. Major structural forces are in place to 
ensure that access is denied.
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In the next section, I consider the influence of institutions which have 
tried to resist this type of classification of residents -  in particular, 
health care professions, law and families.
MEDICINE, LAW AND THE FAMILY - ATTEMPTS AT RESTITUTION
Geriatric medicine and nursing as compromised professional work
The medical specialty for old age, geriatric medicine, has a difficult 
relationship with its patient group. Old people can either be framed 
as sick and in need of medical care or as suffering from a natural 
decline which is not amenable to medical intervention. The 
profession has an interest in framing very old people as sick, as there 
is little  status and few resources in a discipline based on a 
marginalised group. So, much professional interest and rhetoric is 
concerned with reclassifying such old people as sick. Articles with 
polemical titles such as "There is no such thing as ageing: old age is 
associated with disease, but does not cause i t ” (Peto and Doll 1997) 
and "Should be encouraged -  the medicalisation of old age” (Ebrahim 
2002) are not uncommon even in the professional medical press.
Indeed, the ethos of the speciality is based on the ability to reclassify 
old people, and the pioneers of the profession — Warren, Coisin, 
Amulree -  are revered for their success in this against impossible odds 
(Barton and Mulley 2003). Marjorie Warren is attributed with 
establishing a distinct role and purpose for modern geriatric medicine 
(Barton and Mulley 2003, Grimley Evans 1997, Thane 2000). In the 
early 1930s, she inherited a Poor Law hospital when it  was taken into 
local authority control. Warren (1948) introduced serious diagnosis of 
the patients’ conditions in place of the previous, largely silent, taken- 
for-granted assumption that whatever the precipitating cause of 
hospitalisation, older people were close to death. She introduced 
incentives to get out of bed, promoting physiotherapy and other forms
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of rehabilitation — therapies which became the backbone of geriatric 
medicine. By these methods, Warren discovered that cure, or at least 
considerable improvement, was possible and 200 out of the 700 
patients she inherited were discharged home or to their families or 
friends. Warren (1948 p841) noted that such reclassification 
redeemed inmates from a less than human state where killing could 
become morally acceptable: ...in this miserable state, dull, apathetic, 
helpless and hopeless, life lingers on sometimes for years, while those 
round them whisper arguments in favour of euthanasia.
While the modern speciality of geriatric medicine describes itself as 
being based on such redemptive acts, historically and contemporarily 
few benefit from the application of these skills. Major structural 
factors ensure that reclassification is limited.
Until the mid-1970s, geriatricians and the majority of elderly people 
were excluded from the main hospitals and consequently from the 
most sophisticated forms of medicine. When the distinction between 
long-stay and acute hospitals was phased out in the 1970s, elderly 
people began to be admitted to general hospital in larger numbers.
At this point, an arrangement was needed to ensure that resources 
were not inappropriately spent on attempting to arrest “ natural” 
decline. Thus, to make general hospitals run more effectively 
(Grimley Evans 1997), geriatricians were employed to undertake a 
form of triage. That is to say, to quickly establish whether it is 
worthwhile putting any NHS time and resources into the treatment of 
an elderly person or whether they should be discharged to await 
death. A triage decision in effect means classifying the very old as 
“ sick people” or non-people. However, as geriatricians have no base 
in nursing homes and no oversight of the residents, this expert triage 
cannot be used to redeem residents as “ sick people” . As a joint 
working party of the Royal College Physicians, Royal College of Nursing 
and British Geriatric Society (2000 para 2.9) noted, “ Care home 
residents have often become medically dispossessed in spite of their
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complex health care needs” . Arguably, Marjorie Warren’s work of 
sifting through the institutionalised population to look for those to 
actively treat, no longer takes place, for to do so might have a major 
effect on the demands for health care services. The legend which 
sustained the speciality no longer has any basis in practice. Instead, 
the system is arranged in a way which ensures that only old people 
who are close to death linger in a hospital bed.
Recently physicians specialising in geriatric medicine, now the largest 
speciality within the Royal College of Physicians (Grimley Evans 1997), 
have acquired increased responsibility for acute medical care. They 
have become dissatisfied with their assigned role, as it has given them 
little  opportunity to work on the rehabilitation of elderly people 
(Bowman et all 999; Young and Philp 2000; Royal College Physicians, 
Royal College of Nursing and British Geriatric Society 2000; Grimley 
Evans and Tallis 2001). Instead they are "fire fighters of acute 
exacerbations of chronic disease” (Bowman et al 1999). In a report 
(Royal College Physicians, Royal College of Nursing and British 
Geriatric Society 2000) which criticised the current "ad-hoc 
arrangements” for providing health care homes and aimed to 
influence the new framework for regulation of care homes following 
the Care Standards Act 2000, they argued that there was an urgent 
need for specialist geriatric medicine and old age psychiatry to re­
engage in a structured manner with the care home population. The 
report offered mechanisms for re-engagement not only of geriatricians 
but also of a whole multidisciplinary team. Significantly, this was not 
to be achieved through changes to regulatory standards but through 
the commissioning process. They costed the arrangements at about 
£1,000 per year extra for each nursing home resident or an increase of 
4 per cent in the cost of care -  costs which they argued would be 
recovered, as the lack of rehabilitative work may be responsible for 
rising and inappropriate acute hospital admissions and inappropriate 
prescribing.
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Nurses, too, argue that their role in relation to the elderly is to 
restore their functioning (Ford and McCormack 1999) but they are 
prevented from applying these specialist skills where they are most 
needed, in nursing homes. With no requirements for nurses in nursing 
homes to have specialist knowledge, skills or expertise in care of older 
people, the scope for specialist gerontological nurses to develop and 
lead care in homes is unrecognised (Ford and Wild 2001). As a result, 
many older people who have clear nursing needs are often receiving 
only social care because of inadequate assessment. Ford and Wild 
(2001) notes that it  is ironic that a government which has done much 
to acknowledge the professional skills of nurses by creating the role of 
nurse consultant and supporting the development of nurse specialist 
for older people has, at the same time, compromised the professional 
nursing role in nursing homes. Structured by funding arrangements, 
legal requirements and regulatory rules, nursing in nursing homes has 
developed in a way that does not f it  a professional model. In homes, 
nursing is viewed as a series of tasks which can be delegated to and 
carried out by untrained people. When so delegated, it  is not even 
classified as health care, as it  is the subject of co-payment. The 
profession argues for a return to the model for nursing homes where 
“a specialist gerontological nurse should be the lead clinical 
practitioner” (Royal College Physicians, Royal College of Nursing and 
British Geriatric Society 2000) -  the original model for a nursing 
home, revived in the 1970s — as described in Chapter 4: Thus far, 
there has been no effective response to the Royal College of 
Physicians or the Royal College of Nursing proposals. In this area, for 
both professions, nursing and geriatric medicine, one of the defining 
characteristics of a profession, the ability to determine the content 
and terms of their own work (McKinley 1988), is compromised.
Legal and political attempts to reconstruct the resident as a patient
The NHS and Community Care Act of 1990, which shifted responsibility 
for long-term care from the NHS to local authorities, resulted in the
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requirement for co-payment for costs of nursing homes care. As a 
result, the seeds for much discontent were sown. For as well as 
affecting fourth agers, co-payment compromised the capacity of 
families to transfer wealth between generations. It has brought into 
play the resident as family member rather than individual, with the 
potential for an alliance between third and fourth agers. This alliance 
has now mounted a series of legal and political challenges to the co­
payment policies.
First, legal challenges to individual decisions about funding care have 
been mounted. These have resulted in two legal cases. The first is an 
appeal, R v North East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan, 
which clarified the law about under which circumstances the NHS 
should be responsible for payment of nursing home fees. The second, 
more recent, case, in 2006, R (on the application of Grogan) v Bexley 
NHS Care Trust, re-inforced the Coughlan judgement.
Complaints by individuals and their relatives about reimbursement of 
nursing home fees as a result of the Coughlan judgement have kept 
the Health Service Ombudsman extremely busy, as in 2003 as she 
received over 4,000 complaints about this matter (Health Service 
Ombudsman 2004). Secondly, there has been a rise in consumer 
challenges to care homes. In particular, a “ super complaint”  brought 
by an alliance of voluntary organisations against unfair contracts in 
the care home sector (Guardian March 3rd 2004) was investigated by 
the Office of Fair Trading (2005). As yet, none of these challenges 
have resulted in a major change in government policy. Policy has 
been merely moulded to address the criticism without any 
fundamental change. The withdrawal of resources from fourth agers 
continues with very little  check. However these developments are 
worth exploring further, as the nature of the arguments illuminate 
understanding of “ the resident” .
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Attempts to reassert the citizen’s rights to health care
The Royal Commission on the funding of long-term care, With Respect 
to Old Age, which reported in 1999, argued that it  was fundamentally 
inequitable for some diseases such as cancer or heart disease to be 
seen as legitimately the province of the NHS whereas Alzheimer’s 
disease or the effects of a stroke were not (Department of Health 
1999a). This could not be justified. The emergence of diseases of old 
age means that it  is difficult not to classify old people as sick and thus 
the grounds for excluding them from free health care were difficult to 
defend. The Commission also argued that costs were no grounds for 
the refusal to fund long-term care as there was no “ demographic time 
bomb” and the costs of care were affordable. The key 
recommendation was that personal care should be funded. Personal 
care was defined as care that directly involves touching a person’s 
body and therefore incorporated issues of intimacy, personal dignity 
and confidentiality. The Commission remarked that this type of care 
falls within the internationally recognised definition of nursing, but 
may be delivered by many people who are not nurses.
In the same year, before the government responded to the Royal 
Commission, the Court of Appeal decision in the Coughlan case (R v 
North East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan) was announced. 
The judgement carefully avoided the issue of what should be defined 
as health or nursing care, instead concentrating on the division of 
responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Health as laid out in the 
1977 NHS Act, and local authorities. The judgement concluded that 
the Secretary of State for Health was responsible for the provision of 
health care and that these responsibilities could not be shifted onto 
the local authority. When the primary need for nursing was a health 
need then the responsibility is that of the NHS, even when the 
individual has been placed in a home by the local authority. Whether 
the local authority can be expected to provide nursing services 
depends on the quantity and quality of these services. Local
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authorities* responsibilities are limited to those which can be said to 
be “ incidental and ancillary to the provision of accommodation” and 
which are such as “ an authority whose primary responsibility is to 
provide social services can be expected to provide” (Loux et al 2000). 
The court recognised that this decision would have widespread and 
significant implications.
Although this lessened the scope for shifting the costs of nursing care 
to co-payment, it  did not deem that all nursing care should be 
provided and funded by the NHS. Subsequent Department of Health 
guidance toned down the judgement by merely listing factors which 
health authorities should “ bear in mind” or “ pay attention to” when 
considering funding long-term care, rather than pointing out the 
authorities* legal duties (HSC 2001/15, LAC (2001) 18). The Health 
Service Ombudsman (2003), in a report of the investigation of a 
number of cases, notes that this guidance has been misapplied and 
misinterpreted by some Health Authorities, leading to injustice and 
hardship, and that the Department of Health was complicit in this. “ It 
appears to me that some health authorities were reluctant to accept 
their responsibilities with regard to such patients and were not being 
pressed by the DH to do so*’ (para 22).
Instead, efforts have gone into developing limited arrangements for 
providing free nursing care, where nursing care means just care 
delivered or organised by a registered nurse as assessed by an NHS 
nurse. The maximum that the NHS will fund under this scheme was 
around £145 per week in 2003 for the highest category of residents, 
when the cost of nursing homes places is from £400 to £700 per week. 
The Ombudsman has pointed out that as this policy was not designed 
around the Coughlan judgement, many decisions taken using this 
policy are still unlawful. The Ombudsman concluded that the policy 
on funding of long-term care was not fair, logical or transparent. The 
Department of Health is criticised for not providing a clear national 
framework, with decisions about what criteria to use le ft to individual
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Health Authorities and their application left to front-line staff without 
guidance. Again, local discretion has provided a convenient means to 
obscure inequitable treatment, the knowledge of which could be used 
to fuel public debate.
In the six weeks following the publication of her report in 2003, the 
Ombudsman received a further 1,300 complaints and is now 
recommending a review of all cases and a reimbursement. The cost is 
estimated to be in the order of £500m. It remains to be seen how fast 
the Primary Care Trusts (the successors to Health Authorities, which 
were abolished in 2003), w ill work to reassess residents and reimburse 
them or their estates. Even with the backing of an Appeal Court 
judgement, the Ombudsman and the interest of families in preserving 
their inheritance, it  remains difficult to assert the view of residents as 
citizens with rights to health care free at the point of delivery or to 
reconstruct the resident as a patient (Henwood M and Waddington E 
2005). Considerable power has been used to resist the attempts of 
these institutions to redefine the resident as a patient.
Attempts to reconstruct the resident as a consumer
The requirement for residents to contribute wholly or in part to the 
cost of their nursing home care has resulted in a new dimension in the 
politics of the long-term care -  the relative and residents consumer 
alliance. At the end of life, the resident's assets come to be seen less 
in terms of the property of individuals but in terms of the claims of 
the successor generation of family members. Resistance is forming to 
the removal of this family wealth, particularly where the care is poor. 
For example, the Lynde House support group in the middle-class area 
of Richmond, Surrey, mounted a major campaign against the owner of 
Lynde House, Chai Patel. The majority of residents in Lynde House 
were privately funded, paying fees in excess of £700 a week. Their 
publicity succeeded in discrediting Chai Patel, owner of a chain of 
nursing homes, who was forced to resign as government advisor on
236
private health care (A home unfit fo r heroes and Blair adviser quits in 
nursing home scandal Guardian June 9th and September 22nd 2002 ) 
and was investigated by the General Medical Council for serious 
professional misconduct.
Another consumer campaign was mounted by the Consumer 
Association (2003) and 28 other charities (Government agency 
announces care homes inquiry Guardian March 3rd 2004). The alliance 
had requested that the Office of Fair Trading investigate potential 
subsidisation by the private payers or co-payers of the under-funding 
of nursing homes by local authorities and central government. The 
Alliance claimed that there were significant distortions in the market 
for care homes. The Office of Fair Trading declined to investigate this 
subject but instead launched an investigation into one of the 
Alliance’s other complaints, the adequacy of price information for 
potential care home residents and their representatives. This found 
that two thirds of contracts which fee-paying residents signed were 
unfair or unclear. As a result of their investigation, the Office of Fair 
Trading took enforcement action against unfair terms in ten care 
home operators contracts covering 800 homes and around 50,000 
places — about one quarter of the market (OFT press release March 
21st 2005). Examples of the unfair terms included terms which let the 
care home make frequent or arbitrary increases in residents' fees and 
imposed unfair penalties, restrictions or obligations on the resident.
The lack of any standardised information about the performance of 
nursing homes, identified above, is difficult to justify to a public 
which has been encouraged to use performance indicators as part of a 
political debate on the public sector. This “ informal super complaint” 
to the Office of Fair Trading suggests that the family is emerging as a 
consumer in the care home industry.
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The family definition of the resident as person
From a small number of studies (Dupuis and Norris 2001; Krause, Grant 
and Long 1999; Foner 1995; Davies and Nolan 2003) of relatives’ 
perception of nursing homes, there is evidence that family members 
attempt to maintain the resident as “ person” even though the 
institution and its staff member operate as though this were not the 
case. However, at some point nearly all families with a relative in a 
home will relinquish their relative to the institution, with its different 
view of “ the relative” . In a study of daughters of Canadian nursing 
home residents, Dupuis and Norris (2001) found that a major aspect of 
the daughters’ role was described in terms of trying to maintain as 
much of the parent as possible — their parent’s physical appearance, 
mental function, and the parent’s sense of who they are — even 
though little  of their former self remained. But the maintenance of 
this status of person is a struggle against the institution. Relatives 
experienced stress in trying to persuade staff to relate to their parent 
as a person, as considerable effort was required (Krause, Grant and 
Long, 1999). These attempts to maintain the classification of their 
parent as a person carried on as long as adult children received 
affection from their parents. When it  became impossible for the 
parent to reciprocate, it  was likely that the adult child would cease in 
their attempts to maintain this classification and relinquish the parent 
to the institution. This would suggest that near relatives perceive the 
essence of being a person as emotional reciprocity. Staff in nursing 
homes resent the active involvement of relatives, as adult children’s 
attempts to maintain their relative as a person cut across the 
requirements to get through the work (Foner 1995). It was seen as 
pressure on the job. Staff are unlikely to be able to build up such 
emotional relationships with residents as they w ill have no shared 
history, and the impaired residents w ill have little  capacity for 
emotional exchange.
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The re-emergence of the person as the point of reference
I have suggested that major cultural factors rooted in the status of old 
people explain the difficulties in categorising “ the resident” . As the 
rules are vague, based on provision of “ adequate”  care for the 
condition of residents, there are major difficulties in determining the 
point of reference. Yet despite the fact that nursing homes are 
structurally precluded from providing health care, when there is a 
scandal in a nursing home, they w ill be judged by the health care 
experts, using expert knowledge. Any other point of reference would 
raise difficult questions about diminished status of residents.
To illustrate, I use the only two publicly available inquiries conducted 
by independent assessors. Both these inquiries received major 
publicity. The first resulted in a further inquiry by the Ombudsman 
and a Health Select Committee (1997), and the second in the 
resignation of one the government's key advisors on the private health 
care sector. The first report, which is also drawn on for Chapter 6, 
was written in 1996 by Brian Livesley, a Professor in the Care of the 
Elderly, and Sue Ellington, a Director of Nursing in the NHS. Livesley 
and Ellington (1996) analysed care in a particular nursing home, in 
terms of Livesley's experience of managing facilities providing care 
for very old people in the NHS. That is to say, they provide an expert 
account of the institutional arrangements that would be required to 
manage the residents of this type as “ patients” . Judged by this 
standard — the standard expected of contemporary health care, the 
nursing home failed. Expert vignettes describing the problems of “ the 
patients”  in the idiom of a specialist in the requirements of this type 
of care are provided. Three of some forty in the report are given 
below. Livesley and Ellington then identify how the institutional 
arrangements, in particular the staffing resources, would make it  
impossible to provide appropriate care for such “ patients” :
This elderly blind, demented, diabetic patient was aged
86 and known to be confused, disoriented and physically
aggressive with a tendency to undress in public. Within
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a week of admission to the Home the patient had a fall 
and three weeks later, after a separate incident, was 
found on the floor complaining of a great deal of pain.
(para 4.20.)
This patient was aged over 70 and described as elderly 
mentally infirm with Alzheimer's disease and epilepsy 
resulting in total dependency and an inability to 
communicate effectively. This patients was admitted 
with pressure sore which had caused problems since 
January 1994. (para 4.26.)
This patient was aged 69 and had: diabetes mellitus, 
breathing difficulties requiring oxygen at times, several 
drugs requiring repeated administration through the day 
and dressing needed for weepy and swollen legs. This 
patient -  who was just able to stand and could walk with 
a shuffle but normally slept in a chair at night — was 
described as having good understanding of both the 
spoken and written word and an excellent psychological 
state, (para 4.22.)
There were around 130 similar “ patients” in this home. The staff 
employed to care for these “ patients” , could neither produce such 
expertly coded vignettes nor could they possibly translate such 
vignettes into appropriate actions to manage their problems. There 
were too few qualified staff who could understand the meaning or 
practical implications of these reduced codes. The staff consists of 82 
unqualified care assistants and 25 qualified nurses to provide 24-hour 
cover. Medical care was from a GP practice who were contracted for 
five hours a week to provide a service to 130 highly dependent 
residents as well as coping with the several thousand other patients 
on their list. Of the qualified nursing staff, only one had a 
qualification in care of the elderly, and a further six had experience 
of work in caring for the elderly. Data from the RCN survey of nurses 
in the independent sector (Royal College of Nursing 2003b) undertaken 
in 2001 /02 would suggest that these staffing arrangements are not 
atypical. There was no requirement for a medical assessment of 
residents before admission. So, pressure to f ill the beds for economic 
reasons meant residents were admitted with needs beyond the 
capacity of the nursing staff and the limited time of the GPs. In this
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case, the medical and nursing work escalated beyond the capacity of 
the staff to manage and many of the residents were subsequently 
admitted to hospital in a poor condition.
The Livesley and Ellington report also highlights problems between the 
NHS and the nursing homes sector in categorisation of different types 
of care. In the NHS, the terms "Elderly Mentally Infirm” , "Palliative 
Care” and “Terminal Care”  have specific meanings which define a 
level and type of service provision. However, they had no meaning in 
the Registered Homes Act where a nursing home provides 
undifferentiated nursing care. So there was no requirement for the 
nursing home to provide anything else, even though these labels were 
attached to residents. That is to say, the NHS expected its own 
standards and definitions to apply and they did not. Livesley 
recommended that the Health Authority should publish clear 
definitions of the categories of patients for which nursing homes may 
be registered and state the resources, equipment, skills and 
experience that w ill be required. However, as described in Chapter 6, 
any authority that did this would have some difficulties finding a legal 
justification, if  a nursing home appealed. Livesley and Ellington 
concluded that the Health Authority should urgently consider whether 
the nursing home was " f i t ” .
The second inquiry, into Lynde House, was written in 2002 (Kingston 
and Richmond Health Authority 2002) by a nurse manager. She 
considered that the registered person was unfit because they had 
allowed insufficient levels of staff to meet the high level of residents* 
need, had allowed inadequately trained staff to undertake the care 
tasks and procedures, such as administration of medicines and ear 
syringing, and had allowed nursing staff to continue to undertake poor 
practice, for example, wound care. The report also argues that the 
care failed to be “ safe” and "adequate” for the following reasons: 
failure to undertake comprehensive pre-admission assessments, 
residents presenting with acute clinical signs and symptoms were not
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referred promptly to the GP, there was no complete set of nursing 
records that reflected the changing needs of each resident including 
absence of care planning in some critical situations, for example 
diabetes, chest infections, pressure sores, lack of fluid and hydration 
records and so on. In short, this was judged as health care.
CONCLUSION
Vincent (2003, 2006) suggests that in modern societies the problems 
of old age and death are constructed typically as a medical problem 
with a scientific solution. In the fourth age, older people lose control 
of their bodies to the medical profession. This medicalisation of old 
age structures people’s perceptions and stifles the possibility of 
creative cultural activity around old age. Locating the meaning of 
death in striving for an even longer life span denies the possibility of 
old age as a valued part of the life course. The evidence presented in 
this chapter stands in sharp contrast to Vincent’s argument. I suggest 
that the residents of nursing homes are not medicalised. They are 
bereft of medical resources. Yet this has not led to the burgeoning of 
cultural understanding or valuing of the lives of nursing home 
residents.
Instead, borrowing from Cohen (1994), I have suggested that the 
removal of resources, professional, economic and symbolic, 
dissociates residents from the social body and they occupy a 
transitional category between full person and death. Thus nursing 
home residents are deprived of the characteristics deemed 
appropriate for the “ sick person” or “dying people” . But this is 
contested. Institutions in the regulatory space of nursing homes — 
medicine, public and consumer law and the family -  have attempted 
to redefine the resident. Thus the resident as “ sick” or “ dying” 
person forms part of the background debate around nursing homes.
As the raison d'etre of regulation is to protect residents, the
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resident’s contested status, person or non-person, raises difficult 
issues as to what counts as a legitimate interpretation of regulatory 
rules. Nursing homes are structurally incapable of providing the care 
deemed appropriate to "sick” or dying people but such images re- 
emerge as the points of reference for the interpretation of rules when 
there is a public scandal. For what other point of reference could be 
used without calling into question the resident’s status as a person? If 
residents cannot be classified as sick people, what are they? Given 
this situation, nursing homes and their regulators must maintain 
considerable defences against the articulation of this paradox. With 
hindsight, the difficulties in obtaining access to inspection units 




A MORAL OR POLITICAL TALE?
Impaired both physically and cognitively, the residents of nursing 
homes are in a poor state. In any one year, one quarter of them w ill 
die. Such people were referred to by an eminent geriatrician as living 
in the “ Stone Age” of old age, where body and spirit are rock (Isaacs 
1981 p451). These “ fourth agers”  constitute a particular group of 
individuals who are not just old but at the very end of their lives. 
When “ fourth agers” are the residents of nursing homes, they are 
afforded special legal protection in the form of nursing home 
regulation. The raison d'etre of regulation of nursing homes is the 
protection of nursing home residents.
Where regulation is conceived as legal rules backed by some form of 
sanction then two “ ideal” approaches predominate in the literature -  
a “ co-operative” or “ compliance” approach and a “ deterrence” or 
“ punitive”  model (Baldwin 2004, Tombs 2002). Developed as 
theoretical ideals from empirical studies of regulation in practice, 
each is based on particular premises about the best ways of achieving 
social control of corporations and individuals. Thus both are 
underpinned by particular views of states, firms, corporate actors, 
law, and “ protected” .
The “ co-operative”  approach comes in many guises. Compliance may 
be seen simply as negotiated between the regulator and regulatee 
(Hutter 1997), or the aim may be more sophisticated — to proactively 
stimulate corporate self-regulation as in “enforced self-regulation” , 
“ responsive regulation” (Ayes and Braithwaite 1992) or “ meta 
regulation” (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Coglianese and Lazer 
2002; Parker 2002). The “ co-operative” approach is based on the 
premise that there is or can be general agreement about social goals 
and that industry is or can be persuaded to be a moral actor and w ill
be co-operative in ensuring that social harms are minimised (Tombs 
2002). In this approach regulatory rules are viewed with a degree of 
moral ambiguity (Hawkins 1984, 2002). Thus the untoward actions of 
industry are referred to as “ social harms” rather than “ crimes” . In 
order to facilitate a co-operative approach, a regulatory design based 
on broad rules or standards which promote dialogue is required (Black 
1995). As dialogue and mutual understanding are the key, rules need 
to be accompanied by administrative rather than legal sanctions, as 
enforcement through the courts can often cut across the regulators’ 
intentions (Black 1995; Scott 2001). Ideas vary as to who should be 
involved in establishing the meaning of such broad rules. Black (1997; 
1999b) favours an “ interpretive community”  — a closed system where 
all regulatory actors -  the rule maker, regulator and regulatee — 
share a common understanding of the meaning of the rule. In 
“ responsive regulation” , “ the protected” and public interest groups 
should be also involved (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992), while in Parker’s 
(2002) version, “ meta regulation” , corporate management should be 
open to a broad range of stakeholder deliberations facilitated and 
enforced by legal regulation.
Tombs (2002) is critical, describing the co-operative approach to 
regulation as consensus politics — naive to the inherent nature of 
power relations between industry, regulators and the public. Baldwin 
(2004) also has reservations in that he suggests corporate players may 
not see the world in the same way regulators view it, to the extent 
that effective dialogue may not be possible. For example, they may 
be more interested in maximising shareholder returns than in 
responding to ethical prescriptions of regulators.
In the “ deterrence” or “ punitive” model, the most effective way of 
achieving the social ends of regulation is by “ punishment”  rather than 
“ persuasion” (Baldwin 2004). Punitive policing strategies with 
stronger enforcement and prosecution, and overall tougher criminal 
legislation, are recommended (Tombs 2002; Gray 2006). Thus the
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formal legal system is seen as the essential element in the crime 
inhibition process (Simpson 2002). For some proponents of this 
approach (Pearce and Tombs 1991), there is no moral ambiguity 
associated with regulatory law, the state or the nature of capital. 
"Right”  and “wrong” are clear and the untoward actions of industry or 
individual corporate managers are regarded as “ crimes” which should 
be treated no differently from any other crime. The force of the law 
should be used to shame and punish this morally wrong conduct. The 
implication is that the state through legislation should protect the 
public interest against the excesses or social costs of private capital.
In this model, law -  not only regulatory law but, increasingly, 
fundamental human rights law — has a major role in ensuring justice, 
by standing up for those who have been wronged by the actions of 
industry. In practice, neither model exists in a pure form. Empirical 
research suggests that even where regulatory regimes appear 
accommodative or co-operative, sanctions including prosecutions are 
used but used selectively (Hutter 2001). This is the case for nursing 
home regulation where, in the main, regulation appears 
accommodative or co-operative but when this ceases to be tenable 
the registration of homes is withdrawn.
Another way of viewing regulation is to see it as the outcome of 
competition or negotiations between private and public actors and 
institutions in a bounded space (Scott 2001; Hancher and Moran 1989 
ch10). Recently, however, the boundary has become ill defined and 
regulation is now conceptualised as a decentred or fragmented 
activity (Black 2001; Scott 2001) — that is, no longer inevitably 
connected to powers of a central sovereign state but instead 
operating through norms employed by non-state actors.
The empirical exploration of a system conceived in terms of 
“ regulatory space” is a complex methodological problem. One 
approach has been to focus one key symbolic event or object and use 
it  as a means to explore particular regulatory systems. For example,
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Hawkins (2002) focuses on the decision to prosecute, separating the 
regulatory space into the broad setting of economic, political and 
social circumstances -  the surround, the legal and organisational 
setting in which the decisions are made, which is referred to as the 
field -  and the way individual decision makers frame the decision — 
the frame. Thus as well as providing information about the decision, 
such an analysis provides insight into the relative importance of 
particular elements which are part of “ the context” for the decision. 
This thesis is similar, in that I have chosen a specific point of focus — 
not a specific decision, but a key symbolic object central to both 
nursing home rules and the raison d'etre of the regulatory system — 
“ the resident” . The social construction of this key symbolic object by 
different self-referential groups and communities has been explored.
Until the new regulatory framework for nursing home regulation came 
into force in 2002, the state had the dominant voice in this 
“ regulatory space” . In order to control the tensions between public 
expenditure and the state’s role in providing support for this 
vulnerable group, the ‘command and control’ regulatory framework of 
the Registered Homes Act 1984 was nested within an overarching 
framework of indirect state control. A framework of state normative 
and fiscal policies driven by social policies with respect to this 
particular social group, precluded certain interpretations of regulatory 
rules and ensured that some rules remain ill-defined or unstable.
That is to say rather than de-centred, regulation in this area was 
“ centred” . Where the regulated market concerns providing services 
funded by government as part of the traditional welfare state, there 
may be reasons for regulation to remain very “ centred” .
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NURSING HOME REGULATION AND THE COMPLIANCE MODEL OF 
REGULATION
Nursing home regulation as outlined in this thesis has many of the 
characteristics of the traditional “compliance” model. Broad 
standards are accompanied primarily by administrative sanctions with 
few prosecutions and there is a closed interpretive community. Yet 
there are problems with the operation of the traditional compliance 
approach, as many rules rest on an ill-defined construct, “ the 
resident” , whose further definition is actively disrupted.
Ways of fixing standards
As a construct within the normative framework for regulation, people 
who live in nursing homes are the point of reference for many of the 
key regulatory rules. Rules in nursing home regulation may be specific 
but the rules governing the care of residents/patients tend to be 
framed broadly, using evaluative words -  for example, the staffing 
and facilities of nursing homes must be “ suitable” and “ adequate” to 
the “ condition”  of “ patients” .
As Galligan (1986b) notes, irrespective of whether rules are broad or 
specific, there is always considerable discretion inherent in their 
application. Empirical studies of regulation suggest that non-legal 
factors are of considerable importance in understanding how 
discretion is exercised. Organisational factors (Galligan 1986), public 
pressure (Hawkins 1984, Hutter 1988), as well as the size of the 
regulated company (Pearce and Tombs 1998) may all play a part.
Rules may be interpreted interactional^ (Hutter 1997), or used in 
discursive negotiations about the proper conduct of matter under 
discussion (Black 1999b), in which case they may become part of 
rhetorical resources deployed by different groups in an assertion of
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authority. Meaning may be moulded to provide strategic advantage in 
such interactions. Galligan (1986) summarises the factors which 
influence such discretionary decisions as the effective and efficient 
ways of executing the task, the economic, political and social 
environment, the moral background both of the community and the 
deciding official, and the organisational structure of the regulatory 
agency. With so many contextual, contingent and emergent factors 
involved, how is coherence achieved and the norm stabilised?
The starting point for nursing home regulation is that the particular 
framing of rules described above evokes a particular type of question: 
Suitable for whom? Adequate for what purposes? For such rules to 
have meaning, a mental representation or image of the point of 
reference for such rules must be invoked -  or, in a legal frame of 
reference, “ an image of the protected” . Thus “ the protected” is a 
construct created and maintained by social processes whose function 
is to make actions in nursing home regulation meaningful. By 
representing “ the protected” in one particular way rather than 
another certain types of actions are relevant and others are 
unthinkable. Or to put it  another way an image has similarity with 
what is understood within phenomenology as “ a frame” . Images 
frame problems and thus enable action to be planned, steered and 
justified (Dingwall and Strong 1997). Thus “ image” is understood as 
the way that nursing home work and the regulation of nursing homes 
are held together. In the broadest sense, it  is one of the key 
constructs which allows the governance of the activity. What are the 
origins of such images? What resources were available to fashion such 
images? How are such collective images stabilised?
Investigating “ images of the protected” -  that is, situating the image 
in a legal frame -  means identifying the sites of production within the 
regulatory system and gathering information from them. At the time 
of the fieldwork, there was no central nursing home regulatory agency 
-  regulation was undertaken by some 100 separate Health Authorities
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-  therefore two other potential sites of production were considered. 
First, in the interaction between field level officials and regulatee, 
and secondly, the Registered Homes Tribunal — the appeal system for 
nursing home owners. Both became the subject of empirical 
investigation, the former through an observational study of the work 
of two groups of nursing home inspectors from different Health 
Authorities and the latter through an analysis of Tribunal decisions.
The next issue was where to look for an adequate contextual 
explanation for the images encountered. What types of discourses or 
resources are available to inspectors to fashion such images? As 
described in Chapter 5, the different types of images used by the two 
groups of inspectors could be explained simply by their different 
backgrounds.
However, in this thesis, explanations have been sought in the 
macrosocial environment as well as in resources immediately available 
to inspectors from their individual backgrounds or from the local 
organisational culture. What is being asserted here is that the local 
culture is not the only context for understanding collective ideas of 
the protected. As Wodak and Meyer (2001 p21) note, social actors do 
not exclusively make use of their individual experience and strategies; 
they also rely upon collective frames of perception.
Two major frames in the macrosocial environment were considered. 
First, health care professions, in particular nursing and medicine, and 
secondly, the state. As inspectors and nursing home managers are 
members of the same profession, one of the major cultural resources 
available to nursing home inspectors is nursing. An investigation of 
how elderly residents and, more generally, how old people at the end 
of their lives were viewed within the occupation of nursing was 
undertaken through an analysis of the nursing literature. That is, both 
the sociological literature on nursing and the literature written by and 
directed towards nurses were examined to establish what types of 
images were stabilised within nursing. A similar investigation was
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undertaken using the literature of the specialist medicine of old age. 
Second, a preliminary analysis suggested that the state had a 
significant control over a number of key aspects of nursing home 
regulation apart from the regulatory legislation. For example, the 
state is also the main purchaser of nursing home care. Therefore the 
policy intent towards residents or, more generally, towards elderly 
people at the end of their lives, was considered as a cultural resource 
for the production of images of the residents. To understand how 
such old people were viewed in health and social policy, an 
investigation of the resources and institutions which historically have 
been available for old people at the end of their lives was compared 
with resources and institutions available to "sick people” .
CONSTRUCTING THE RESIDENT 
The resident as a "sick person”
While the resident is described as “ a person”  in primary legislation, in 
the secondary legislation which is concerned with the conduct of care, 
residents are described as “ patients” . But the image of the resident 
as a "sick” person or "patient”  is difficult to sustain as specialist 
doctors have been excluded from nursing homes and the version of 
nursing enacted in nursing homes is largely divorced from the 
profession.
Chapter 7 presented evidence that specialist medicine for elderly 
people was founded just before the inception of the welfare state on 
the idea that the decline in health of significant numbers of old 
people in long-stay institutions could be arrested or reversed. That is 
to say, it  was the role of specialist medicine to engage in heroic acts 
of taking very old people o ff the path of inevitable decline to death 
and restore their function. But historically as well as contemporarily, 
few benefited from these redemptive acts (Thane 2000). Major
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structural factors ensure that this type of reclassification is limited. 
Thus the Registered Homes Act 1984 placed no requirement on nursing 
homes to employ doctors, either generalist or specialist. Having 
specialist doctors sift through the institutionalised population looking 
for those to apply the expensive specialist skills of modern medicine 
does not f it  with the policies of cost constraint required for the 
contemporary welfare state. Excluding doctors sends a very clear 
message that residents should not be treated or given the rights to 
care as the sick. Similarly, Chapter 7 presents evidence that it  is 
difficult to classify residents as “ dying” , as they are not afforded the 
same care as the terminally ill. Instead, in the Registered Homes Act 
1984, residents are deemed as having undifferentiated nursing needs 
where nursing is operationalised as an activity carried out by 
untrained staff.
Despite the increasing construction of old age in terms of diseases 
such as dementia, the Registered Homes Act 1984 continued to be 
interpreted in a way which denied that residents had a need for 
specialist care. Residents were required to compete for medical care, 
both specialist and general, with the rest of the population. In 1999, 
in an effort to influence the implementation of the Care Standards Act 
2000, the successor to the Registered Homes Act 1984, the Royal 
College of Nursing, the Royal College of Physicians and the British 
Geriatric Society (2000) co-operated in producing recommendations 
aimed at increasing the specialised nursing and medical input into 
nursing homes. Thus the professions have attempted to reclaim the 
resident as sick. Yet, these proposals were not incorporated in the 
new Act, under which the nursing homes were abolished as a legal 
category, moving even further away from the health care sector.
With this move, the image of the resident as a sick person is even 
more difficult to sustain.
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Images of residents in professional nursing
As indicated in Chapter 7, from about the 1930s there has been a 
professional interest in halting or reversing the decline of body and 
mind in old age and promoting “ rehabilitation” . As the predominant 
concept of self is based on autonomy and independence, the aims of 
“ rehabilitation”  are often inappropriate to the characteristics of 
nursing home residents. But recent work undertaken by the 
professional association for nurses, the Royal College of Nursing, 
working with psychologists interested in old age, has explored ways of 
relating to residents more appropriate to their characteristics. A 
range of sociological and psychological theories -  for example, 
symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and psychoanalysis — have 
been pressed into use to develop more sympathetic models of care.
For example, interventions based on this so-called “ humanistic 
gerontology”  (Estes and Linkin 2000), have been devised which draw 
on life histories or emotions1. Yet, as Chapter 4 concluded, such 
models have only recently entered the discourse of professional 
nursing of old age, and work to transmit these images throughout the 
nursing profession -  or specifically to the nursing home sector — is 
being developed. A further problem is that these models require a 
sophisticated interpersonal relationship between the nurse and the 
client -  a relationship which is difficult to realise with an untrained 
workforce. The characteristics of the labour force within nursing 
homes, the structure of nursing as an occupation, the use of 
unqualified nurses, the poor opportunities in the sector for specialist 
training and the absence of specialist doctors from the sector mean 
that there are considerable difficulties in undertaking this translation 
work.
Chapter 4 noted that nursing is a segmented occupation. Qualified 
nurses and care staff in nursing homes have little  connection with 
professional and academic nurses responsible for developing these
1 eg Kitwood T (1993) Towards a Theory o f Dementia Care: the interpersonal 
process.
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professional resources specifically related to old age. As Dingwall and 
colleagues (1988) noted, they are in effect enacting different versions 
of the same occupation, each with its own culture and objectives.
With no requirement for such nurses to have professional 
qualifications in the care of the elderly, or to show professional 
leadership, owners or managers of nursing homes who are qualified 
nurses may be drawn towards the “ tradeswoman” version of nursing. 
That is, managing a nursing home, whether as an employee or as the 
owner, is not seen as a profession or a calling, but as a business. 
Proprietors and private sector nurse managers may be less concerned 
with promoting the profession, education or writing — very few 
articles in journals are authored by nurses working in nursing homes. 
This makes it  difficult to stabilise or transmit any images produced by 
this culture. Instead of the traditional professional interests, nurse 
proprietors or private sector nurse managers are more concerned with 
adopting practices which promote financial viability, given the 
straitened circumstances for funding nursing homes.
The lack of the “ professional” segment of nursing in nursing homes is 
compounded by the fact that much nursing in nursing homes is carried 
out with unqualified staff who are paid very low wages, with few 
training or educational opportunities for learning sophisticated ways 
of relating to very old people. Therefore, although cultural resources 
may be available, an invisible wall exists between professional nursing 
and staff, qualified and unqualified, in nursing homes.
Communicating different practices from academic nursing to nursing 
practice in nursing homes takes place in an ad hoc manner and is 
reliant on the initiative of a few academic departments engaged in 
trying to improve the learning experience of student nurses.
The problem of developing a stable coherent image of the resident is 
compounded by the fact that they are excluded from commonly 
legitimated roles of being sick or terminally ill. For example, 
although in the initial regulations and guidance people who live in
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nursing homes were referred to as “ patients” , care is not offered on 
the same terms as the rest of the sick population, by experts and free 
at the point of delivery (eg Glendinning et al 2002). Instead, care is 
subject to co-payment and given in the main by untrained staff.
When people are considered sick or disabled, one of the functions of 
health care professionals is to produce coherent images of such people 
which form the basis for morality of conduct or an ethics of practice 
towards that subject. But the symbolic resources required to 
standardise and describe an image of sickness or disability tailored to 
this group are either denied, or, where they have been developed, the 
stabilisation and transmission has been disrupted. Given that it  is 
difficult to embed an image of “ the protected” as “ a patient” , what 
other general cultural resources are available to produce such images?
Resources for producing images of very old people
Much writing on nursing homes is normative, concerned with issues 
such as how life in a nursing home could be “ made better”  (eg Weiner 
and Kayser-Jones 1990; Davies 2003). In this respect, i t  echoes the 
literature on old age, which Cohen (1994) describes as being 
dominated by a “ language of conversion” and “ a trope of anger” .
That is, the reader is invited to feel shame at conditions under which 
old people live and is invited to join a movement to improve things. 
Yet, as I conclude in Chapters 1 and 7, there are considerable 
difficulties in understanding what a “ good enough” life might be for 
an old person at the end of their life who is severely physically and 
cognitively impaired. Vincent (2003, 2006) argues that the search for 
immortality through science and medicine has impoverished thought 
in this area — there is a paucity of cultural resources with which to 
produce a coherent image of a very old person.
Theories of the self, whether legal, sociological or developmental, f i t  
poorly the attributes or characteristics of old people at the end of 
life. Generally, as described in Chapters 1 and 4, such theories
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presume a capacity for rationality, independence, competence and 
self-reflection. Moreover, theories of self which emphasise autonomy 
and independence are on the ascendancy in law and in contemporary 
culture in general. The work of Agich (1993) explored in Chapter 4 
suggests that physical or mental decline in old age is not incorporated 
into contemporary cultural understandings of the self. Leaving aside 
these theoretical ideals, the lived experience of old age is considered 
to be a neglected area within gerontology (Estes and Linkin 2000).
But there are particular difficulties in understanding the “ lived” 
experience of nursing home residents. Recent work in anthropology 
suggests that the body is important to maintaining the integrity of self 
(Lawton 2000), yet the resident’s sense of self is challenged by bodily 
decay. Similarly, cognitive impairment limits the capacity for 
articulate self-reflection of the experience. As Cohen (1994) notes, 
old age presents an extreme existential crisis. Given the lack of 
coherent image to fix the question, suitable for whom?, on what do 
nursing home inspectors base their judgement about compliance?
Nursing home inspectors and images of residents
The analysis of the fieldwork presented in Chapter 5 was based on the 
proposition that images of residents could be inferred from the 
different inspection methodologies employed by the two different 
groups of inspectors. One inspection unit placed a heavy emphasis on 
“ risk”  — particularly legal risk. The legal risk to the nursing home was 
from the burgeoning web of regulation in which nursing homes are 
embedded, not just the Registered Homes Act 1984. The risk of 
litigation was “ talked up” . The main threat was portrayed as arising 
from a failure of the home to have systems and practices in place 
which adequately protect the resident, specifically the resident’s 
body. Elderly residents were like very delicate china which could 
easily be chipped or broken! The systems required to protect 
residents were conceived not only in terms of the state of the 
buildings and equipment but in terms of the systems of care, including
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staff employment and training. For this unit, there was no need to 
ask residents for their views or experiences of the home. The failure 
or absence of routines, procedures and systems was written on the 
resident’s bodies. The inspectors’ job was portrayed to the home 
manager as “ to protect you from the law” . Inspectors would attempt 
to form an alliance with the home manager to inculcate systems and 
practices which would become everyday. In this way, the home would 
be protected from a harsh and threatening legal environment. The 
formal reports issued contained bare statements about whether the 
home had met the standard or not. They contained little  other 
information to help readers or service users flesh out what this meant 
in terms of the quality of a home. In effect inspectors were 
protecting the resident as a body -  an object -  and the home as a 
business.
For the other inspection unit, the inspection methodology employed 
involved a professional discussion with the nursing home manager 
about “ the needs” of residents and interviews with residents to find 
out their experience of care. Nursing homes were thus expected to 
respond to residents’ needs either as professionally defined or as 
articulated by the residents themselves. The relationship that 
inspectors attempted to portray with nursing managers was that they 
were holding them to account professionally. The resident was 
constructed as a person with agency whose needs were professionally 
defined. However, neither professionally defined needs nor views of 
residents appeared to carry much persuasive force. It was too easy 
for nursing home managers to discredit residents as very difficult or 
confused. Unfortunately, as described below, the decisions of the 
Tribunal analysed in Chapter 6 suggest that in this regulatory system, 
professionally defined needs generally carry little  weight against 
economic constraints imposed by the state on the nursing home 
sector. However, the inspectors from this group issued very forceful 
public reports which spelt out very clearly a home’s deficiencies. In 
these reports, homes were publicly shamed. Or, from a professional
point of view, their colleagues in nursing homes were shown up as 
letting the profession down. Inspectors might be seen as more 
concerned with the effect on the profession, not the effect on 
individual businesses. However, for the reasons identified below, 
resting an inspector’s authority on the nursing profession may carry 
very little  weight. In contrast, when the state of the resident’s body 
and systems used to protect it  are used as evidence of compliance 
then it is possible to draw authority from more powerful regulatory 
frameworks concerned with the environment such as the Health and 
Safety at Work Act.
Like all models, the key features of these inspection models have 
been heightened for analytic purposes. They have been described as 
“ ideal types” . However, the first model has been reported in other 
empirical studies of nursing homes. Davies (2004) found three models 
or communities of care in nursing homes she studied: “ the cosmetic 
community” , where the objectives were “customer satisfaction”  and 
where relationships were “ cordial but superficial” ; the “ complete 
community” , where the aims were growth and development and 
relationships were spontaneous and reciprocal — a “community of 
equals” ; the “ controlled community” , where the objectives were 
minimising risk and relationships were distant and combative.
Davies’s “ controlled community”  fits well the risk model that the first 
group of inspectors were trying to inculcate into nursing homes. It is 
also a model which fits contemporary ideas about the governance of 
organisations (Power 2004). However, the model does not find favour 
with Braithwaite (1993), who saw similar models in operation in 
nursing homes in the USA, or with Davies. Speaking from the 
perspective of an academic nurse, Davies (2003 p233) notes that “ the 
views and preferences of service users are secondary to the 
institutional view of how life and care are best ordered” .
The approaches to compliance used by the different inspection units 
can be understood as an appeal to the two different versions of
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nursing outlined above -  an appeal to the business person and an 
appeal to the professional nurse. The inspectors who were part of a 
private consultancy were in effect business women themselves and 
were enacting that model with managers. They were encouraging 
managers to engage in practices which they perceived would lessen 
the risk to their business. The other group, whose background was as 
NHS nurse managers, adopted a professional model which emphasised 
the resident as independent autonomous subject -  a model of the 
patient which was prevalent in professional nursing in general. The 
analysis also suggests that strategies of compliance which appeal to a 
shared authority within the profession of nursing are likely to have 
limited effect with the business-women working in nursing homes.
The premise that there is a shared professional nursing culture 
between the inspector and the nursing home manager is questionable. 
If nursing is construed as professional nursing then for the reasons 
outlined above nursing is arguably part of the context, not a 
constituent part of nursing homes or their regulation. Or to put it  
another way, professional nursing is not part of the interpretive 
community for nursing home rules and the profession may only have 
weak control over qualified nurses in nursing homes. Whether or not 
there is a shared culture between nurses in nursing homes and nurse 
inspectors or the professional sectors of the occupation about what 
would constitute the proper conduct of a nursing home or the proper 
relationship towards a very old person, clearly warrants more detailed 
empirical investigation. It was not possible to explore the views and 
images of residents developed and promoted by private sector 
managers in this thesis.
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THE STATE - A THE DOMINANT ACTOR IN THE REGULATORY SPACE 
The interpretive community for images of the protected
Black (1995) suggests that an interpretive community is one in which 
there is shared understanding of interpretation of rules. Professions 
are excluded from being part of the interpretive community of nursing 
home regulation, except insofar as they are members of the 
inspectorate. Similarly, patients or their representatives have no 
voice in this community either. Thus the interpretive community of 
nursing home regulation consists of inspection units, regulatees and 
the Registered Homes Tribunal.
“Appropriate to the condition of residents” could mean a high 
standard of care. However, there is a patterned attempt to ensure 
that standards are not interpreted in this way. As professional 
expertise is excluded, other models must be pressed into service as a 
basis of, and justification for, action. Some models identified from 
the fieldwork can be a useful aid to compliance, for example when 
the resident is conceptualised as a delicate body in need of 
protection. But such models can also be out of step with the 
characteristics of residents. For example, nurse inspectors may use a 
methodology which involves interviewing clients about their views 
when they are aware that very few residents can provide a coherent 
response. Bathrooms may be built and approved which are not 
suitable to the physical needs of residents because they f it  a business 
model which presumed both that the relatives are the main decision 
makers about the choice of homes and that relatives expect private 
bathroom facilities.
Other voices are now attempting to enter the interpretive arena.
They have contested the accepted view of the resident and there have 
been efforts to reconstruct the resident as “ sick person” and 
“ consumer” . The Health Ombudsman (2004) is now supporting 
campaigns to reinstate health care free at the point of delivery and is 
recommending a national assessment tool underpinned by a
multidisciplinary assessment, not just a nursing assessment. Both 
these development take place against considerable resistance from 
the Department of Health. Similarly, the lack of information about 
nursing homes has compromised the image of the resident as 
“ consumer”  to such an extent that the Office of Fair Trading (2005) 
has recently conducted an inquiry into availability of information 
about nursing homes.
However, there does seem to be some shared understanding within 
the traditional closed community that care “ appropriate”  to the 
condition of residents is of a lower standard than that afforded to the 
sick. This view is supported through the decisions of the Registered 
Homes Tribunal described below.
Images from the Registered Home TribunalThe Registered Homes 
Tribunal was set up to allow nursing home owners a right of appeal 
against the arbitrary administrative decisions of inspectors or Health 
Authorities. As such the resident or the residents’ representative had 
no voice in the Tribunal. The Tribunal is part of the regulatory system 
but, although in theory independent from government, in its operation 
it is arguably very much under the control of the state, specifically 
the Department of Health. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the 
Tribunal always seems to have an eye on the Department’s legislative 
and policy intent in its decision making.
Earlier reviews of the Tribunal’s work (Harman and Harman 1989 and 
Brooke Ross 1989) concluded that the Tribunal did little  to improve 
the rights of residents. The conclusion of this thesis is similar. The 
cumulative effects of a series of Tribunal decisions was not to raise 
standards, but to ensure that home owners were not adversely 
penalised for working within economic constraints set centrally by the 
state through the reimbursement rates. Inspectors who required a 
specific standard of care based on their professional judgement of the 
“ condition” of residents were dismissed as “over enthusiastic” . 
Residents were fitted into buildings rather than a requirement to
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make buildings f it  for the specific “ condition”  of residents. Similarly, 
the Tribunal ruled that there was no requirement to employ specialist 
staff to care for people with dementia. This was not the state’s 
intent. In another case, one major provider was allowed to determine 
its own staffing levels, with the Tribunal arguing that risk of loss of 
reputation and market forces would prevent care falling to a low 
level. Thus the Tribunal reinforced the view that, unlike other areas 
of health care where professional provider pressure is a powerful 
influence on level of service provision, professionals have little  
authority in nursing home regulation and the resident can only expect 
a standard of care solely set within economic constraints imposed by 
the state. However, the Tribunal had a bottom line below which 
standards must not fall. So, while residents do not have rights to care 
on the same terms as sick people, they do have some minimal rights.
As noted in Chapter 3, nursing homes appear to operate with a “ social 
licence” (Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2004). In cases of cruelty, 
abuse, neglect or dishonesty, a home owner would be declared unfit 
and the home closed. Any care above this level is acceptable.
While residents do not have the same rights as others to health care, 
human rights legislation has been used in a way which appears to 
confound the regulatory intent to protect residents from poor quality 
care. In a recent decision (RHT 457), the Tribunal ruled that the 
Health Authority’s evidence about the state of health of the residents 
was inadmissible because the authority had not obtained consent from 
all residents to be examined. The majority of residents were so 
cognitively impaired that they could not give consent, but the Health 
Authority’s failure to get such consent from either residents or 
relatives violated the residents’ human rights. The Health Authority 
lost the case, and the nursing home where conditions were bad 
carried on operating. The irony is that, with the emphasis of human 
rights residents’ right to privacy is exerted over their rights to a 
standard of care, irrespective of their capacity to exercise or 
comprehend or enjoy their privacy.
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The effect of the Tribunal decisions is to obscure state policy and 
render it incomprehensible when judged by the requirements of 
services offered to the sick. When the economics of the industry and 
residents* needs conflict then the Tribunal only enforces needs at a 
very basic level. Thus care is “ adequate” and “ suitable”  for a person 
with fewer rights than someone who is sick. But the state’s influence 
over the operation of the Tribunal extended beyond reference to 
state’s legal and policy intent. The state, specifically the Department 
of Health, controlled the Tribunal’s procedural rules. Despite protests 
from the Council on Tribunals, for over two decades, the Department 
of Health allowed the Tribunal to operate with no formal rules 
regarding the filing of evidence and the negotiation of hearing dates. 
As a result the Tribunal’s activities were hampered by frequent 
cancellations and requests for adjournments. The protracted hearings 
allowed nursing home owners considerable advantage and generated a 
reluctance on the part of Health Authorities and inspectors to take 
actions which might result in appeals.
Other state instruments and relationships of control
The analysis above suggests that interpretation of regulatory rules or 
regulation in this sector cannot be fully understood from within the 
legal system circumscribed by the Registered Homes Act 1984. 
Moreover, the Act is not the only, or necessarily the most important, 
mechanism of control in this system. The state, one of the major 
defining forces in this regulatory space, has inculcated values through 
mechanisms which lie both inside and outside the framework of the 
1984 Act.
As described in Chapter 7, the development of the nursing home 
sector has enabled the NHS to withdraw from the responsibility of 
caring for frail, old people at the end of life who can no longer live 
independently. The Department of Health manages the market in 
nursing home places to broadly f it  with government policies for this
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client group. The evidence from Chapter 7 suggests that one of the 
major planks of this policy is severe cost constraint. With two thirds 
of nursing home places subsidised by the state (Laing and Buisson 
2000), the state is in effect the main purchaser of nursing home 
places. Mechanisms are in place to control the prices that the care 
home may charge to publicly funded residents. Thus the Department, 
through subsidies and other financial measures, has control over the 
supply of nursing homes places and the economics of the sector. In 
effect, the Department of Health is the economic regulator for the 
sector. There is now considerable evidence that these financial 
policies have created a marginal industry (Netten 2005) where large 
providers are favoured (Holden 2002) and residents' needs must be 
made to f i t  within cost constraints. In such industries, there are 
tendencies to “ cut corners” and the difficulties of regulating marginal 
industries are well known (Kagan 1994).
In terms of the legal framework, the Secretary of State for Health was 
responsible for drafting the nursing home regulations, and Health 
Authorities, accountable through the NHS to the Department of 
Health, were responsible for inspecting nursing homes and enforcing 
the 1984 Act. The Secretary of State also has powers in the 1984 Act 
to define the nature of the labour force in the sector and has not 
required doctors or other members of the modern health care team to 
be employed. Nursing homes are required to be in the charge of a 
“ qualified” nurse and employ “ qualified nurses” , but the 1984 Act 
gives the Secretary of State the power to define the qualifications 
required for a “ qualified nurse” (c25 (2)). And as noted above, the 
state has chosen not to construct “ qualified” as someone who has 
expertise in care of the elderly.
It is difficult to classify residents as “ sick” or “ dying” , because the 
resources generally available to such people in terms of professional 
relationships and expert knowledge are absent from nursing homes. 
Co-payment for nursing home care also provides a clear signal to the
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public that nursing homes are not part of the health care system 
which remains free at the point of delivery to the sick. Chapter 7 also 
outlined how nursing home residents are largely excluded from the 
collection of population statistics about health, with little  medical 
research in general on the problems of extreme old age. Information 
on which to base a comparison of the performance of homes is 
lacking. Although this lack of information could be explained by the 
contingencies of data collection and funding, the same is not true of 
implementation of the assessment for funding nursing care in nursing 
homes. This has been implemented with no requirement for 
standardised assessment tools. This suggests an intent to ensure that 
comparative information which might fuel a public debate about 
levels of care or geographical or other inequities cannot be produced. 
The general impoverishment of symbolic resources disrupts attempts 
by skilled actors to produce, elaborate and transmit a coherent image 
of the resident. Thus skilled actors cannot consolidate a site of power 
within the sector.
This thesis began with the assumption that the key actors, 
instruments, relationships and processes in nursing home regulation 
flow from the Registered Homes Act 1984. That is, the system of 
regulation consisted of the primary legislation and the relevant 
regulations, the enforcement system, the appeal system and the 
nursing homes themselves. The interpretive community for nursing 
home rules consisted of these elements. Following from this, images 
of the protected would be generated from within these traditional 
boundaries. However, the analysis above leads to the conclusion that 
on close inspection nursing home regulation is a "centred”  activity. 
But it  is one in which the responsibilities between industry, regulators 
and state become very blurred, obscuring the operations of power to 
the extent that informed debated becomes impoverished.
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THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF THE RESIDENT
So-called "participative regulation” is one way in which “ the 
protected” are increasingly being given a focus and a voice within 
regulation. Although the term has been given new impetus in 
environmental regulation and in consumer protection, its roots go 
back to the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. This Act was 
designed as a tripartite structure to fully involve the workers whom 
the legislation partly aimed to protect in the regulatory process 
(Hutter 2001). Rothstein (2004) suggests a number of reasons for the 
current vogue for participative regulation: providing a broader 
assessment of risk; ensuring the legitimacy of regulatory processes; 
and increasing public trust in the regulator. Clearly, there are a 
number of different ways of involving the public or the protected in 
regulatory processes. Rowe and Frewer (2005) suggest that there are 
three basic concepts for public involvement in general based on the 
flow of information: public communication, which consists of 
providing the public with information; public consultation, where 
information is communicated from the public to the regulator; and 
public participation, where there is a two-way dialogue or negotiation 
between the public and the regulator which aims to transfer the 
opinions of both. Compared with the regulatory regimes concerned 
with occupational health and safety, environment or food safety, 
nursing home regulation under the 1984 Act was a very closed system 
with litt le  public involvement. However, the new Commission for 
Social Care Inspection which took over in 2004 is more concerned with 
public involvement. The reports of inspection visits are available 
from its website, occasional reports about the compliance of the 
sector are also published, consultation processes have been mounted 
and the Commission is planning to pilot new ways of involving the 
public in inspection processes. All these processes may make the 
regulation of care homes more transparent and hence more 
legitimate. But little  public information is available about the 
sanctioning of care homes, for example, enforcement notices,
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withdrawals of registration or prosecutions. Given that information 
about the enforcement actions by the Health and Safety Executive 
against individual care homes is available, this seems a little  odd. As 
Rothstein (2004) notes, there is always a need to balance stakeholder 
interests in participative regulation and one of the most powerful 
stakeholders in nursing home regulation is the state.
The category or image of “ the patient” has been the subject of 
centuries of historical, social and cultural elaboration. This has 
produced an image, stabilised within any particular historic period, 
which governs the moral conduct of the health care professions and of 
people in general towards patients. Much of the training for health 
care professionals and their continued professional development is 
concerned with the further elaboration of this image and the 
professional's relationship to it  (Good 1995). In contrast, the image of 
“ the resident”  remains unstable -  unanchored by any fitting cultural 
definition. This precludes the expression of a clear ethical mandate 
towards this group. The lack of stable image means that the conduct 
of nursing homes and their regulation exist in a state of moral 
ambiguity. On the one hand, if residents are fu ll people with all 
relevant citizens' rights, then care should be provided on the same 
terms as the rest of the population -  that is, in line with 
professionally defined needs. Indeed, when scandals about nursing 
homes erupt, then experts -  doctors and nurses — are brought in to 
judge the nursing homes' deficiencies. Such judgements inevitably 
use the frame of expert health care with the resident framed as a sick 
person (see Livesley and Ellington 1996; Kingston and Richmond 
Health Authority 2002) as there is no other frame which can be openly 
justified. But through financial constraints and other mechanisms 
other values are insinuated. A lesser form of care is expected and the 
appropriation of resources, both financial and symbolic, from this 
group is acceptable. As a consequence, both inspector and managers 
must work with this ambiguous image, sharing a guilty secret. They 
cannot operate openly with this devalued image. For in doing so, they
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would place themselves outside the moral community which declares 
that all people are equal -  that old people -  our parents and elderly 
relatives -  have the same rights as the rest of the population, that 
they should be treated as individuals according to their needs. 
Residents and the conduct of nursing homes can thus be read from 
different and conflicting frames of reference — one ethical, the other 
with an unsettling moral provenance. Inspectors and nursing homes 
are reluctant to expose their work to the outside world for fear that 
external observers may read what they see in the wrong frame. This 
may account for the difficulties I had in getting access. A further 
consequence of this moral ambiguity is that it is difficult for staff to 
understand how the proper conduct of a nursing home should be 
organised and how, ethically, they should relate to residents. Where 
the framing of the resident is contested and morally incoherent then 
neglect and general poor standards can be negated by an alternative 
framing.
Both models of regulation outlined at the beginning of this chapter 
can be viewed as moral enterprises. In the compliance approach, 
there is expectation of understanding of the aims of regulation as 
socially desirable goals. Either firms operate according to a “ social 
licence” based on what is tolerated by wider society, or the aim of 
regulation must be to persuade them to do so (Scott 2003). In the 
deterrence model, the aim is justice achieved through a formal legal 
system. However, the expression of the purpose of regulation in 
terms of moral goals becomes very vexed in relation to nursing home 
regulation as “ the protected”  have a very ambiguous social status.
Cohen (1994), writing from an anthropological perspective, suggests 
that the relationship between old people and other groups is best 
understood by acknowledging the nature of generational politics. A 
central dynamic is the challenge posed to the continuity of the social 
body by the degeneration of each successive generation. In an act of 
intergenerational violence, individuals in the generation close to
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death who show the ominous symptoms of decay are symbolically 
separated from the social body by being denied access to the 
resources, economic and symbolic, that are attributed to full people 
-  that is, they are symbolically put to death. Cohen argues that 
social policy and much scholarship on old age avoids facing the true 
nature of this conflict and disguises the violence involved. There is a 
sense in which nursing home residents are separated from the social 
body and have their resources appropriated. Morality in this case 
cannot be construed as ensuring equality between nursing home 
residents and other groups. To be sure, the major inequalities 
between very elderly people and the rest of the population raise 
issues of social justice. Thus an appeal to legal empowerment or 
political action might seem appropriate. But such solutions, 
advocated for other disadvantaged groups, hardly seem appropriate 
for old people approaching death. There may be reasons why the 
articulation of the social goals of regulation may be difficult. 
Societies may have darker non-consensual ends.
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